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
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Military Affairs

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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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'Corrections' to Yazov Interview 'Omitted'

91UM0576A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 8, Feb 91 p 4

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, by Sergey Romanovskiy on the occasion of Soviet Army Day; place and date not given: "USSR Minister of Defense Dmitriy Yazov: 'For Some Reason, I End Up Being the Fall Guy'"]

[Text] *It appears that "February meetings" between SOBESEDNIK and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense are becoming a tradition. How does the life of the Soviet Army go on? What changes have occurred in it since we last met? It would be best to discuss this with a competent and honest interlocutor on Soviet Army and Navy Day, such as, for example, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, USSR minister of defense. However, in today's interview you will not find a word about the eternal problem of hazing [dedovshchina], prospects for switching to a professional army, and its might. Other events, which have little connection with the glorious army holiday but nonetheless directly affect the Armed Forces, have pushed the focus of our attention away from everything else.*

[Romanovskiy] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, at present the military is blamed for many offenses: Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius... Not a single "commotion" goes by without the army.

[Yazov] Perhaps, this is precisely why I was the first one to learn about the incident in Riga. At about 0100 hours, I was awakened by a phone call from the office of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Latvia Godmanis: "They are shooting here, in Riga! Did you give the order?" I asked: "Who is shooting?" "We do not know who, but they are shooting..." Several minutes later, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Rubiks called: "They are firing around here. What is happening, Dmitriy Timofeyevich?" After him, the military commissar called: "Somebody is laying aimed fire on the Commissariat!..." The voices of all of them trembled, the people were agitated. I said: "Can't you figure out yourselves over there what has happened? Which one of us is in Riga—you or I?" As you know, that night the Riga OMON [Special Missions Militia Detachment] got into a fire fight with the local militia. However, for some reason I ended up being the fall guy. They called Yazov first.

[Romanovskiy] Keep in mind that the fire fight in Latvia occurred just one week after the military seized the Vilnius TV center. Incidentally, what was your response to the events in Lithuania?

[Yazov] Unfavorable. I understood that they would once again drag the Army through the mud. This is why the first thing I did was to call the commander of the Baltic Military District, Colonel General Kuzmin. He is a quiet and steady man. I asked: "Who do you have in Vilnius?"

"General Ovcharov, my deputy." "Where is he now?" "I do not know for sure, but most likely with General Uskhopchik, commander of the Vilnius Division." I got in touch with Ovcharov: "What and why?" He answered: "This is what is happening. Local comrades have approached the division commander, asking him to provide aid and take control of television." "Who approached him?!" "Representatives of the Committee for National Salvation." "Who specifically?..." He fell silent, he did not know. You may not believe this, but I am still not familiar with the personal composition of the Lithuanian Salvation Committee though, perhaps, Uskhopchik has all the names.

[Romanovskiy] Have you talked to him?

[Yazov] I must have called him 50 times by now. He gives me different names all the time.

[Romanovskiy] This is indeed hard to believe. However, did General Uskhopchik at any rate explain to the minister of defense why he ordered that tanks be brought into the city?

[Yazov] He said that he wanted to delimit the confrontation.

[Romanovskiy] By using tanks?!

[Yazov] Yes. As a garrison commander, he is responsible for order in the city. However, there was no need to use tanks in Vilnius, as I see it. After all, even in Baku we did not send a single vehicle into the city. I asked Uskhopchik several times: "Why did you have to deploy tanks? You could have 'delimited' by armored personnel carriers. After all, they cannot be penetrated with a shotgun." I reprimanded him seriously on this account.

[Romanovskiy] What difference is there between tanks and armored personnel carriers? The main point is different: Very soon, they will begin to order paratroopers and military materiel as they order a taxi.

[Yazov] I understand your irony. At present, many democrats believe that the Committee for National Salvation is an unconstitutional organ. Is a strike committee a constitutional organ? However, the latter for some reason has a right to exist, arms workers, and does what it sees fit.

[Romanovskiy] However, striking workers do not solve their problems by using the regular army.

[Yazov] Sergey, we should take into account the situation which has emerged in our country. If you want to support the Army write this: Given general lawlessness, arbitrary rule may be expected of any organization. Landsbergis, who has trampled on the USSR Constitution and the civil rights of thousands of his fellow citizens, has committed an act of lawlessness. His opponents proceed from the Union laws, which they advocate verbally, quite as seldom. It is not surprising that the Army, having found itself between a rock and a hard place, facing chaos, at times violates the law itself.

Of course, the simplest thing to do at present is to hold Uskhopchik responsible: Indeed, he sent tanks to the streets; indeed, he imposed a curfew. However, think about this for a moment: Could it be that my subordinate indeed wanted to restore order in the city and avert still greater bloodshed?

[Romanovskiy] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, at present they talk and write a lot about "black colonels," USSR People's Deputies Petrushenko and Alksnis. I know that you had a serious talk with them.

[Yazov] They go overboard to no lesser extent than democrat deputies, but in the other direction. Recall this: Quite recently, the elected representatives of the people did nothing but voted "in favor" and applauded. They have now been given THE RIGHT. The day before yesterday, a deputy came to me, a former soldier, and said: "I would like to visit your dacha." Perhaps, he thought that everything is gold-plated there. However, setting out to detect abuses, he forgot for some reason that entering someone else's dwelling is in itself lawless. Or is it that the deputies can do anything at all?

It is the same with these colonels. Say, Alksnis is a well-read, educated officer; it is a pleasure to talk to him. However, he is combative: He is ready to stick it to the president himself. So to say, don't mess with us! It is possible that my notion of human integrity is old-fashioned, but this is how my mother, an illiterate collective farm member from Siberia, brought up her 10 children. Even having become a minister, I still cannot address a person who is my superior in terms of age or rank in a familiar manner. Indeed, I invited both Alksnis and Petrushenko in for a talk. I asked them: "Do you want to fight?" When they gave me an answer in the affirmative, I advised them to do it in their own name. One represents an election district in Kazakhstan, and another in Latvia. Why speak on behalf of the entire Armed Forces? Besides, modesty will do them good. Otherwise, you hear Petrushenko, Petrushenko everywhere... This name is getting old by now.

[Romanovskiy] However, following this meeting, Alksnis told journalists: Yazov smiled, and we understood that in his heart of hearts he was on our side.

[Yazov] You can say what you want about another person's heart, but you can never be sure. Of all their positions, I subscribe only to one—the struggle for preserving the union. I regret that presentations by Alksnis have become more aggressive since we had a talk.

[Romanovskiy] Recently, two of your colleagues, Vadim Bakatin and Eduard Shevardnadze, left ministerial offices. The latter was frequently rebuked for surrendering Soviet positions in Eastern Europe almost without a fight and withdrawing Soviet troops from there too rapidly.

[Yazov] Perhaps, I worked more harmoniously with Shevardnadze than with anyone else. However, we disagreed on quite a few things. You know that at present we are reducing armaments. However, the Americans will be able to come to our country for inspections more often than we will go to their country. Is this fair? Also, why can inspection flights proceed over the Soviet Union, but not over the United States?

Everything is not that simple with Bakatin either. We were stuck for two weeks in Baku with him and ate nothing but sandwiches. He is a man of integrity, a good man. Still, in all honesty: Who transferred the Baltic militia to republic control and made it strictly national? My friend Vadim Viktorovich. Why did he have to sign this treaty with the Estonians? After all, there is the USSR Constitution, and we should act within its framework... I do not think that someone wanted to offend Bakatin. I know that he was offered good positions of responsibility, up to that of vice president. However, Vadim Viktorovich refused. Turn off your tape recorder for a minute, I will say one sentence...

(The recording is interrupted, the minister discusses reasons for Shevardnadze's resignation, and we go on.)

[Romanovskiy] ...so, Dmitriy Timofeyevich, it turns out that the Americans are no longer afraid of us?

[Yazov] Of course, they are. We are also afraid of them. If the Union strikes, there will be no America. If they launch their missiles there will be nothing left of us. This is how we live in fear.

[Romanovskiy] Still, Shevardnadze's prophecy concerning the advent of a dictatorship appears to sound more realistic than World War III.

[Yazov] Listening to him was strange. On the one hand, this person says: Mikhail Sergeyevich is my friend. And... a dictatorship. Tell me who is going to be a dictator? Could the minister of defense be suspected of being power-hungry?

[Romanovskiy] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, nobody is counting you among "hawks." Apparently, there are no such extremists on Gorbachev's team. However, it is common knowledge that there are many conservatively-minded (not to use the word reactionary) military men among senior Soviet generals. For example, many Western observers associate the possibility of a dictatorship coming with one of your deputies, General Kochetov.

[Yazov] My deputies are people's deputies, and they have not shown themselves to be "hawks" in any public presentation at a session or a congress.

[Romanovskiy] Still, do you have differences with Kochetov?

[Yazov] I do not have differences with anyone. I am not a commander who turns a blind eye to failures to carry

out orders or insubordination. As the Ukrainians say, "I said so, and you execute" [published in Ukrainian], end of discussion.

(The minister gently banged his fist against the table, and I involuntarily blurted out this question:)

[Romanovskiy] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, will you be able to keep all of them in check?

[Yazov] We have been so far. However, the shakier the country is the more difficult it becomes. After all, the Army is a copy of our society.

(Reflecting for a moment, my interlocutor added:)

It is difficult for us at present. However, it is even more difficult for the president. He carries the entire burden, all criticism is directed against him. I frequently think: How can I help him? After all, last fall, when the crop was being lost, he did not order me, he just asked: "Help me, do what you can." While journalists gossiped about potatoes (including in SOBESEDNIK), soldiers were digging them up day and night.

[Romanovskiy] Do you communicate with the president often?

[Yazov] Almost every day. I report to him daily on the situation in the Persian Gulf.

[Romanovskiy] However, the president also cares about the military. No sooner had the paint dried on the order you and Pugo issued concerning joint patrols than Gorbachev supported it by a special ukase.

[Yazov] I only signed this order because the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] did not have enough of its own resources.

[Romanovskiy] And you did not notice that it runs counter to the USSR Constitution...

[Yazov] It does not. Yours is contrarian logic. When they rob and kill this does not run counter to the Constitution, but as soon as the struggle against crime is stepped up some, it does.

[Romanovskiy] I know that lawyers from the legal administration of the USSR MVD made an unfavorable recommendation on the joint order (to be sure, Pugo signed it anyway). Did military lawyers analyze this document?

[Yazov] Of course. They compared the draft order with the manual at the Administration of Affairs, and they found no variance.

[Romanovskiy] Would it not have been better to compare it with the Constitution?

[Yazov] The Manual of Garrison Duties is a constitutional document. It has been adopted by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Servicemen will help militia employees in extreme situations only: for example, when they apprehend armed criminals.

[Romanovskiy] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, why do they need armored personnel carriers?

[Yazov] We do not have other transportation vehicles. Certainly, no one will drive them for no reason—the patrols move on foot. However, if the boys run into some mafia and a fire fight begins—this is, as they say, when you pull out all the stops. You do know what is happening in our country: Weapons change hands, disappear from depots...

[Romanovskiy] At a meeting with the editorial board of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, you admitted that Armenian warrant officers had to be quietly removed from the positions of chiefs of weapons depots. Was there a special directive to this effect?

[Yazov] No, I could not have issued such a directive: This would have been reminiscent of the deportation of the peoples, the year 1937. We had to couch it in general terms: Study the people and retain the worthiest as depot attendants. We did not use the words "Armenians" or "Georgians." However, weapons keep disappearing to this day. Recently, President of Azerbaijan Mutalibov sent me a coded message: Find 160 flame throwers stolen from a military unit. An Armenian is chief of the chemical service there, and an Armenian is the depot chief. I have no proof of their guilt, but the flame throwers are missing nonetheless. At present, the Azeris are sitting there and thinking how many of their houses these flame throwers may incinerate.

[Romanovskiy] During our previous meeting a year ago, you were a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. However, at the 28th congress you, as well as many soldiers of "the old guard," were not elected to the political leadership of the CPSU. Be honest with us: Did the Army succeed in getting rid of the party dictate? Is it any easier for you without this burden?

[Yazov] What can I tell you... I have not noticed that it is easier.

EDITORIAL NOTE

The law does not require that a journalist have an interview endorsed by the person interviewed. However, our correspondent proposed to D.T. Yazov to meet again and proofread the galleys in order to avoid inaccuracies. Such a meeting took place. Having assessed the interview favorably on the whole, the minister asked Chief of the Press Center of the Ministry of Defense Major General G.P. Kashuba to refine some details. Unfortunately, Gennadiy Panteleyevich approached this crucial assignment so "creatively" that, as a result of his corrections, it was difficult to grasp the original meaning of the words of the minister. For example, the point of view of the minister concerning the Lithuanian events was considerably abridged, and a negative evaluation of

the actions of General Uskhopchik by Yazov disappeared. Another correction which grossly distorted the words and position of the minister was also made. Moreover, the pen of the vigilant general swept even the words of our correspondent. Alas, this is reminiscent of the times when the newspaper not only could be left without an answer but also deprived of the very right to a question.

Of course, the chief of the press center of the Ministry of Defense is entitled to his own view of the events, and he may disagree with his bosses on some points. However, since we, after all, interviewed the USSR minister of defense rather than the chief, the editorial board of SOBESEDNIK decided to omit the corrections made by the journalist-general. Having read this interview as it was recorded on tape, you will certainly appreciate the sincerity and straightforwardness of our interlocutor.

We congratulate Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov and his Army on the forthcoming professional holiday and hope that in February 1992 we will meet with the minister of defense again, as we have agreed.

Moiseyev: 'Massed Offensive on Our Army'

91UM0570A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 9, Feb 91 pp 10-11

[Interview with General of the Army M. Moiseyev, first deputy USSR defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by L. Chernenko, "on the eve of Soviet Army and Navy Day"; place not given: "Defense: Roots and Crown"]

[Text] This could not have been foreseen even by the most consummate military strategists. A massed offensive on our Army has begun. Not from the West, not from the East, but from left and right. It is to be found in the "parade of sovereignties" and in the "war of laws," at mass meetings, in papers which have "turned yellow," and on the television screen. A routine redeployment of units is declared to be preparations for a military coup. Joint patrolling, steps toward dictatorship. On our own territory Soviet soldiers are called "occupation forces."

The events in this "military theater," unforeseen by any strategic plans, are at times resulting in tragedies, at times, in calamity, and sometimes, in farce. But even under these difficult conditions, under the fire of criticism, the vast army mechanism continues to operate meticulously. Missile launcher crewmen, air defense men, and pilots are performing their operational duty. Drills are proceeding according to plan, and field training exercises are being conducted. The Army is in a state of combat readiness from A to Z. On the eve of Soviet Army and Navy Day, our correspondent met with General of the Army M. Moiseyev, first deputy USSR defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

[Chernenko] Mikhail Alekseyevich! Under the conditions of the growth of distrust in the authorities, the crisis in the economy, the sharply increased separatism

and interethnic conflicts, the Army remains one of the few structures continuing to operate precisely. How is this being achieved? Could the Army, without resorting to force, be a factor of stabilization of the situation in the country?

[Moiseyev] There has been no shortage of late of forecasts of the future of our state, pessimistic included. Many people believe that the domestic political situation is approaching the critical mark beyond which the collapse of the state structure and economic cataclysms will inevitably follow. In my view, the most dangerous of all the social upheavals for our society is the bloodshed in the attempts to untie the knots of interethnic conflicts. Under these conditions formations and units of the USSR Armed Forces, which have operated in conjunction with the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs authorities and interior forces, have been called in to protect the lives, honor, and dignity of USSR citizens, of national minorities, as a rule, and maintain public order.

It is well known that the main purpose of the army of a state with any social and political system is to provide for its external security. At the same time, however, the army, possessing great human and technical resources, has always participated actively in the solution of various problems of society—from the elimination of the consequences of natural and environmental disasters through the accomplishment of national economic assignments. And it has to be said that this army activity has not evoked the discontent of anyone and that no one has cited articles of laws on the wrongful nature of enlisting the armed forces in the harvesting or the rescue of earthquake victims.

The reaction to the armed forces' operations in respect to the protection of legality and law and order has been entirely different. As a result a negative attitude toward the Army has been formed in a short space of time by the efforts of certain mass media, pacifist sentiments are being propagandized actively, and there are incessant political attempts to pull apart the armed forces into national apartments and counterpose to the Army the people also. All this is evidence that the leaders of various political currents and their supporters recognize the significance of the Army as a guarantor of the stability of society and statehood and are for this reason, for the achievement of their selfish interests, exerting considerable effort to break down the unity of army structure.

The mechanism of the stability of the USSR Armed Forces is simple. Each structure, an army structure included, has a certain content characterized by the aims and tasks and methods of their accomplishment. The purpose, aims and tasks of the USSR Armed Forces are determined by the USSR Basic Law—the country's Constitution. And however contradictory the social consciousness, each honest citizen of the Soviet Union is aware that, as a member of the armed forces, he is called upon to defend his fatherland, his parents and his beloved and defend values common to all mankind. The

times of the "cold war" are becoming a thing of the past, but the danger of aggression arising continues at an extraordinarily high level. These are the realities of the modern world, which should be equally comprehensible to both the statesman and the ordinary citizen.

While opposed to a further exacerbation of social relations and condemning the separatist aspirations of political demagogues, we believe that the power of the Army should not be used in the solution of conflict situations born of such a policy. The forces and resources of the law enforcement authorities in our country are sufficient for this.

As far as the Army is concerned, any use thereof should correspond to the defense act, which has still to be adopted. Prior to enactment of the law, a decision on the use of the Armed Forces may be adopted only by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in extreme cases, by the president of the country.

The Armed Forces are and may be a factor of stabilization of the situation in the country even without resorting to force inasmuch as their potential presence is a guarantor of the security primarily of the state itself and, in its person, all citizens also.

[Chernenko] Despite the "thaw" in the international climate, Soviet people cannot fail to be disturbed by the fate of the Warsaw Pact. How will the impending departure from the stage of this military-political bloc be reflected in our country's security? What structures will replace it? How will the European security system currently being created correspond to the interests of all participating states?

[Moiseyev] In our opinion, an evaluation of the changes occurring in Europe is possible only from the standpoint of the ideals, ultimate goals, and means of achieving them which have become the foundation of Soviet foreign policy based on the new political thinking. The concept of the common European home organically combining within it such concepts as respect for state sovereignty and extensive cooperation and all aspects of mutual security has won general recognition. It would seem from these standpoints that European security based on bloc structures has no future and is serving as an obstacle to integration processes in the economic and humanitarian fields.

The methods and approaches of a solution of military-political questions which existed earlier came into conflict with the new forms of interstate relations of the Warsaw Pact countries. This, in turn, predetermined the need for and possibility of a revision of the entire set of relations of the allied countries and the evolution of the goals and tasks of the Warsaw Pact as a military-political alliance. The Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (June 1990) confirmed the concerted opinion of the need for politicization of the Warsaw Pact. In the course of mutual consultations the participants concluded that there is no need under the new conditions to preserve the previous

forms of close military cooperation, assuming it possible to tackle the tasks of safeguarding national security independently.

As far as the USSR's national security interests are concerned, both now and in the future, the effective combat strength of its Armed Forces will ensure the inviolability of the state borders of the USSR, a stop to encroachments on the sovereignty of our motherland and the guaranteed repulse of aggression. This will undoubtedly be possible only within the framework of a strong, united Soviet state.

In addition, the winding down of the military structures of the Warsaw Pact by no means signifies a winding down of military cooperation with our present allies altogether. We are, as before, open to various forms thereof, primarily on a bilateral basis, proceeding from the principles of mutual advantage and preventing any infringement of the interests of other countries. In a word, we stand on the threshold of the creation of extra-bloc structures of European security.

[Chernenko] Are there problems in the cooperation of the military, politicians, and diplomats in formulating and implementing the policy of disarmament and preparing the corresponding treaties and agreements?

[Moiseyev] Generally speaking, this question has become so hackneyed of late that I do not care to bring it up once again. To speak about this unequivocally, it should be said that, yes, there are problems. But, on the other hand, were there no different viewpoints in the approach to a solution of these problems, why would the cooperation of the military, politicians, and diplomats in formulating and implementing the policy of disarmament and preparing the corresponding treaties and agreements be necessary. A one-man volitional decision would be sufficient in this case. And it is very good that we have long since departed from such lamentable "experience."

An interdepartmental body for supporting the negotiating process in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament has long been functioning quite efficiently with us. It is composed of representatives of the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and other interested ministries and departments. Practically all decisions in the sphere of the negotiations are discussed and formulated collegially.

Of course, such discussion does not always go smoothly, without arguments. But this is an entirely natural process. As a result, mutually acceptable decisions in keeping with the interests of the state, by which Soviet delegations at the negotiations are guided, are found, as a rule. The main principle, on the basis of which the general line in respect to the formulation of our positions at the negotiations is pursued and the corresponding treaties and agreements are concluded, is that of security, given reduced levels of arms. In other words, the security

of our state is the main and determining goal. The military, politicians, and diplomats are devoted to this goal in complete accord.

[Chernenko] The Western press and the statements of officials have reproached the USSR in respect to compliance with the terms of the conventional arms treaty. It has been a question, specifically, of the large-scale redeployment of combat hardware beyond the Urals and the incorporation of Army divisions in the Navy and the KGB. Does the West have grounds for such rebukes?

[Moiseyev] Truly, the Western press has recently been engaged in a veritable campaign, in the course of which Soviet policy in the sphere of arms limitation has been shamelessly distorted. The main emphasis here is being put on the fact that the Soviet Union is allegedly failing to comply with the conditions of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. In other words, it is being said that the Soviet side has deliberately withdrawn from the purview of the treaty a large number of arms by way of their transfer beyond the Urals and also transferred several Army divisions to the jurisdiction of the Navy.

This does not correspond to the truth. In reality these divisions were transferred to the Navy in mid-1988, that is, prior to the formulation and signing (10 January 1989) of the mandate of the negotiations in Vienna on conventional armed forces. These measures were carried out in the course of realization of the plans for the transition to a defensive doctrine. The divisions are intended to enhance our fleets' possibilities pertaining to position defense in the face of the growing power of the U.S. and NATO navies. We did not conceal the fact of the creation from them of coastal defense forces and at the time of the exchange of data on the eve of the signing of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Paris presented full information on these formations and units. In addition, we agreed, in accordance with its demand, to the West's supervision.

At the time of formulation of the mandate of the Vienna negotiations we insisted that naval forces, including such an inalienable part thereof as coastal defense forces, be incorporated in the subject of the negotiations. But because of the hard-line position of the United States and its NATO allies, this proposal of ours was not accepted. Ultimately we agreed to concessions, and at the insistence of the Western countries the mandate of the negotiations signed by all the participants incorporated a provision to the effect that the negotiations "will not examine naval forces."

It is strange that, knowing the true state of affairs in this sphere, some officials of Western countries are unceasing in their insinuations on this issue.

They are confronting us with another question also: In July 1988, the Soviet Union announced that in the ground forces in Europe it had 41,500 tanks, and as of 19 November 1990—the date the treaty was signed—approximately 21,000 tanks. Where are the rest?

We made and make no secret of this. Almost 21,000 tanks were withdrawn in the said period from the effective combat strength in the European part of our country in the course of the unilateral reduction in the Armed Forces, at the time of their transition to a defensive structure and also in the process of the withdrawal of forces from the East European countries. Of these, 8,000 were sent to the Asian part of the country for the rearmament and additional provisioning of the forces, approximately 8,400 were deployed at storage depots in Western Siberia and Central Asia, and 4,100 tanks were written off (broken up for scrap and converted). All these measures were undertaken long before the signing of the treaty, of which representatives of the highest echelon of power of the Western countries were opportunely notified. Thus tanks and other types of arms were transferred beyond the Urals outside of the framework of the treaty, and, consequently, we are not bound by any treaty commitments here.

As far as the transfer of an airborne division to the jurisdiction of the USSR Committee for State Security is concerned, this measure also was carried out prior to the signing of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe and is not contrary to its provisions. Everyone knows about the incident that occurred on the Soviet-Iranian border in January of last year, when the border was opened in the area of Nakhichevan over a length of 200 km. This required of the country's leadership an immediate decision aimed at a strengthening of the border forces.

Summing up what has been said, I would emphasize that the Soviet Union is pursuing an honest and scrupulous policy aimed at the strengthening of peace and stability. It attaches importance here to unwavering compliance with the commitments it has assumed in accordance with international treaties and agreements. And I would not want a variety of insinuations on this score to jeopardize a most important achievement of recent years—trust, the very foundation of the all-European process.

[Chernenko] While knowing the shortcomings of our civilian technology, we are accustomed meanwhile to believing that the Army has equipment and arms at the level of world standards and higher even. But voices have been heard in the press recently saying that our submarines make far more noise than the American submarines, we are lagging behind in our aircraft and electronics and that we more often than not compensate for these shortcomings in the sphere of combat hardware quantitatively. Is this the case?

[Moiseyev] Comparing the tactical and technical specifications of the arms and military equipment of the USSR and the United States and evaluating the state of development of most important military technology, it may be concluded that arms development in our country and with the Americans proceeds along axes which are close.

National arms as a whole are not inferior, and in a number of specifications, superior, to their U.S. counterparts. Thus our strategic missile systems have high combat indicators ensuring parity in this type of armament. In terms of tank and artillery arms, the USSR has as of the present maintained its advantage over the United States and NATO. Our armed forces are equipped with salvo-fire artillery and rocket systems without, in terms of power and design perfection, parallel in foreign armies. The lack of infrared sights and modern fire-control automation facilities reduces the efficiency of their combat use, it is true.

Our MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters and military transport aircraft are not in terms of their flight-engineering specifications inferior to their best foreign counterparts. But the United States has the lead in the creation of low-signature aircraft of the Stealth type and continues to maintain leading positions in aircraft radar, thermal-imaging equipment and on-board computers. As far as the submarines are concerned, ours are truly somewhat inferior in terms of engineering level to the Americans' and make more noise, although in terms of the basic operational indicators the nuclear-powered missile-firing submarines of the USSR Navy and the U.S. Navy are, as a whole, identical.

Thus, while roughly equal in terms of a number of specifications, national arms are, as distinct from the best overseas models, somewhat behind in respect to saturation with electronic and optical-electronic facilities and data-processing and transmission hardware.

[Chernenko] Does the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the East European countries continue? What problems are you encountering here? What, in your view, needs to be done to ensure that this unprecedented action is painless?

[Moiseyev] The most painful question here, of course, is connected with the fix-up and provisioning of the forces withdrawn from the East European countries and Mongolia and provision of the officers and warrant officers and their families with apartments, hostels, kindergartens, schools, medical institutions, and other general amenities in their new deployment areas. As of the present, the number of servicemen without apartments has already reached 192,000. Under the conditions of the withdrawal of forces from Germany, which has begun, and their anticipated withdrawal from Poland this figure will increase to 250,000.

In addition, the agreements with the FRG pertaining to realization of the housing construction program for the forces withdrawn from German territory could be in jeopardy in view of the fact that the local authorities of a number of areas are dragging out the concordance of questions pertaining to the accommodation of the withdrawn forces and decisions on the allocation of land for the impending construction, putting forward unacceptable conditions in respect to engineering support for the

construction sites and development of the facilities of the construction materials industry and the infrastructure of the cities.

Property and financial questions, which the Defense Ministry is tackling in conjunction with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, have not been settled conclusively either. There are fundamental differences with the leadership of the countries in which our forces are temporarily based in respect to key questions on the timeframe and mechanism of the payments for the stocks, real estate, and military-engineering property which we hand over.

In our view, it is essential for a solution of the whole set of questions connected with the withdrawal of the forces to accelerate the elaboration by the USSR Cabinet and the examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet of a comprehensive state program for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the East European countries and their fix-up and provisioning on the territory of the Soviet Union. It is necessary to step up the negotiations with the government of Poland on the through passage of our forces withdrawn from the FRG and the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces within a timeframe satisfactory to both parties.

[Chernenko] Has the perestroika which is currently occurring in the Army affected the General Staff? What changes have occurred in this "brain" of our Armed Forces? What qualities should an officer working on the General Staff possess?

[Moiseyev] The radical changes currently under way in our country and in the Armed Forces have affected all aspects of the life and activity of the General Staff. The range of tasks which it performs has expanded. Aside from the traditional tasks, new ones connected with the prevention of war, military reform, support for the negotiating processes pertaining to a reduction in conventional and nuclear arms, the elaboration of legislative instruments on defense issues and conversion, and also the withdrawal of forces from East Europe and Mongolia have emerged.

Simultaneously a great deal of work is being performed by the General Staff in the sphere of both the theoretical interpretation of doctrinal propositions and the use of the Armed Forces under the new conditions and the practical planning of their strategic operations in a link with the elaboration of specific questions pertaining to the creation of defensive groupings of forces and their manpower acquisition and re-outfitting and supplies and other measures ensuring the country's high defense capability and the combat readiness of the Army and Navy.

This makes it incumbent upon us to perfect the style and methods of our work and promptly and in high-quality fashion tackle the assignments that confront us and those that arise, given an appreciable reduction in the managerial machinery. Whence ensue objective demands on the professional training of our generals and officers. They must possess a high degree of theoretical training

and great professional skills, a general scientific and political outlook, good organizing capabilities, and an ability to work with operational staffs and large military outfits, interact with specialists of other ministries and departments and, of course, be selflessly devoted to their cause and their fatherland. An absolute majority of the generals and officers of the General Staff corresponds to these requirements and is working selflessly in the areas of work assigned them.

The restructuring processes have directly affected the party organization of the General Staff also. A General Staff party committee was created in the Armed Forces for the first time at the recent party conference. The secretary of the party committee was elected publicly, by show of hands. Colonel V. Samokhvalov, an officer with great experience of life and service who has risen from platoon commander to division chief of staff and who has given more than 10 years of service to the General Staff, was elected secretary.

A process of rejuvenation is currently under way in the General Staff, and officers who have graduated from military academies and from the field are being brought in. They have to assimilate duties new to them as quickly as possible in order to prevent the least decline in the effectiveness of control of the Armed Forces in the complex international and domestic political situation.

Muslim Cleric Lauds Ties With Military

91UM05634 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Kazi Zakhidzhan, deputy chairman, Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, by Lt Col S. Bagdasarov: "We Have Supported and Will Support the Army!"; date and place not given; first four paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] It must be admitted that our life is changing in a fundamental manner! What was impossible yesterday is today a reality; what was forbidden is entirely permissible. Even religion has become for us an integral part of our society's life.

What changes has this brought? Are we putting aside our principles and convictions? Or has this given rise to a two-way discussion with clerics, so that we can find a way out, not from the political and economic crisis in which the country presently finds itself, but of the crisis of our morality, of our soul?

That is why I, in setting out to meet with the deputy chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, wanted to become better acquainted with those who until recently were excluded from public activity.

I was able to achieve my goal. Kazi Zakhidzhan was surprisingly pleasant and interesting to speak with.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Respected Kazi! The perestroika process has touched virtually all areas of our society's life. Changes are coming about in people's everyday living and in their consciousness. To what extent is this process reflected in the activity of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan?

[Zakhidzhan] I shall start off by saying that a perestroika has not been required by our activity, nor is it now or I hope will be required in the future. This is in respect to our faith. How can it be restructured?

Nonetheless, we are indebted to perestroika for the reality of the Law on Freedom of Conscience; for the recent opening of many new mosques and the restoration of old ones that the government has returned to us. For example, it is planned to erect in Fergana Valley a Muslim spiritual secondary school; a divinity school in Bukhara; in Tashkent, a new school building and a dormitory for students attending the Islamic Institute.

More religious literature is being published, with new printings of the Koran in Uzbek.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How many mosques are there in Central Asia and Kazakhstan?

[Zakhidzhan] I cannot give you an exact answer, since new information is arriving on that score with every passing day. I can however say that in Uzbekistan until 1989 there were only 85 major mosques, while today there are about 400.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is no secret that there are believers serving in the military. It was only recently that they encountered difficulties in performing their religious rites. Now, military authorities are meeting them half-way. However, not all military stations have a mosque. What are Muslim servicemen to do in that case?

[Zakhidzhan] Authorities in military units, complying with the new legislation, do not hinder Muslim servicemen in their performance of religious rites. We are very pleased that the Ministry of Defense and the Turkestan Military District have adopted this position.

However, what is the Muslim soldier to do if the nearest mosque is located hundreds of kilometers away? This of and by itself is not a particular problem for a believer: He can say his prayers without being in a mosque. I do not see any particular tragedy in that. This is so of course if the military unit will make available for Muslim servicemen a special building where they can feel free to recite their prayers the five times without detriment to the service, thus rendering a further contribution to our spiritual repose.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Respected Kazi, the country's Armed Forces are experiencing difficult times. There has been an increase in verbal assaults, so to speak, and in physical assaults. This has resulted in a growing number

of refuseniks, with conscripts in compulsory service committing desertion. How do you feel about this situation?

[Zakhidzhan] The Koran teaches via the sayings of the Prophet that youth must always resist an enemy. Preparing oneself to protect the Motherland, the home and the family is a sacred duty of the Muslim.

We have required and presently do require a guaranteed defense. We stand for the Army. And so, if we permit its moral fiber and fighting power to be weakened, we can lose much. I do not see anything that would cause youths to escape from military service. That is their sacred duty.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nonetheless, many of them do not understand that or refuse to understand that. They use any excuse to generate distrust of the Army and foment in society an unhealthy attitude toward people who wear the uniform. A recent proof of this is the "polemics" launched against the USSR Presidential Ukase on Interaction Between the Militia and the USSR Armed Forces in the Maintenance of Law and Order in the Struggle Against Crime. The main "argument" offered by the orators—if we may call them that—is: Grant the Army freedom and a coup in the country is inevitable. We have but to recall the tragic events occurring in Osh, Namangan and Dushanbe.

[Zakhidzhan] Honestly, I do not understand such people. Do we not need universal order?

One can easily see that there are among our fellow citizens those who abuse democracy in their striving to gain power. They employ mass disorders to make political capital, and, even worse, provoke religious conflicts. Who can stand up to them? The militia unfortunately does not always have sufficient forces to deal with that. It is difficult to imagine what kind of outcome there would have been in the case of the tragic events that occurred, say, in Dushanbe and Osh, were it not for the men and officers of the Soviet Army and MVD troops. For that they should be thanked, not vilified.

Also, there can be no doubt about the Presidential Ukase. Such action is still necessary, since it does at least something to insure order.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Regardless of what may be going on in our country, what we may be doing, what our concerns may be, we cannot help but be troubled by the reports of combat activities coming from the Persian Gulf. The USA has introduced troops there under the pretence of liberating Kuwait. However, more peaceful citizens have been killed in Iraq than in Kuwait. Is this a case of liberating some people by bombing others?

[Zakhidzhan] That is indeed a painful situation. Let me remind you that we sincerely condemned Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. We are also sincere in our grieving over spilled blood, both Muslim and other.

I however will not hide the fact that we are surprised by the position adopted by Western countries, including the

USA, Great Britain and France. Iraq did not carry out the numerous UN resolutions, so they lined up against it. Israel on the other hand has been ignoring the UN, but they fail to take measures in this regard. This incidentally is a fairly powerful trump Hussein holds relative to his political relations with the Arab world.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Respected Kazi, does it appear to you that our conversation may be somewhat depressing, with our discussing the country's difficult situation and the strife rampant in the Arab area? Our readers may complain that they cannot take another discussion about problems.

[Zakhidzhan] That is the kind of life we have; we experience sadness and difficulty. However, is that a reason for despondency? The Koran teaches us to be strong in spirit.

Relative to problems, well, that is the way of mankind: Some people do not get along, while others live in harmony as good-natured and wise neighbors.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Incidentally, about neighborliness. In Tashkent there also is the Diocesan Administration of the Russian Orthodox Church. How does this affect your relations? Are the two religions able to coexist?

[Zakhidzhan] The relations could not be better. We exchange greetings on religious holidays and other days, get together for tea. In fact, Vladika Lev (presently working in other areas)—the bishop of the Tashkent and Central Asian Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church—did himself represent our Mufti in the election campaign! Is this not the highest proof of our good interrelationships?

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What can you say about interrelationships with various political, social and unofficial organizations?

[Zakhidzhan] Politics does not come within our area of interest. Nonetheless, I repeat that we are frightened by the fact that some persons active in this area employ various methods and means to produce both political and factual capital for themselves by exploiting people's grief and suffering. I do not care to go into detail, but, to answer your question, I shall say that hypocrisy and deceit have become an integral part of the activity of certain newly-created political and social organizations. This of and by itself works against our faith, indeed against everybody's spirituality.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Now for the last question, respected Kazi. Between the Turkestan Military District and the leadership of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems there has arisen what may truly be called strong businesslike ties. What benefits have accrued, and should these contacts be established even more firmly?

[Zakhidzhan] I can answer that without hesitating. The contacts with the military are a reason for rejoicing.

We are sorely troubled by the spiritual state of youth. Young people often act so thoughtlessly! Mostly due to the fact that parents and society have somewhere diminished their influence on them, have neglected something in bringing them up. We should help youth to acquire spiritual repose, assume proper attitudes toward everyday living. The point here is that soldiers are the same young people who are prone to make mistakes and errors in judgement. In a word, it seems to us that our working jointly with the district's military authorities will have a positive influence on the moral and spiritual state of Turkestan servicemen, thus affecting their willingness to defend in times of difficulty their home, family and Motherland.

Republic Paramilitary Formations Assailed

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16 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by Major V. Kazakov: "National Armies: The Obvious and the Secret—Subjective Notes"]

[Text] Today the words "the war of laws" literally are never off the pages of the newspapers, but it seems that a far more dreadful meaning is hidden behind them. The requirements of the USSR president's ukase on the disbandment and disarming of illegal militarized formations have not yet been met, although the representatives of authority on the spot give assurances that this work has been accomplished. What is more, there has been intensive creation of militarized structures in recent months in some republics that have declared their sovereignty, and demands are being made on central authorities to make arms available to them... There was shooting from both sides. As far as one could determine there was firing not only from hunting guns and small caliber rifles but from pistols and automatic weapons, and even a projectile whistled overhead and exploded somewhere beyond the kitchen gardens. Suddenly, the gunfire abated, and then quickly stopped entirely: A military column was moving at top speed to the scene of the skirmish...

All I have to do is close my eyes and terrible sequences unfold in my mind of Armenian pogroms, the wild eyes of barefoot Azerbaijani women on mountain passes who wrap little children up in soldiers' duffel coats... The real image of military formations that are being promoted by the "national idea" and with impunity is frightening!

In my opinion, it was in Armenia and Azerbaijan that the first attempt was made to recreate national and "independent" armies. It is not accidental that local newspapers frequently carried the words "people's army" and "people's home guard," but those in the headquarters of the People's Army of Azerbaijan and the Armenian Pan-National Movement were even insulted when correspondents called the unshaven and not quite sober people militants, and they were advised to call them "fighters," "defenders," and "soldiers." Through the connivance of the authorities the militia was disarmed, the incidents of attacks on military installations

increased, and the military training equipment of DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] and the military departments of VUZ's [higher educational institutions] were almost openly turned over to latter-day "regiments." A T-34 tank was taken down from its pedestal in Victory Park in Yerevan, repaired, and sent to one of the rayons of the resistance. Monsters attired in armor were built hastily in republic automobile enterprises out of lifting cranes, excavators, and Japanese bulldozers. Clothing shops sewed camouflage attire and military uniforms. Battalions, companies, subunits, platoons, and groups were created. Letters were sent to countrymen in military units throughout the Union with proposals to desert, steal weapons, and head for home. In large headquarters of national formations, independent organs of security, intelligence, and counterintelligence functioned. To adopt these methods, emissaries from the Western Ukraine and the Baltics came to Yerevan and Baku. All told, according to operational data, more than 100,000 persons from both sides were mobilized to reinforce the terrorists.

But the combat operations did not take on a large scale: Internal Troops and Soviet Army units were brought, though belatedly, into the region and to the borders of the republics, whom the "democrats" once again hastened to blame for the carnage unleashed by extremists.

In a private conversation one of the leaders of the nationalists (I will not mention his name, I will say only that today he holds a prominent post in the republic government) told me: "We were just one month short of completing work on the establishment of our own national people's army. But the experience that has been acquired and the already evolved structure can be useful in the future. Although I am now disturbed by those weapons that are in unknown hands..."

And so hundreds of people sustained wounds, severe injuries, and were killed. Enormous material damage was inflicted on the republics, and thousands of residents were deprived of shelter and work. Whole groups of social outcasts appeared with the contemptible names of "bakarms," "yerazes," and "Russian-speaking refugees." This is the visible side—there is also another less noticeable side, one that is presented by the newspapers as a "natural process of democratization": People also came to power who, in fact, incited the people to fratricide. After becoming "legally elected" representatives of authority, many of them hastened to join the market. Particularly since the path there is extremely easy—hold a republic and municipal post, with personal participation (or that of close relatives) in a large and small business, in the creation of commercial banks, joint-stock companies, and consumers associations. These selfish motives are also one of the reasons for such a hasty attempt to establish national armies and to assign mostly police functions to them. The bloody flywheel of Tskhinvali events is picking up speed. True, information from there is scanty, and the "democratic" press did not raise a great fuss. There are several reasons for this. In

the first place, Internal Troops and paratroopers are not taking an active part in the interethnic conflict—but you will not, in fact, hold up your "brother democrat" to shame!

There is one more reason for this silence. Taking the experience of their neighbors into account, the Georgian "democrats" are changing tactics: The combat nucleus of their militarized organizations (the type of "black falcons" and "georgiyevtsy" who were sent to South Ossetia "to establish order") were reinforced not by "people's home guards" but by militia who were fully mobilized for this, which made it possible to legalize the employment of weapons. Nadar G., one of the "field commanders" (probably analogous to the leaders of the mujahidin), told me quite openly about the true purpose of such "operations": "Even before the establishment of independence we had to form our own Georgian army, whose core would be our detachments, which were already tried in battle. Our ultimate aim was supremacy in the Caucasus. Today there is no shortage of soldiers, and while there is a shortage of weapons this is a matter of time and political steps on the part of our leaders.

The actions of such armies, which were made public today, are astonishing in their cruelty. It is naive to think that they are being committed by some kind of peculiar cruel monsters or inhuman individuals. However terrible it may be, people who are outwardly ordinary, as a rule from 17 to 30 years of age, are killing, raping, burning houses, and torturing old people. What makes them like this? I will quote a statement by S. Gamsakhurdia which was published recently in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA: "...thousands of the best arable land areas ended up in the hands of the non-Georgian population," "the non-Georgian population is multiplying at catastrophic rates," "we will make short work of all traitors, we will call for an appropriate response, and we will expel from Georgia all malicious enemies, non-Georgians who have found shelter here." The mass media are multiplying the leader's guiding instructions and drilling them into the heads of the people. Inconspicuously and gradually, nationalism is being raised to the state level. A picture is being formed in the consciousness of the average citizen of an enemy whose persecution and destruction will make it possible to live better and more fully...

I want to note that such a process of making a fool of the population is one of the common features of today's "national revival." Various militarized nationalistic and pro-fascist organizations are quickly being resurrected or legalized for this purpose. And what is most dangerous is that it is they who are intended by many for the role of nucleus of the future national army.

I would like to make the reservation that the word "army," which, by the way, is extremely rarely used by official representatives of authority in the republics, should be understood to mean that the issue concerns a militarized force or a quickly armed organizational

system aimed not at repelling a foreign threat but at the resolution of internal and interrepublic problems through the use of force.

This is especially noticeable in the Baltic republics.

Here are several examples of the existence in this region of secret organizations that are inclined to be anti-Russian and anti-Soviet.

Lithuania: In the city of Telsiai one night gasoline was poured on the front doors of 21 apartments of servicemen, which were set on fire. In Vilnius, Major General (Retired) Mickevicius, the former military commissar of the republic, was severely beaten and died several hours later from the injuries sustained (it is remarkable that twice before this the general turned down the post of "military adviser" of the security department of the kray that was offered him).

Estonia: In the village of Jagala a sentry was killed at his post and his assault rifle and ammunition stolen. In the city of Tapa a monument to deceased Soviet soldiers was desecrated, with these inscriptions written on it: "Communists, you will lie here soon," "Russians! Take your corpses home!" and "Your time has passed, ours has arrived."

Latvia: A letter with the following content was dropped in the mail box of Colonel (Retired) Yu. Ponomarev: "Communist pig. Occupier! Get out of Latvia. You are on the list of the "CD" [Security Service] service of Latvia. We are giving you two months to get out! Otherwise, death!" In Riga, an explosive device was placed under the door of P. Chumakov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War. The apartment was destroyed. Explosions continue to be heard in Riga today.

More than 500 similar actions have been conducted during the last year in the Baltics just in relation to servicemen and members of their families. I do not intend to judge which of the organizations, which will be talked about later, had a hand in this, and this is not that important. It is more important that their activity is already being legalized.

The security department of the kray was organized in March 1990, has more than 15,000 members in its ranks, and is broken down into seven districts. The academy of the department is located in Kaunas in one of the hotels where training is being conducted for future commanders in an accelerated program. Personnel of the "green scarfs" are being trained at a base of sports complexes and former DOSAAF schools. According to available data, foreign instructors are taking part in the training of both officers and soldiers. Here are several lines from a letter by Major Kotlyar, who is engaged in the city of Kaunas in the investigation and return of Corporal Z. to his unit: "I went to his mother so that she would talk once more to her son about his returning to his place of service. After thinking, the woman replied that she can no longer do anything because her husband is on a national security committee, is in charge of

ideology issues, and, according to the father's plans, the son must join the security organs of a free Lithuania, undergoing training beforehand for two months under the leadership of American advisers." I might not have attached any importance to this letter if it were not for a January article in the American newspaper THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, which was headlined "Veteran' of the Crusade" and which recounted the assistance given by Andrew Aiva, a former officer of the "Green Berets," to Lithuanian nationalists. Explaining to a correspondent the reasons for his presence in Vilnius, Aiva said the following: Today old partisan weapons caches are being found, and the possibility of a partisan war becomes more and more realistic each day." But, in the meantime, according to the testimony of the newspaper, he is "teaching snipers how to fire at the tail rotors of Soviet helicopters, and explaining how to use bottles with flammable mixtures."

"The spilled blood of the people cements a nation," Goebbels said in his time. Is it not this principle that was used in the Baltics by certain forces to retain a shaky rule and strengthen their authority? Is it not for this that there has been a full restoration of militarized nationalistic organizations that have compromised themselves through cooperation with fascists?

In Estonia, it is the Kaitseliit (Defense Union), an organization which under the name of Omakaitse (Self-Defense) actively participated during the war in the elimination of Jews and communists, that was responsible for guarding prisons and concentration camps, and that helped persecute Soviet citizens in Germany. In November of last year a joint conference was held in Tartu of a union that already represented 63 voluntary people's patrols. The conference approved a provisional statute for the "transitional period," and it decided to send the text for confirmation "to the government of Estonia in exile." I. Hallaste, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic, was chairman here. The statute clearly establishes that Kaitseliit is a military and not political organization. Its structure today is almost indistinguishable from the structure of fascist times: a joint staff, uyezd people's patrols, detachments in cities and villages, and squads and groups according to farmsteads. Its overall numerical strength is more than 12,000 persons.

In Latvia, the Aizsargs (Defenders) organization is claiming the role of skeleton of the future army of a police type. Its symbol is a gold letter "A" in a setting of oak leaves—which is very popular today among young people. But far from everyone in the republic shares this attitude toward the Aizsargs. Here is what Ya. Riekstins writes in a local newspaper: "I lived through the times of Ulmanis and everything that followed. And it is for this very reason that I am outraged by the fact that the organization of the Aizsargs is being revived. I do not want to see anymore how a worker on the street has to run away from a drunken Aizsarg. But this is not the worst thing. Let the facts of history attest to the other more dismal side."

From the first days of the war the Aizsargs were the loyal accomplices of the Hitlerites in the establishment of the "new order." Here is the testimony of G. Shwabe, another eyewitness: "They were worse than the Germans. In several days they changed from countrymen to enemies. They served as guards, robbed and killed, trying to outdo the SS in their cruelty."

In the struggle with their people, to all appearances, there is a need for just such organizations with precisely such experience and traditions. And what an approving fuss was raised by the republic press and television over the revival of the all-Latvian organization of Aizsargs and the swearing in of its chief, Ya. Ribas. At the present time the organization numbers about 6,000 persons, and is divided into six regiments...

Perhaps a main link is lacking in order to close this circle of militarization of national sovereignties—Russia—a step to lay the legal foundations for the future national army. Open the recently published draft of the constitution of the Russian Federation and you will become convinced that the president of Russia, allotted almost monarchical authority, will head such an army. Only there is this question: Against whom will this army wage war? Although, judging by the recent speech of the pretender to this post, B. Yeltsin, the answer seems obvious: Against Russians who do not share the political views of Boris Nikolayevich.

Nationalistic militarized organizations are also building strength in other regions as well—the Western Ukraine and Moldova.

Undoubtedly, the creation of national formations is but another, and possibly the last, step toward civil war, which will be promoted by those who derive the blessing of personal power from the troubles of the people and the spilled blood, profitable foreign journeys, and hard currency, and who, in doing so, do not risk anything personally.

'Internationalist Servicemen' To Hold Conference in May

*PM2404160591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Apr 91 First Edition p 2*

[Unattributed report: "All-Army Conference of Internationalist Servicemen"]

[Text] The USSR Defense Ministry has decided to hold an All-Army Conference of Internationalist Servicemen in Moscow in the second half of May this year in response to numerous requests from servicemen who performed their internationalist duty regarding their organizational association.

Representatives of branches and categories of the USSR Armed Forces will assemble at the forum, where they will discuss questions concerned with enhancing the role of internationalist servicemen in the life and activity of

army collectives, molding qualities of military professionalism in personnel and instructing them in the traditions of the army and the centuries-old history of our state, work with predraft youngsters, and problems of servicemen's social protection.

Military District Party Organizations Hold Conferences

New Turkestan MD Party Chief Interviewed

91UM0492A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Mar 91 First edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel N. Leuchev by Lieutenant Colonel V. Astafyev: "Party Conferences: We Don't Expect Ready-Made Recipes"]

[Text] The Turkestan Military District has held a party conference. A report delivered by Major General I. Furmanov, first deputy chief of the district military-political directorate and chairman of the organizing committee, and speeches by delegates analyzed the state of party work in the district and outlined ways of improving it.

General of the Army N. Popov and Colonel General N. Moiseyev, Chief of the Ground Forces Military-Political Directorate, took part in the conference.

The conference elected a control commission and district party committee. A plenum of the party committee elected Colonel N. Leuchev as its secretary. Our correspondent met with him immediately following the conference.

[Astafyev] Nikolay Konstantinovich, first allow me to congratulate you on your election to such an important post.

[Leuchev] Thank you.

[Astafyev] Could you say a few words about your work program for the immediate future?

[Leuchev] To call it a program might be going a bit too far. But the initial elements, needless to say, are in place. I think we should concentrate the efforts of all links of the new party structure on restoring and strengthening the party's authority and on winning the confidence of Soviet army servicemen and civilian employees. And there is but one way to do this—through practical actions. Of course, we'll pay special attention to our party cadres. For the success of all our work depends precisely on them. We'll start with instruction. Why? I think this will become clear when we take a look at the following breakdown: 80 percent of these people have entered party work for the first time. A year from now we'll conduct a certification of full-time party committee workers. And, of course, one of the party committee's main tasks will be party admissions and the education of communists, especially young communists.

Under the new conditions, we must establish a clear-cut mechanism for interacting with commanders, military-political agencies, the Communist Youth League, trade unions, and other public organizations.

We will continue to maintain close working ties with territorial party organizations. A leading area of the party committee's work will be that of looking out for party members. We need a special program for the social defense of communists.

[Astafyev] The district party committee will have to carry on its work at a difficult period for the CPSU. How are events in the country affecting the psychological state of the district's communists?

[Leuchev] Yes, the party—including our own party organizations, naturally—finds itself in a difficult situation today. The army, having become the target of shameless speculation, has perhaps first and most acutely felt the gravity of the situation in the country. The intensity of anti-army hysteria is not abating. Moreover, it is becoming more refined and harder-edged and is moving from the sphere of slogans to the practical realm.

Given this situation, there is less passivity and temporizing in the district's soldier and labor collectives. Communists are becoming more active: Any further temporizing is simply inadmissible. This position is meeting with understanding on the part of most servicemen. Party members' influence is growing. I think the following figures attest to this: Last year, 245 people left the party (111 of them servicemen), while 1,117 joined. I think this is not only stabilization but also evidence of the party's authority. We're going to enhance that authority through our work.

Transcaucasus MD Party Conference Held

91UM0492B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Mar 91 First edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel V. Kushanskiy: "Party Conferences: We Don't Expect Ready-Made Recipes"]

[Text] The complexity of the sociopolitical situation in the Transcaucasian republics accounted for both the tone and "temperature" of debate at the party conference of the Transcaucasus Military District. The common denominator of the speeches was the proposition that in the context of the fundamental reorganization of political agencies and party structures, army communists must not only not relax their influence on personnel; on the contrary, they must clearly define their place in solving key problems of interethnic relations, combat readiness, and political-education work.

Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, the district troop commander, addressed the conference.

CPSU Central Committee Secretary Yu. Manayenkov took part in the conference, as did USSR People's Deputy Major General M. Surkov; D. Mikeladze, first

secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee; and senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee and the Armenian and Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committees.

North Caucasus MD Party Conference Held

*91UM0492C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Mar 91 First edition p 1*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel N. Astashkin: "Party Conferences: We Don't Expect Ready-Made Recipes"]

[Text] The North Caucasus Military District has held a party conference. Major General B. Sein, chief of the district military-political directorate, delivered a report on the state of party work and measures to improve party organizations' activities in independent structures.

Those who delivered reports and spoke in the debate; Colonel General L. Shustko, the district troop commander; Major General I. Puzanov; Colonel A. Grishin; Lieutenant Colonel V. Kulikov; and other delegates emphasized that today, when anticommunist hysteria is growing in the country and stepped-up attempts are being made to bring down the Union, army communists must take vigorous action, deal a resolute rebuff to destructive forces, and uphold the ideals of socialism.

Colonel General A. Ovchinnikov, First Deputy Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, took part in the conference and addressed it, as did N. Kravchenko, Second Secretary of the Rostov Oblast CPSU Committee.

Black Sea Fleet Party Conference Held

*91UM0492D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Mar 91 First edition p 1*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin: "Party Conferences: We Don't Expect Ready-Made Recipes"]

[Text] Concern and alarm at the situation in the country and in the party was heard in the speeches of delegates to the party conference of the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, the keynote speaker, Vice-Admiral V. Nekrasov, chief of the fleet military-political directorate; Fleet Commander Admiral M. Kronopulo; Comrades V. Romanenko and V. Filatov; and others who spoke in the debate cited concrete ways of enhancing the militancy of the fleet's party organizations in the political education of personnel and in accomplishing the tasks of military reform, strengthening discipline and organization, and uniting soldier collectives.

A. Girenko, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, addressed the fleet party conference.

Captain 1st Rank A. Tarayko was elected secretary of the fleet party committee.

Tallinn Garrison Denies Military Threat to Republic Government

*91UM0481A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 18 Jan 91 p 1*

[Article by Tallinn Garrison authorities: "A Military Threat?"]

[Text] The mass media have recently opened a broad and well-organized campaign of misleading the population relative to alleged actions which the USSR Armed Forces plan to take to overthrow the legally constituted government of Estonia.

With fabrications relative to the "military threat" as a basis, the Constituent Defense Council was formed on 13 January 1991, and the Kaytseliyt and Kodukaytse organizations are assuming a state of readiness to repel the "aggressor." With bases of the NFE [People's Front of Estonia] as a foundation, a defense management system is being organized and reserve servicemen trained to provide self-defense detachments for the bases.

In the campaign under way in the mass media there is not a single fact proving the allegations.

The stability of the situation in the republic was not helped by the appeal made to servicemen on duty in Estonia by RSFSR Supreme Soviet President B. N. Yeltsin and the visit made to Tallinn by Lensoviet people's deputies, who levied serious accusations at the military authorities, making no attempt whatsoever to consider the officers and their dependents in their situation in the Baltics.

In this connection, it should be noted that the 14 January meeting held in the Tallinn DOF [House of Fleet Officers] by representatives of garrison military units was peaceful in nature; it was an attempt to set up a dialogue with the mayor of Tallinn to arrive at a constructive solution to the problems facing the servicemen. The servicemen supported the 15 January meeting to be held by Tallinn workers, making no decisions relative to the use of military force.

The events that transpired in the Estonian Republic in 1989 and 1990 were a graphic illustration that the Army at no time interfered with internal matters; that no one can accuse it of presenting ultimatums and threats to the government. In addition, the republic leadership and city authorities on a number of occasions received aid from the military authorities when faced with various economic problems. Garrison authorities state responsibly that statements of a "military threat" constitute a lie and insinuations that have no connection whatsoever with the Army; their actual purpose is to enlist the support of the people during the period of the governmental crisis under the guise of a struggle "for freedom of Estonia."

Profiles of Deserters Returning to Troops in Kiev MD

91UM0482B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by A. Khokhlov: "Deserters Report to Regiment: Politicians and Army Create and Resolve Problems"]

[Text] There is probably nothing more tragic for any army than desertion from the ranks. Soldiers are deserting the Soviet Army. Where do they go?

The country is large, but a deserter has nowhere to go—except home. That is where they were usually taken into custody. Some of the deserters were returned to their units, while others were sent to prison. It was about two years ago that the efficient military-militia system started to break down. Republics began to pass legislation dealing with the desirability of having youths serve their tour of military duty in "their own" areas.

In the end of November of 1990, the chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff signed a directive setting up collection points in military districts to take in soldiers that leave their units without official authorization. Colonel General Boris Gromov, former commander of the Kiev Military District, was the first to organize these "musters."

Deserters brought here are not asked many questions. They are given a uniform that has seen better days and asked to write an explanation: where, when, why.

Writing of the explanation is more easily said than done. Soldiers commit desertion because of constant humiliation and insults, excessive demands made of them, and indifference on the part of fellow servicemen and commanders.

The military commissar of Kagarlykskiy Rayon, Kiev Oblast, sent Anatoliy M. to construction troops. The soldier, committing desertion while in Chita, was subjected to a physical examination in a Kiev military hospital. The diagnosis arrived at by military doctors confirmed the one resulting from a civilian examination: mental retardation with onset of mild mental dysfunction. Gennadiy Shushkovskiy of Borispol, with his congenital spinal curvature, served in what was very much a line and combat unit. Kievan Pavel Bindyuzhen-ko was required to manhandle a wheelbarrow in construction work, in spite of his epilepsy. You can imagine the glorious manner in which these boys protected the Motherland. What they put up with in the service is beyond description.

Of 339 men that had been "mustered" in the Kiev Military District, a total of five were given a "clean" discharge into the reserve.

The early 1990's deserters' social profiles show much variation. Since we are reporting on the Ukraine, the majority of the boys are Ukrainians. However, there are

Russians, Azerbaijanis, Armenians. About 80 percent of deserters were serving in construction battalions. One out of four is from the Moscow Construction Battalion. That is followed by the construction battalion of the Far Eastern and line units of the Transcaucasus and Baltic military districts. A search for "politicians" among personnel of the deserters' company would be fruitless. The reason for desertion in most cases is the same: "I was delivered beatings."

The civilian defense regiment after which the "musters" are patterned is a good one. Fifteen former deserters were required to virtually compete for inclusion onto the personnel roster; all of them are pleased with their duty. However, of those that remained behind as "muster soldiers," 77 are again on the run.

What are they trying to escape now? Living and service conditions for deserters are approaching those of a resort, as far as the Army is concerned.

"They simply do not want to serve," remarked Major P. Zborovskiy, commander of the "musters." "They know what it is like to act with impunity; now no one—we, the militia, or mama and papa—can help them."

Major Zborovskiy, decorated for action at Chernobyl, does not mince his words when he speaks of the service. He feels that the "nursery" for deserters is nothing but foolishness generated in the perestroyka period. The officer must look around in Kiev Military District units two or three months to find a place for especially hard-to-please soldiers. This is the third time that one of them has taken leave of various units and been brought to the regiment. He makes no effort to hide the reason for his actions: "I am lucky to be in a place like this." Another soldier, about to be sent to a unit, swallowed a handful of nails. After release from the hospital, it will be necessary to keep him in the regiment until his discharge.

Deserters are disliked even more by the regiment's soldiers than by the officers. Certainly, the boys do take offense: They pull their weight in the service, while mixed in with a hundred idlers who are biding their time between AWOLs. This was on the minds of 12 soldiers that had been inducted in Uzbekistan when they wrote a report to the commander and a letter to the Supreme Soviet of their republic. They asked the question: "Why are Ukrainians permitted to desert, while we are not?" Just ask Lieutenant Colonel A. Panchenko, the commander, to provide an answer to something which a delegation from President I. Karimov was unable to explain.

We hear a different opinion from V. Timoshka, chairman of the Commission on Liaison with the USSR Ministry of Defense at the Ukrainian Council of Ministers:

"Powerful political mechanisms have been set into motion. They can and do exert painful influences on

both society and the Army. I do not hesitate to accept any actions the military chooses to take to assist errant lads."

Nonetheless, how can they be helped?

Perhaps by following the example of Private Sasha Deshpetsko's parents when they decided to save him? After his girl friend got married, the young man committed three acts of AWOL. The last two were in this regiment. Worn out from repeated efforts, the parents requested that Lieutenant Colonel A. Panchenko grant their son three days of leave. So that they can take the boy to visit an old peasant woman. So that she can cast a beneficial spell over him!

Army Komsomol Reorganization Criticized

91UM0613A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Apr 91 First edition p 1

[“Our correspondent” report: “Many Resolutions. But a Result?”]

[Text] It has has been a little over a year since the Armed Forces Komsomol underwent serious organizational-structural changes—councils of Komsomol organizations were created in youth collectives. But has this resulted in more effective and lively work with the youth of the Army and Navy? This was the key question when a plenum of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations was held.

The answer was far from cheerful, but it was principled. Changes for the better were noted and the young people's crisis of faith in the Komsomol may have been stopped. But the state of the work of the councils of Komsomol organizations is in the main not satisfactory. Youth leaders are tied up in organizational questions and have distanced themselves from the real life of their collectives.

What to do? Recommendations were proposed in the report of Lieutenant Colonel A. Reshetnikov, chairman of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations, and in speeches by plenum participants: More radical changes in youth work are needed, more fruitful ideas are necessary, but the main thing is that people properly concerned with reviving the authority of the Komsomol are able to raise it, speaking bluntly, from a rut.

A sharp discussion unfolded in the evaluation of draft charters for the Armed Forces Komsomol organizations and of their programmatic goals.

A resolution was adopted at the plenum to hold an All-Army Komsomol conference at the end of June.

Transcaucasian MD Commander Patrikeyev Profiled

91UM0447A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Feb 91 First edition pp 3-4

[Article by Colonel B. Kaushanskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric “People of Duty and Honor”: “Tactical Problems for General Patrikeyev”]

[Text] Only once in almost two years have I seen him angry. His eyes darkening in an instant from indignation, his muscles playing, and his voice as though edged with metal... In his office were six young lieutenants who had just finished their service schools. They had arrived at the district and, on the very first day, as though having come to agreement, they had requested discharge from the Army: They said they had made a mistake in their choice of a profession and did not wish to serve in the Transcaucasus. Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, district commander, tried to talk with all of them together and then with each separately—he had no success. In response to his arguments and his appeals to honor and common sense there was only icy youthful stubbornness. Then the commanding general hit the button on the intercom: “Send the procurator to me...”

In the presence of the jurist, stressing the words “I command,” he handed the confused lieutenants, to whom they had politely but firmly explained the clear interpretation of the law, the directives on leaving a duty station. And only afterwards, having thawed a little, he asked them to stay a little longer and said in a quite different tone, leaning back tiredly into his armchair, “It has to be that way—you have not been here a day and you are already refusing your orders. Serve a little while, look closely at yourselves and at the people; there is always time to run away. Yes, yes, you are running away, do not look offended, you are running home with the diplomas you got from the people...”

And in the end the lieutenants are serving here where they were ordered. And they are serving well. But all that evening and a fair amount of the night set aside for work, the commanding general was very upset: It was the first time in all his years he had sent out people—perhaps one might call them obstinate youngsters, but they were nonetheless commanders—in that fashion to serve. Recalling that episode, he told me:

“Do you think I personally was delighted with my appointment here? It was a horizontal move—from the Volga Military District to the Transcaucasus Military District. I simply never knew the meaning of the word ‘No.’ That is the way I was raised. Although, I admit, I felt an urge to refuse...”

“The Tbilisi syndrome?” I asked.

He was quiet for a minute.

"Those are just words, and in life everything goes deeper." Patrikeyev paced the office. He is tall, athletically built, and has a chiseled profile. "Each person has his own destiny. Mine is to command and to conduct people in battle if necessary. But had I thought or guessed that in the fourth decade of my service fate would offer me such 'tactical problems' as we, commanding officers, never dreamed of three years ago, never mind at the beginning of my career as an officer..."

One can probably only dream of such a military career. He finished service school with distinction. He also finished two academies with gold medals. He served as a battalion commander in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and after six years he accepted the post of division commander. Directly from commander of a regiment, bypassing the intermediate steps. True, it was a strong regiment that he had taught to handle every eventuality.

Everything was decided by one mock battle which, incidentally, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA also wrote about.

An attack was coming up. The battalions were already prepared for battle. The reports of the artillery men concerning their readiness to open fire had been received. Nerves were stretched to the limit. And then there was the simple, calm voice of the general in charge of the exercise standing behind him. The meaning of his words reached the regimental commander as though in slow motion, causing him an unpleasant feeling in the pit of his stomach. He was told that, according to the situation report, the "enemy" had launched an attack two hours previously, which was soon "confirmed" by the new positioning of the targets. Patrikeyev abruptly turned his whole body to the general, but the latter did not blink an eye: He said, why are you looking around, commander? Fight, make a new decision.

He will remember those two hours his entire life. How with the help of his deputy he maneuvered the battalions, how he replanned the delivery of fire, how he carried out a river-crossing operation in a piercing wind...

He fulfilled the task in the allotted time, carrying out the task with brilliance and a certain vicious bravery. But for a long time after that battle his heart beat three times faster than usual and he could not sleep for a week from nervous exhaustion. And as though in consolation, that same leader of the exercise was the first to congratulate him on having received the post of division commander and later on the conferment of general's rank: "Not bad, not bad, Valeriy Anisimovich, not even 36 and already wearing trouser stripes. You will go far..."

As it turned out after the General Staff academy, "you will go far" meant to the Far East.

His zone of responsibility was enough to take one's breath away. Sakhalin, the Kurils, Kamchatka, Chukotka, Magadan... The typhoons, whose female names he could not accustom himself to, the steady

downpours, and the cold snaps below fifty degrees when ones boots turn into cast-iron shoes. There were flights over the Pacific Ocean and crossings over taiga rivers and streams—it was the only way to reach the rest of his subordinates... But even these days Patrikeyev considers himself a lucky man because he went through the "Far Eastern school" and travelled the region far and wide, a region which, he jokes in recollection, "there were three cold months and the rest of the time it was very cold." It was not a time of our best relations with China, nor was it our best times in international politics. The combat readiness of the forces was the primary concern of the general, who for the most part could not watch his children grow up because, leaving at dawn and returning at midnight, he only saw them when they were sleeping. He tried to persuade his wife Yevgeniya Nikolayevna that he would soon free himself from some of his duties and lighten his load... But he never saw that day. Neither in the position of chief of staff nor once he became commander of the Volga Military District.

There were another four years of service in the very center of Russia, with its fantastic scale and secret remoteness. He himself grew up in these remote places, in an ancient Russian village with the cozy name of Bogolyubovo. He lost his father in childhood here. His mother taught her children here. His older brother left for the war from here.

There is an opinion that professional politicians should handle grand politics and that the job of military men is only to train soldiers and commanders for a possible engagement with an adversary. It is probably correct. But what if the very situation in a country or in a specific region of the country, like a gigantic funnel, pulls you into circumstances where the job of the military commander and the job of the politician suddenly coincide?

During the time that Col. Gen. Patrikeyev has been commanding the Transcaucasus Military District, the leadership in three republics—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—has changed. And not just the leadership but circumstances influencing that change, the course of the administrations, and, most importantly, attitudes toward the military (particularly in Georgia and Armenia), which at all times had been consistently positive and sincere. Now, believe it or not, together with the concepts of "independence" and "sovereignty" that were revived in the years of perestroyka, the unjust and insulting word "occupiers" arose. Before Patrikeyev's very eyes the bonds of human communication fostered for centuries were broken and then previously close neighbors faced off and shots were fired. In the border villages where Armenia and Azerbaijan join, the hostile hands of local fighters reached out for weapons. Death also touched the servicemen there who were defending their lives, their families, and their dignity. Bullets marked the fences of the military units and the garrison's living quarters.

In those dark days (by the way, today they are not much brighter) Patrikeyev walked about as gloomy as a cloud:

The planned combat training exercises were interrupted and the schedule for schools and live fires was discarded because significant forces had to be enlisted for their own protection and defense. And what was worse, the number of stolen weapons and ammunition increased. The military facilities turned into inaccessible fortresses. How does one get people? How does one answer the letters of the wives of officers and warrant officers asking why, in their own country in peacetime, they feel that the lives of their husbands and children are threatened?

I saw many of those letters and I was shaken by their incomparable pain. It was impossible to keep up with the commanding general. With a dark and sunken face, in the course of a day he managed to visit an Azerbaijan village destroyed by artillery weapons, the area of a tactical exercise, and negotiations with those whom, in accordance with long tradition, we still call informals. When I had the opportunity to accompany him on these journeys, I mentally envied the iron nerves of this man, the clarity and stability of his position, his unfailing politeness, his self-possession, and his endurance. One can only guess what it cost him. Perhaps the integrity of his nature and the rejection of extreme measures that might cut off even the slightest hope for a dialogue are the basis of his nature.

In the name of dialogue he, finding a few precious minutes, sat down to a book on history and to phrase-books on the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijan languages, preparing himself to communicate with the local authorities and delegations. At various times I had the opportunity to observe him in the offices of the three republic leaders. Making their acquaintance, he introduced himself briefly: "I am Col. Gen. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District." Then attentively and respectfully listened to the arguments of the leaders. He presented his own view of the situation concisely. Sometimes there were complaints when he raised the issue of weapons "circulating" around the region, the interruption of the conscription campaign, and delays in supplies to the troops. At such negotiations he indulged in a few jokes, and was amiable, and he talked without a martinet's straightforwardness and without bureaucratic ostentatious enjoyment of his power.

I remember how quickly he agreed with A. Mutalibov, president of Azerbaijan, to conduct a joint meeting with young officers serving on the territory of the republic. Both the commanding general and the president spoke at that meeting.

Has his chief weapon—logic—always worked?

Answering my question he said, "I never have illusions. How can you convince a leader when by his signature he has, for example, sanctified a suspension of the conscription into the Soviet Army and then created his own military structure, as has happened in Georgia and Armenia in violation of the USSR Constitution? They have done this deliberately. Their thinking is the same:

Once you have independence and sovereignty you need to have the accessories, including your own barracks. And that decision is made without any of the hard economic calculations and without any clear scientific and purely military grounds. Whom are you getting ready to fight, whom are you defending yourself from, and what do you need weapons for? These questions of mine were not answered. In essence, the local authorities would not help us to collect up the weapons stolen from servicemen."

A few days ago when he returned from Tskhinvali, having seen the picture of the blockaded life of the city and felt for himself the leaden chill of the gunfire, he repeated with surprise and bitterness, "But after all they are our own, our own..."

Yes, the weapons depots and sentries they have attacked and the automotive equipment they have hijacked is not from another planet—they are ours, Soviet. Patrikeyev warned of possible harsh consequences in the press (he never refuses to meet with journalists) and on television, and more than once he invited the leadership of the Transcaucasus republics to meetings of the military council... But it did not help very much. As a result harsh measures for self-defense were taken. And as a result the roofs of the barracks in "shooting" regions bristled with weapon emplacements and the senior men in vehicles received personal weapons. Barbed wire and other barriers surrounded the living areas of other military settlements. Is such a thing conceivable in our Fatherland?

In the most criminal instances Patrikeyev flew to the spot to look into everything himself. More than once he was struck by the effrontery and diabolic inventiveness of the extremists as, for example, in the small Armenian town of Bambakashate. Armed bandits dressed in military uniforms seized a military vehicle on the road sent out for the personnel of the guard. They entered the territory of the town and—drove straight to the parade grounds where Senior Lieutenant R. Bredikhin was mounting the guard. The officer saw the shouldered assault rifles and, instantly appraising the situation, gave the command to open fire. He captured the band and saved the weapons. For this he was awarded a decoration by the commanding general.

But I also know of other cases: Patrikeyev is merciless to those daydreamers in epaulets who, pleading circumstances, forgot about duty and vigilance and by their own negligence lost weapons and ammunition from their subunits. Just a few days ago he signed an order dismissing several officers of one of the district's units from their posts. Weapons were being kept under the same roof with equipment and food. Criminals "lifted" them from the depot under the very nose of the guard. And the commanding officers noted it only two weeks later.

"Punishment is not my favorite method, but I do not have the moral right to be lenient," he said at a meeting of the military soviet soon after his return from that unit.

"It is time to make comprehensive decisions at the state level in the spirit of military reform."

These decisions have been influenced by life itself and by the scrupulous calculations of Valeriy Anisimovich himself and of his "team." Once more they carefully checked all the places weapons were kept, toured their mobilization capabilities with an eye to every detail, and analyzed the dynamics of the armed attacks of the local fighters. In addition, information that had been received gave much food for thought. Misfortune was knocking at those doors where there were great amounts of equipment and very few people. Precisely the structures with reduced numbers of personnel had turned into an Achilles heel. The fighters were afraid to crawl into those units at full strength. Would it then be better to have fewer units? Fewer units at full strength, staffed to the last soldier. All subordinated to a single schedule of combat training, and only to that. What about mobile resources? If necessary they can be centralized by decision from above. This gigantic effort is already partially completed and partially in the preparation stage, on the road from plans and experiments to final decisions at the level of the Ministry of Defense.

In general, I noticed more than once in the commanding general a preference for solutions that are unusual but convincing, well-grounded, and graphic in their logic. Who, for example, could have thought that on his familiarization trips throughout the units he would assemble the officers and begin with a visit to the sports facilities, approach the gymnastic equipment, and do a variety of exercises. Then he would ask the officers to do the same exercises. Far from all were able to do them—their stomachs got in the way. In the meantime, even now Patrikeyev gets up at 0530, runs cross-country, and then goes to the gymnastic equipment. A little after 0700 he is already at work. A curious detail: In autumn of last year he headed a military delegation to Turkey. He visited one of the regiments of the Turkish Army to study physical training. He was not shy—he approached the parallel bars and the horizontal bars and won the hearts of his hosts not only by the democracy of his gesture but also by his well-rounded sports skills. That was when he was out visiting; at home he completes similar demonstrations with a wish: I would like, he says, to consider you a kindred spirit in this, too.

I will not try to be too optimistic: For those who have never served in it, the district is not particularly popular today. There is interethnic discord to the accompaniment of shooting. Housing is tight. Job placement for wives is tight, and the antimilitary bacchanalia continues unabated in Georgia and Armenia. There are plenty of "negatives." But that is reason for Patrikeyev to knock all the more insistently on the doors of the Council of Ministers and his own ministry, petitioning for a whole package of privileges for servicemen in the Transcaucasus Military District. And for him to remind the local republic leaders of the needs of his subordinates all the more often. Against the background of our national troubles, it is not easy to obtain regional goods for

servicemen today. But there is no other way. The district has great strategic importance if you consider that the war in the Persian Gulf occupies the thoughts of Patrikeyev somewhat more than those of other district commanders. The war is thundering next door, practically "over the next hill." The tighter the knot of problems, the more one must be concerned about those who are nearby and about your compatriots in key questions of military training.

One might think that the harsh situation itself would affect the nerves and that it would be difficult to keep them in check. But talk with any commander of a regiment or division. You can even go lower—the commanders of companies and battalions. None of them have ever heard abuse from Patrikeyev or felt the spiritual pain of a verbal "heavy hand." Because Valeriy Anisimovich is convinced that it is not easy for any of the military people in the Transcaucasus region today and it is not worth increasing the nervous tension through harshness and impolitic utterances. A rude person, even if he is in a high position, will not work well together with Patrikeyev. But if the commanding general is convinced that a certain officer is able to confront his own shortcomings and his personality, no matter how abrasive he may be, and advances the cause in the best fashion, then the commanding general will support him, put him on the "advancement track," and put him up for promotion. In conjunction with this, Patrikeyev once talked about a man for whom he felt, it seemed to me, some sympathy. It was Major General Rokhlin.

Not very long ago Lev Yakovlevich, who was still a colonel back then, arrived in the district from Afghanistan and took over a division. His views on the organization of combat training under mountain conditions coincided with the views of his commanding general in every way. Patrikeyev decided to conduct a training session for commanders of the combined units at the base of the division: It was a very suitable place for practicing defense in mountains. The only thing required was to bring the training center up to the proper condition. Three months later the commanding general was struck by what Rokhlin and his subordinates had done. There was a mountain firing range, sites for crossing ravines and raging rivers, obstacle courses, routes for driving that were equipped according to all the rules, areas for alpine training... And all this had been done without interrupting combat training.

The training session was unconventional, with a demonstration battle against a most difficult tactical background. But... when the time approached to promote Colonel Rokhlin to the rank of general, his immediate boss "vetoed" it. He said, we should wait a while, he is a crude "Afganets" [Afghanistan veteran], and he administers by mere injunction; true, he does not spare himself, but the people under him are groaning. Patrikeyev received the division commander's statement by special messenger in Moscow, where he was on a trip. He got in touch with the leadership of the Army by telephone. He convinced them. And he signed the promotion. And

when he returned he had a long conversation with Rokhlin. Today the latter is in a different and even higher post. His reviews are excellent.

In short, the road to success leads through people. And this, so to speak, is the final result. The district passed with distinction a difficult inspection by the Ministry of Defense headed by General of the Army P. Lushev, first deputy minister. And that despite all the objectivity of the critical remarks and despite all the severity of the criteria and the requirements resulting from our complex times. Despite all the tension of the situation in the Transcaucasus region.

At our last meeting there was no long conversation. I recall the little flags on the giant map in the office of the commanding general reflecting the course of combat operations in the Persian Gulf and the endless telephone calls. Journalists asked to be received. The leader of one of the standing commissions of the parliament of Georgia reported that an armored personnel carrier full of servicemen was "roaming" through Georgian villages in South Ossetia and the people were alarmed. There was irrefutable proof, he said. "Give me the number on its side and I will look into it," he promised, and he asked him to wait. He looked into it right away by talking on another telephone line. "There is no such armored personnel carrier," he answered. And he added, "Our people are well-disciplined and, as you know, none of them are looking for a conflict with the people. We stand by that..."

Then the operations duty officer called: The helicopter was ready for flight. Valeriy Anisimovich tiredly half-closed his eyes:

"Do you know that for three days I have been carrying a letter from my son and that there has been no time to read it? He is my namesake. He is studying in the Academy imeni Frunze. He had the post of battalion commander. My daughter called: 'When are you coming to visit your grandson? Valeriy III talks of nothing but you and misses his grandfather.'" He was silent for a moment and then sighed: "I will lighten my load a bit and say hello to my grandson in Kuybyshev."

When the helicopter lifted off the concrete landing pad not far from the district headquarters, I thought doubtfully about how far the commander is from his grandson. And about how difficult it is for him to lighten his load, as he dreams of doing.

Statistics on Servicemen Entering, Leaving CPSU

91UM0629A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 12, 21 Mar 91 p 4

[Unattributed article: "We Answer Questions": "The Inflow Exceeds the Outflow"—First paragraph is reader's letter.]

[Text] As a result of people leaving the CPSU, the membership of many party organizations has sharply

declined. But I have heard that in the Armed Forces, to the contrary, the number of party members is growing. Is this true? [signed] Ye. Sigova, Chita.

In the Main Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces our correspondent was given the following information:

In 1990 more than 41,000 people were accepted into party organizations in the army and navy; that is 3.7 percent more than in the preceding year. The number of those accepted into the party exceeds by almost 20 percent the number of those leaving the CPSU. Eight of every ten new members are officers, noncommissioned officers or students in military-educational institutions. Ninety-seven percent of new members are people younger than 30.

Results of Investigation of Soldiers' Peacetime Deaths

91UM0612A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Major of Justice N. Karpov: "Searching for the Truth"]

[Text] A special commission recently finished its work. The commission was checking into the objectivity and thoroughness of investigations conducted in cases concerning deaths or traumas among servicemen and military construction workers in peacetime. Major of Justice N. Karpov participated in the work of the commission as a representative of the Main Military Procuracy. Today he describes his impressions to us.

From the very first day the receiving group carried most of the load, both physical and moral. Members of the group met with the parents of dead soldiers, who brought their grief with them; they saw the relatives of those who got into trouble while in the service; they often saw people who had deserted the Army. The number of visitors, together with the flow of letters, of which there were over 3,500, forced the commission members to turn for help to the USSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs, whose premises the commission used to receive the visitors.

It must be mentioned that during the initial stage our volunteer helpers, representatives of various public associations, as well as the authors of the complaints filled the atmosphere with psychological tension and nervousness, which of course interfered with the work that we, the lawyers, had to do. But in all fairness I have to say that quite a few people, in spite of their feelings of profound grief, had enough moral strength to view the facts and their interpretation calmly and objectively, and in this way they helped to establish the truth.

In order to examine the most distressing complaints the commission set up a kind of a rapid reaction group whose members would go to the military units at various locations. I, for instance, had a chance to visit one of the

Moscow Military District's Air Defense Units, a road-building unit in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast. There we assessed the legality of their decisions concerning the deaths of their servicemen, and conducted procuracy checks of the personnel service and living conditions. We insisted on an immediate elimination of the shortcomings and drawbacks that were disclosed. Unfortunately, there were a lot of them, some of which were simply outrageous. However, the commission members with whom I had to work in those units, RSFSR People's Deputy L. Kudinova, and a representative of the committee of soldiers' mothers, N. Lysova, displayed wise restraint, understanding, and objectivity in their assessments of what they saw.

As the letters arrived and were investigated, concrete criminal cases were being determined, which the commission wanted to examine in more detail. There were 107 such cases. Our 10 examination groups were made up of people's deputies, independent lawyers and forensic medicine experts, relatives of the deceased servicemen, and representatives of public organizations.

As a result of our work, most of the decisions that had been made on the criminal cases were left unchanged. In 22 cases we agreed that investigators would check on the arguments of the claimants independently from the military procuracy and then pass the final judgment. It is possible that the legitimacy of earlier decisions will be upheld after this, but we cannot exclude the possibility of having to change some of them. Why so?

In this connection I recollect a criminal case that was examined by the Far East Military District Procuracy. A young soldier died of sunstroke during training. The death was considered an accident in the unit. The military procurator of the garrison accepted this explanation and did not do an in-depth study of the circumstances. He decided not to initiate any criminal proceedings. But due to the complaints of the soldier's parents,

the main military procuracy reversed that judgment and requested another military procuracy to investigate the incident anew. It was established in the course of the investigation that Senior Sergeant R. exceeded his authority and made his subordinate do physical exercises in broad sunlight as an "educational measure." They also uncovered certain facts of abuse of soldiers displayed by Junior Sergeant K., who by that time was already in the reserves. As the result of the investigation, both guilty persons were convicted and justice triumphed.

Cases like this are, of course, unique. However, they do occur, and because of this many people start thinking about the necessity of setting up some mechanism of government and public control over the actions of the Armed Forces and of social protection of the military.

Here is the final thing. There were intensive, quite ungrounded, but very emotional discussions at the commission meetings which tried to prove that nobody needs the military procuracy at all. There were claims that it is too dependent on the Ministry of Defense, almost to the point of taking orders from it. Any person who has even a vague idea of the work of military procurators may only be perplexed by such statements, they are so absurd. Besides, it is obvious that replacement of the top structure of procuracy control in the Army and Navy and the transfer of its functions to the local procurator would inevitably serve to destroy the unity of the Armed Forces.

The summing up of the results of the commission's work is yet to come. But it is already clear that there are many problems within our Armed Forces, just as there are, by the way, within our entire society, and it is impossible to resolve them all at one sitting. It is only gradually, all together, with close cooperation between the command and the public, that we will manage to make military service truly prestigious and honorable.

Outpost Uses Armor in Battle With Armenian Group

91UM0614A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 May 91 First Edition p 6

[Article by Colonel L. Arshantsev: "From Gyandzha: Outpost Under Fire of Guerrillas"]

[Text] The shooting has not halted on the frontier of Armenia and Azerbaijan. At 1915 hours on 29 April, near the village of Kheyremli an army outpost came under fire from the direction of the Armenian population point of Kirants. In response the servicemen also opened fire. The exchange of fire lasted until 2200 hours.

But at around midnight the guerrillas, having moved up siege guns, again began to fire on the outpost. The fighting lasted until 0300 hours in the morning. The servicemen were forced to return the fire from two tanks and three armored personnel carriers. Also involved in the fighting were outposts near the population points of Yukhary-Askipara and Ashaga-Askipara. One of the outposts suffered the wounding of three soldiers and one officer. The Armenian guerrillas suffered much severer losses but data about them is still being checked.

Gamsakhurdia Administers Georgian Military Oath

91UM0614B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Colonel L. Arshantsev: "From Tbilisi: Guardsmen Have Taken Their Oath. And the Others?"]

[Text] Last Saturday at the Tbilisi Central Stadium around a half-thousand national guardsmen vowed their loyalty to the republic. The text of the oath was read by the Georgian President, Z. Gamsakhurdia. He presented the colors to the new formation, and gave a solemn send-off speech befitting the occasion. According to the law recently passed by the parliament concerning the prefecture, special powers have been given precisely to this structure on matters of Georgian defense. The prefects are to ensure that the officials and citizens carry out the governmental decisions concerning a call-up for compulsory military service, they are to assist in this as well as organize and hold military training assemblies and basic training.

Can the young men of the republic wear their insignias outside of Georgia? Yes, but on a voluntary basis. This is stated in the governmental decree of 26 April.

Baltic MD Seizes Confiscated DOSAAF Vehicles

91UM0614C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Article from the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Equipment Returned"]

[Text] The announcements from certain information agencies coming in from Lithuania have committed a major distortion of the truth over the actions of servicemen involving a number of organizations of the republic sports and technical association.

What has actually happened?

Here is what was announced at the Staff of the Baltic Military District. At one time, the USSR Ministry of Defense had provided the Lithuanian DOSAAF organizations with over 200 motor vehicles in the aim of training drivers for the Army and Navy. The sports-technical associations which were established on the basis of the illegally abolished republic DOSAAF organizations used this equipment for other purposes. They refused to return it to the legitimate owners regardless of repeated demands.

For this reason the command of the Baltic Military District on the morning of 25 April began to implement measures to recover the vehicular equipment. For this the garrison chiefs assigned subunits equipped with drivers and tractors. During the day around 150 vehicles were recovered. They were sent to bring the district units up to strength.

Lithuania Moves Toward Creation of Armed Forces

91UM0594A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Captain 2d Rank V. Gromak: "'We Will Have Our Own Army' Is What They Are Saying in Lithuania. But in Fact an Army Has Already Been Created"]

[Text] It is a secret to no one that the new Lithuanian authorities are about to acquire their own army. Last autumn no one was taking such actions seriously, even though the process itself had been initiated in a practical way following the proclamation of independence in March of last year. However, the republic leaders are trying not to make too big a show of these matters to world opinion..

With what is this linked? I think that it is linked first and foremost with the "domestic tasks" that will be assigned to the Lithuanian army. And I shall try to show that here in some detail.

It was announced last autumn that 1991 would be the year for the creation of their own army. Already by then their own defense structure was planned in the form of a government department for defense of the region. Now it is planned to institute a draft of young men into its ranks. Even the figures are being cited—from 10,000 to 15,000 men. And all of this is quite realistic.

On 17 January associates from the department took more than 100 firearms from collectors. A training regiment has been openly set up. On 11 April, the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council himself, V.

Landsbergis, offered his congratulations to 400 volunteers who had taken the oath. For what is all this being created?

At a recent meeting with foreign journalists, the general director of the department, A. Butkevicius, was still quite open about this, and he repeated it for the nth time: "Our goal is to defend Lithuania, to defend the motherland." Grandiloquent words but, as they say, just for foreign consumption. In the "domestic market" there are more concrete things. It can be seen immediately for whom all this fuss is being made with the department. All we need do is quote from a statement by that same Butkevicius:

"As of today the regional defense for our republic has four main directions of activity.

"One is the so-called special services, in the border zone and to protect important objects. I am sure that today we in Lithuania should, are obligated, to protect a number of objects. The second important direction is a rescue service, fire-fighting service, and civil defense.

"The third direction is a system of volunteer service to protect the region of Lithuania, and the creation of the nucleus of our national guard. We shall, therefore, strive to have in each rayon of Lithuania a detachment of patriotic people, volunteers who would make up a reserve for primary training, that is, so that if necessary there would be people on whom we could call for help. This group of people would be trained in the best way and would have a thorough knowledge of its business.

"Well, the fourth direction is the nucleus of a regular army, a core, if the republic government decides that it should be set up...

"It is quite clear that as in other republics and countries, in Lithuania what is needed is a stabilizing force, that is, a force that could cull from the party or some other organization the desire or thought that it could with the help of that force guarantee for itself a path to power. I think that the only such force there can be should be a strong system to defend the region."

I have deliberately quoted this television statement so fully. If we discard all the asides then we can immediately see that the new army and national guard will serve not so much the defense of the region from the outside but will rather exercise political functions within the republic. The more so since purging the republic of "unpatriotic elements" has in fact already started. And here a by no means minor role is being played by Butkevicius' department, with its "patriotic people."

Few journalists are now in the rural areas. But it precisely there that the Butkevicius "company" has assumed the duties of "propagandist and organizer." For example, they are trying to convince the peasants that the paths of the republic and the Union have diverged. But these are words, and they may not be heard. And

when the moral arguments fail to work, what then? As a rule, the department employees are not squeamish about using threats.

First of all, of course, they move against the Communists. There are many examples of this. J. Razminas, an inspector with the department for the defense of the region in Siauliai Rayon, demanded that the secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Siauliai rayon committee "quit the premises." This is still just a threat. But this same Razminas with his two aides conducted an armed search of the work place of the secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party organization at the Sakine sovkhоз, J. Kucinskiene, and then beat a woman...

True, the department still has few forces. It leaders have recently tried repeatedly to remind the republic leaders of this. The Lithuanian Supreme Council reacted quite quickly to the "comments," passing a law on the volunteer service to defend the region.

What is it proposed to do? First of all to find recruits. For the time being this will be done on a voluntary basis. Here, those selected are being divided into combatants and noncombatants, and honorary volunteers. Militarized formations are being set up on a territorial basis. Companies, detachments, and militia units will be operating. The general director of the department appoints the militia commander, and the chief of staff appoints other command personnel.

It is also proposed that the forces will have their own officers. Whom do they think they will recruit for the service? The trump card is that after serving eight years as an officer, anyone who so wishes may resign and be given a gratuity to build his own house or acquire an apartment on favorable terms. True, it is unclear where the apartments will come from. Deputy Prime Minister Z. Vaisvila helped here, stating openly that the housing problem would be solved through the officers of the Soviet Army, who "in any event will be forced to leave Lithuania."

Officers' courses are already under way in Kaunas, and in Vilnius there is a training unit where warrant officers are being trained. Planned training for volunteers is going on.

"The volunteer," says the chief of staff of the department, I. Gecas, "is a person who does not give up his permanent work but only comes to us for training part time under the terms of a contract."

In undergoing this "thorough and comprehensive check" (I cite from the document), the future professional, the volunteer, undergoes training four times a week. Then each year he must spend 20 days at a training center where, if required, he can also be used "to carry out various missions" "if the circumstances warrant."

We see that the appeal from the president of the USSR to disband all illegal military formations has not been met with a proper understanding among the Lithuanian parliamentarians. On the contrary, they have created a powerful lever with whose help they will easily influence the situation in the republic. And it must be said that they are already succeeding on that plane.

Legality of Using Airborne Troops To Enforce Draft Discussed

*91UM0483A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 12 Jan 91 pp 1, 3*

[Report on interview with Col. V. Teimers, deputy military commissar of the Latvian SSR, by SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA correspondent V. Karinin: "Will the 'Blue Berets' Appear in Latvia?"]

[Text] "This depends entirely on the next steps the Latvian leadership takes in meeting the republic quotas for the fall military draft," said Col. V. Teimers, deputy military commissar of the Latvian SSR, to our correspondent. "At the meetings between A. Gorbunovs and the military, the Supreme Soviet chairman assured Col. Gen. F. Kuzmin, Baltic Military District commander, and representatives of the republic draft commission that he was going to Moscow on 13 January and would personally ask the USSR president not to allow special Airborne Troop contingents to be brought to Latvian territory, since the republic is capable of managing the draft campaign on its own. Let us hope that reason will prevail, and that this is the way we will go."

Earlier, on 8 January, in response to the Ministry of Defense decision to take additional steps to carry out the USSR President's 1 December 1990 Ukase "On Certain Acts on Defense Matters Adopted by Union Republics" (subunits of the Airborne Troops [VDV] would be brought in to accomplish these tasks), the Latvian parliament adopted two documents, namely: the resolution and the statement of the Supreme Soviet, in which the actions of the center are called an aggression and measures to carry out the military draft law are portrayed as forced mobilization into the USSR Armed Forces.

This is how Col. V. Teimers commented on the situation that arose as a result of this:

[Teimers] A number of republics, including Latvia, have not fulfilled their quotas in drafting citizens into regular military service. Nationwide, only 70 percent of planned quotas have been met. This has resulted in difficulties in manning the Armed Forces. Let me look more closely at the situation in our republic. Leaving politics aside, the main reason for not fulfilling the plan are shortcomings in the law on alternative service passed in Latvia. (I will add right away that such a law is definitely needed, including one on the Union level, and a draft of such a Union law already exists.) First, it gives everybody who so desires the right not to serve. There is no such thing in any country in the world. There is no real accounting for those who take alternative service. This has led to a situation in which 1,635 people have entered neither the army nor the alternative service.

Among those in the alternative service, 109 have turned out to be Army deserters. This is another proof of the imperfections of the law. Something else. The Supreme Soviet decision, which charged the Council of Ministers with drawing up a list of non-prestigious professions for

alternative service, has not been carried out. The result is that among those who are listed in the ranks of alternative service are lease holders, cooperative members, auto service employees, etc. In rural areas many people stayed on their kolkhozes, doing the same work they did before the draft. That is, it is as if they had no alternative service. But it is called alternative service precisely because it should come close to the military one in terms of hardship. This is an accepted practice around the world.

A few words about so-called deserters. About 200 of them are hiding on Latvian territory. All of them left their units without permission. We suggested that the Supreme Soviet or the Council of Ministers, either directly or through ispolkoms [executive committees], call on these people either to return to their units, or report to the military registration office. By order of the Baltic Military District commander we will arrange for them to continue their military service on this district territory, regardless of where they deserted from.

Until 13 January the offer is also extended to those who are evading both the military and the alternative service (1,685 people). We are not going to punish them for the fact that they showed up in January instead of November. However, those who do not respond to our appeal will be prosecuted.

Unless the republic leadership undertakes certain steps, there is no guarantee that next spring or fall we will not have a similar situation again. Therefore, a number of legislative acts already passed need to be revoked, particularly the 8 January 1991 Supreme Soviet decision which proscribes all offices, organizations, and officials from cooperating with military registration offices, USSR Armed Forces units, and USSR organizations that take part in the "forced mobilization of the Latvian population."

[Karinin] There were calls in the Supreme Soviet to use the time remaining until 13 January (the republic has until then to ensure compliance with Union laws through its own measures) to hide, to shelter the draftees. What is your opinion of this position of some parliament members?

[Teimers] I see it as irresponsible. However, such voices were heard before Point 5 of the statement by the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet was adopted. It says, among other things: "The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia proposes, before special designation troops are brought into Latvian territory, to work out together with the leadership of the Baltic Military District procedures for the military registration office and local soviets to implement the Latvian Republic's law "On Alternative (Labor) Service," also keeping in mind the issues of prosecutorial measures against individuals who do not comply with the laws on alternative and military service; it also proposes the establishment of procedures for handling grievances and complaints from those in the military service who were drafted from

Latvia and left the place of service because of intolerable conditions. Therefore, since Point 5 has been adopted, the statements by some parliament members that you just mentioned may be considered illegal.

[Karinin] Does bringing in VDV units to carry out the draft campaign not contradict the USSR Constitution from a legal point of view? Young people of draft age are not members of the military yet. Their refusal to serve in the military must be punished in accordance with the law, that is, they can be prosecuted in accordance with a certain article, and searching for them is a matter for law enforcement organs.

[Teimers] First, we cannot predict yet what will happen after 13 January. Besides, the Ministry of Defense representatives explained that VDV units will only be used to accompany the draftees, to guard the military draft offices, etc. But not to carry out any other functions. Therefore, we are not talking about some forceful actions on the part of the VDV. As to the republic Ministry of Internal affairs organs, they have received a directive from their own minister and have removed themselves from carrying out their tasks. They received a directive not to interfere. That is, formally what you are saying is correct, but in practice, under current conditions in Latvia, it is impossible to accomplish. At least during the last six months not a single criminal prosecution has been initiated.

[Karinin] There are persistent rumors that an entire VDV division will be stationed in Latvia to carry out the draft program. Is this not too much—so many VDV for 1,600 young people? Would it not make the population of our republic overly nervous? You will agree that moving armored vehicles through the streets of Riga has already caused adverse reaction from Riga residents.

[Teimers] Right now (this interview took place on 10 January.—ed.) not a single VDV unit has been brought into Latvian territory. As to troops movements, they are related to the beginning of academic year in the USSR Armed Forces. Until 11 January we have exercises with general staffs, command posts, etc. These movements were planned in advance and have nothing to do with the draft. In principle, I am optimistic. If the Supreme Soviet and local soviets support the Supreme Soviet chairman in his efforts that I have already mentioned, we will arrive at a compromise.

Yazov Pays Last Respects to General Vasyagin

*PM2604133591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2*

[TASS report: "Last Journey"]

[Text] USSR Armed Forces servicemen and Moscow's working people bade farewell 18 April to Army General Semen Petrovich Vasyagin, the eminent USSR Armed Forces political worker and a participant in the Great Patriotic War.

The M.V. Frunze Soviet Army Central House, where the deceased was lying in state, was decked in black. There were many wreaths around the base of the coffin.

USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR deputy defense ministers, and military leaders were in the honor guard.

A funeral ceremony was held at the Novodevichiy Cemetery, where S.P. Vasyagin was buried.

German - Western Group of Forces Contracts

*91UM0494A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Mar 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Colonel V. Markushin: "The Western Group of Forces: First Contracts"]

[Text] The first contracts, totalling 12 million marks, have been signed with German firms. Included in the goods offered are ferrous and nonferrous scrap metals, discarded storage batteries, pulverized coal for compression into briquettes, and diesel fuel. Still under discussion are 11 contracts worth 24 million marks. The list of interested companies is growing: IPM, Heideman, Albert G. G. Koch, A. Schmidt, and others. Firms of other countries are also interested.

Preliminary work on the creation of joint enterprises that would support residential housing construction has been initiated, with our facilities and military installations as a basis. Specifically, plans call for utilizing three tank repair plants and four automotive repair plants. Under way is intensive study of incoming proposals to establish an intermediary service for buying and selling of movable property and real estate.

This effort involves representatives of directorates and services of the Western Group of Forces that will according to plans be combined into a separate official entity. Substantial expert assistance is being rendered by a temporary working group of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations headed by V. Sukhorukov. The role of the ministry's specialists is clear: There is a need for professionally qualified persons who could select an intermediary to fulfill the function of an auctions organizer. Also clear is the fact that our specialists' work must be endowed with permanence.

FRG Retraining for Western Group Personnel, Families

*91UM0494B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Mar 91 First Edition p 3*

[Interview with I. Smirnov, deputy chairman, USSR State Committee for Public Education, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Yu. Samsonov: "Help from Abroad: WGF Reserve Personnel Offered Training Opportunity"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] It is generally known that 9 October was the date of signing of the Bonn Agreement on Certain Transitional Measures, which is associated with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the FRG. The German side took on a number of responsibilities, including assisting the USSR in providing job training and retraining for group personnel facing discharge into the reserve and their adult family members. The purpose of this program is to facilitate their successful reemployment in civilian life in an interesting and well-paid job. This is more easily said than done. The unemployment existing in our country does not render the situation any easier.

How will this part of the agreement be accomplished? What has already been done in this regard? Yu. Samsonov, our correspondent, put these and other questions to I. Smirnov, deputy chairman, USSR State Committee for Public Education.

[Smirnov] The Soviet component of the Joint Soviet-German Working Group on Problems of Job Training and Retraining for Servicemen and Their Families has been organized. It is headed by F. Kovrigo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems]. It also includes representatives of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, USSR Ministry of Defense, and other interested organizations.

Meetings held with the German partners produced an accord, whereby the major goals and developmental stages in this joint venture were outlined. The decision was made to set up, equip, and modernize 10 training centers to provide job training and retraining for the labor force. This is funded by the German side. Instructors delivering the training at the centers will be able to enhance their qualifications in the Federal Republic of Germany, should this be necessary. That is where experience in job training and retraining of men discharged from the Bundeswehr has long existed. In addition, German experts will participate in developing training programs that will be geared to training the reserve servicemen and their dependents.

[Samsonov] It is generally known that the adoption of a market economy is associated with the need to improve the qualifications of personnel. Will this be a factor in the training and retraining to be offered to the WGF personnel?

[Smirnov] Definitely. The principal function of the training centers will be nothing less than rendering assistance to the students, the persons who will become an intrinsic part of the market economy. Reserve personnel and their dependents will receive training in largely useful civilian trades. The training and retraining to be offered at the centers fall into the following categories: construction and building materials; household appliances; electrical work; plumbing; automotive repair and maintenance; metalworking; woodworking; agriculture; environmental protection; computer technology.

[Samsonov] What kind of centers will be set up, and where will they be located?

[Smirnov] There will be training centers for agriculture in Ramenskoye (Moscow Oblast) and Khorol (Poltava Oblast); for construction in Leningrad and Kiev; machine construction in Minsk, Krivoy Rog, Talgar (Alma-Ata Oblast), and Borisov (Minsk Oblast). Persons will be able to receive instruction in a modern trade in those places. Students from other areas of the country will have the advantage of entirely adequate dormitories.

The above pertains largely to persons possessing a secondary education. In the case of individuals credited with a higher—including a military—education, we propose to offer retraining in a number of pedagogical institutes, to which they will be admitted after they complete special courses, without the necessity of taking entrance exams.

[Samsonov] What remains to be done in the immediate future?

[Smirnov] This month we intend to circulate questionnaires among WGF troops slated for discharge into the reserve in 1991 and their dependents to determine those who wish to acquire a new trade or improve their qualifications in preparation for selection of candidates for instruction.

Akhromeyev on Military Balance, pt I

91UM06104 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 14, Apr 91 pp 14-19

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev by NOVOYE VREMYA Editor-in-Chief Aleksandr Borisovich Pumpyanskiy, Commentator Yevgeniy Rusakov, and Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov: "Is Everything Reasonably Sufficient?"]

[Text]

In War like in any Other War. But also After War like After any Other War.... What Is the Army's Role After the Cold War?

Our guest, interlocutor, and opponent is Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev. NOVOYE VREMYA Editor-in-Chief Aleksandr Pumpyanskiy, Commentator Yevgeniy Rusakov, and Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov participated in the discussion.

Certain recent NOVOYE VREMYA articles served as the basis for the discussion.

[Pumpyanskiy] It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to NOVOYE VREMYA territory, Sergey Fedorovich. When you proposed the idea of a direct discussion, I responded to you that my colleagues and I considered this opportunity to be an honor. I am not being deceitful. It is more often different: when responding to criticism or when a question is more or less sharply posed, officials

complain about us to the highest levels of authority and request that journalists be called to order....

[Akhromeyev] In that case, I must also say that I even reported my disagreement with one of your articles (NOVOYE VREMYA, No. 2/91) to the president. Yes and how could I act otherwise when several military district commanders called me and protested.

[Pumpyanskiy] It seems that I have not begun this discussion in the most appropriate manner. Nevertheless one more preliminary comment. If and when we enter into polemics, it will not at all be with the goal of pinning someone to the wall or even to protect someone personally according to the principle: "ours"—"alien", "ours"—"not ours." We are interested in clarifying and presenting your point of view on pivotal security problems and relations between the army and society to our readers.

And now down to business. It seems to me that the main thing is to answer the question: does a military threat exist for the Soviet Union today? If yes, then from where does it originate? What is the size, nature, and direction of the threat? All remaining questions and answers, including military structural development, are derivative.

[Akhromeyev] Actually, this is a fundamental question. Our foreign policy in many ways and the Soviet Union's domestic situation to a large degree depend on the answer to that question.

Today a military threat does exist for the Soviet Union. And it primarily originates from the United States and NATO. But today this threat is different and is not the same one that it used to be. Three or four years ago this was a direct threat of war. Today there is none. The military threat and tension have diminished significantly. Normal relations are being established between the countries. But today you could not call United States policy with regard to the Soviet Union simple. It interweaves the aspiration to find mutual understanding and to even establish cooperation with the Soviet Union with pressure on us using various techniques, including military force. This is the threat. I will try to demonstrate this.

First. The Warsaw Treaty military organization has been eliminated. The NATO Bloc military organization has survived. They assert that the NATO Bloc has been preserved to protect Western democracy and because of the military threat from the USSR. I think this is trivial. Today no one in Europe is threatening the NATO Bloc.

There is an official document called "U.S. National Security Strategy" which President Bush submitted to the Congress during the Spring of 1990. Congress took it into consideration (actually approved it). Nearly a year has passed since this document was introduced but nowhere has it been said that it is no longer in force. This is what President Bush said in it: "No matter what course the Soviets choose during the next decade, the

Soviet Union will remain an awesome military power. The United States must also have a modern defense at its disposal in the future which will increase deterrence and strengthen security." This clearly states how the United States regards the Soviet Union today. Yes, Paris was after this and we and the United States signed three important treaties there and officially stated that we do not consider each other as enemies but "U.S. National Security Strategy" also remains in force.

Second. We are conducting negotiations with the United States on the reduction of all types of weapons other than naval weapons. And for just one reason: the United States has multiple superiority in naval forces over us and does not want to reduce them.

Third. Having surrounded the Soviet Union 40 years ago with its military and naval bases, the United States still maintains these bases now. And none of our American negotiating partners can say why the United States needs these bases today and there are 1,500 of them and armed forces totaling 500,000 men are maintained on them. But the answer is clear. They are needed to exert military pressure on the Soviet Union.

Fourth. The USSR has state interests which do not coincide with the interests of other countries. Take the problem of the Kurile Islands. The United States officially supports Japan in her claims on the southern Kurile Island chain. Finally, there is the Baltic problem. Does the United States position with regard to the entry of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union in 1940 coincide with the interests of the Soviet Union? The interests of the USSR and of the United States far from always coincide. We need to frankly say this. The Americans are not shy about doing this. All of this requires us to have those minimal armed forces that can provide our state the capability to defend the Soviet Union's state interests and prevent interference in our internal affairs.

About Nuclear Weapons, Vietnams, and Afghanistans

[Pumpyanskiy] This requires clarification.

It is one thing when an army threatened our border and which was about to invade our borders and attempt to seize our territory and enslave our people. That is one situation. Does such a military threat exist? If yes, then everything is clear and we only need to think well. If Alexander the Great is on our border, then we need to have one hundred elephants. If we do not have 100 elephants but 100 whales, then preliminarily of course we need to resolve the strategic riddle of childhood: which is stronger—an elephant or a whale. If Bonaparte is threatening us with his continental army, we also need to put 600,000 men under arms. The traditional logic of our military propaganda creates precisely this perception of the threat among our people. If you will, this is the 1812 or 1941 syndrome. The entire Cold War epic literature operated on this. We instilled in the people: our primary enemies are American imperialists, West German revanchists, Japanese militarists, NATO, and

the West. All of these mighty powers were threatening us and they intend to invade and launch a nuclear attack at any moment. If this is actually so, then our conduct is logical. Everything—for the army! We will tighten our belts, create a military economy at any price, and sacrifice everything, but we will not permit the worst.

But is that the situation today? A different picture arises from what you are saying. The very existence of a powerful American military force is the threat. But this is already a fundamentally different situation and we should draw entirely different conclusions from it. Let us still determine if any changes have taken place in your definition of the threat? And were the traditional ideological and political precepts (that existed in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's) in this regard correct?

[Akhromeyev] The Soviet Union has been conducting a new foreign policy for five years. It was formulated in 1986. All of the fundamental changes which have occurred in Europe are primarily the result of our foreign policy. When we began to implement it, we assumed that changes would occur in Central Europe and that the unification of Germany would possibly occur. This did not happen all of a sudden. In a state like ours, foreign policy is not planned for one year or even for several years. Therefore we calculated that the elimination or at least the significant reduction of the threat of war and the changes that are taking place would be the result of this foreign policy. We have achieved that. Have our Western partners met us halfway? Yes. The United States vacillated for a long time but later moved toward the achievement of mutual understanding with the Soviet Union and an arrangement with us. The countries of Western Europe also met us halfway and maybe even to a greater degree. And therefore today we are not talking about the threat of war [voyennaya ugroza] but about the military threat [voyennaya opasnost].

And the military threat and tension have diminished and, I would say, they have even lost their shape. Does a direct threat of the initiation of war exist today? Can one contend that NATO's armies stand on our borders, ready to begin aggression in a short period of time? It is impossible to contend that. Today there is no such direct threat of war for the Soviet Union. I am convinced that it does not exist either for us or for the other countries of Europe. This is a joint achievement of the USSR and the countries of the West. But something else has remained (I am repeating this): military pressure on us has not ceased. The Soviet Union's state interests have remained and the Soviet Union's socialist choice has remained which need to be protected. And there are forces, external forces, that are seeking to get the Soviet Union to conduct a policy that suits them and that does not always meet our interests. I am frankly saying that these forces exist in the United States and that these forces exist in other countries. We must have the minimally required military force and, of course, not only military, so that we can conduct our own independent foreign

policy. And first of all, we need to have an economy and we need the people to support this policy. Everything must be balanced.

[Pumpyanskiy] The Soviet Union's new foreign policy is unquestionably a fundamental factor. But with all of the desire to compliment our country and our foreign policy, our leadership should still be modest. We are saying that perestroika is a return of common sense. Common sense has returned to us and the West has responded. If common sense had returned to us earlier, the West also would have responded earlier. By the way, this is so. The main thing is that a fundamental change in the assessment of the threat of war has occurred.

Previously, it was thought—justifiably or not, that is another question—that a direct threat of invasion existed. Right now this is not so. This is a revolutionary change in consciousness but our military thought has still not drawn the appropriate conclusions because then there must also be fundamental changes here. Entirely different forces are clearly needed to repel a different threat. Then the principle of reasonable sufficiency is already natural and we have subscribed to it on the political level. But our military people are reacting very noisily to proposals to reduce a thousand excess, even obsolete, tanks in order to serenely believe that the idea has also been accepted by the military.

In war like in any other war. But also after war like after any other war. Demilitarization of the country is also natural after the Cold War. Instead of this, panic has arisen: they say we will be left completely defenseless....

[Rogov] What can present a military threat for a nuclear superpower like the Soviet Union? As long as nuclear weapons exist and as long as the United States is capable of destroying the Soviet Union in 30 minutes and the reverse, the military threat will be preserved.

But we must consider not only the capabilities of potential enemies but also their intentions. And today both we and the Americans are admitting that neither we nor they intend to initiate a thermonuclear war. From this point of view, your thesis that NATO and the United States present a threat to the Soviet Union signifies approximately the same as what Bush said with regard to the United States. But this message contains a whole series of fundamentally new, previously unseen theses in American policy for Congress which are in keeping with the new political thinking. For example, it talks about the reduction of the role of military force and about the need to develop cooperation with the Soviet Union and a shift from confrontation to partnership. American presidents have never spoken such language during the last 40 years.

[Pumpyanskiy] I must generally admit that Bush's "horrible" quote did not horrify me at all. Yes, in the circumstances that have developed the potential on that side is already grounds (or justification) that there should also be a definite potential on this side. But if the concept of the threat of war is exhausted by the very fact

of physical force on that side, then entirely different conclusions follow from this. First, define what you are or what you want to become to each other—an enemy, opponent, partner, something else or, I am horrified to even articulate it, an ally in world affairs. And as soon as we decide that there are no hostile intentions, then reduce the military component. Mutually reduce. Prove our good intentions to each other. There are no grounds to threaten someone or to increase the revolutions of the military machine.

[Akhromeyev] Dear comrades. There are three of you and I am alone. You have immediately posed many questions and it is difficult to answer. When I spoke about the military threat, I certainly considered that the parties have nuclear weapons which are a means of deterrence. It constantly creates a potentially lethal threat to all mankind. But today nuclear weapons do not create a reliable guarantee of protection from possible aggression or protection of state interests. The United States had nearly as many strategic nuclear forces in the middle 1970's as they do today but they suffered a defeat in Vietnam. We suffered a defeat in Afghanistan and nuclear weapons also did not help us at all. I am taking not the political or moral but the purely military side of the issue. Under certain conditions, nuclear weapons have turned out to be useless. Conventional armed forces and conventional weapons have been employed.

Today's world is such that states need conventional armed forces besides nuclear weapons which have become a political means of deterrence. Take the Persian Gulf. Iraq had an enormous military machine at its disposal. It crushed Kuwait in short order. An incommensurably large military force was concentrated in response to this aggression and it defeated Iraq.

The Soviet Union does not live in a simple geostrategic situation. It needs force to protect state interests. Whoever asserts that this military force is not needed is either confused or is consciously harming the country. What will happen if the Soviet Union becomes weak and cannot defend itself? A great power cannot be weak in a military sense.

With regard to how to determine who is an enemy and who is an ally, permit me to point out: This is a bilateral process. For now the United States frequently acts from a position of strength. And reductions are a bilateral process.

[Pumpyanskiy] Sergey Fedorovich, in my opinion you have cited marvelous examples. Nuclear weapons—yes, they provide deterrence or, more correctly, restraint and a certain degree of security but they are not omnipotent and it is no wonder that the Americans could not win in Vietnam and that we could not win in Afghanistan. Right?

[Akhromeyev] We simply could not use them. It was impossible to use them.

[Pumpyanskiy] But a completely different conclusion follows from these examples. Nuclear weapons do not support any offensive, interventionist, occupation, or whatever other goals—either for the Americans in Vietnam or for us in Afghanistan. This thesis does not have any relation at all to defense.

So, why do we need armed forces: for defense or for some other tasks? Both examples are examples of aggression. You cited them in the context of protection of state interests. The Americans, they say, were not able to support their own state interests while fighting in Vietnam and we could not support our state interests while fighting in Afghanistan. And it is remarkable that I am telling you about this. From my point of view, the state interest of the United States of America consisted of not becoming involved in the war in Vietnam and the state interest of the Soviet Union consisted of not becoming involved in the war in Afghanistan.

We are obliged to respect America's legitimate interests, but not the interest to fight in Vietnam. The world community did not recognize our conduct in Afghanistan as being totally justifiable. In this sense, the world community, if you will, better understood our state interests than our leaders did.

So it is worthwhile to talk about legitimate, universally recognized, and properly understood interests. This requires a corresponding system to elaborate and formulate them. In a broad context, this means the presence of a democratic system within the country and, in a narrow context, this means an open procedure and parliamentary hearings....

If you proceed from this democratic, civilized idea of state and national interests, then the need for armed forces will also be qualitatively and quantitatively different than if you are planning new Vietnams and Afghanistans.

About the Tanks that Saved Us from Nuclear War and About the Tanks that We Saved from Disarmament

[Akhromeyev] I also cited a third example: Iraq—Kuwait. When I spoke about nuclear weapons and about conventional armed forces, I was just answering the question that you raised—about nuclear and conventional forces and their correlation.

After that, you began to say: an aggressive army is not needed and policy must be justifiable. I do not have any argument with you on that issue. I repeat: any state needs conventional armed forces to defend itself from aggression and to protect its own state interests. If you are subjecting this to doubt, I consider it to be groundless.

Just what are the Soviet Union's state interests today? Our relations with other countries are determined by our foreign policy and the new military doctrine. If we talk about the core of modern Soviet foreign policy, it is a triad—demilitarization, democratization, and deideologization. Demilitarization—is the non-use of military

force when they are not attacking you. Use of force only for defense from aggression. Democratization—each state, small or large, is free to establish its own procedures and no one has the right to infringe on this will of the country and the will of the people. Deideologization—international law and nothing else lies at the foundation of foreign policy.

The Soviet Union's new military doctrine was also developed while proceeding from this. And while implementing this foreign policy, we stated that today we only need that army that can provide the country's reliable defense under modern conditions and nothing more. And right now we are reorganizing our armed forces in accordance with this doctrine. No one else has reduced their armed forces by 12 percent, but the Soviet Union has done this. No one has reduced their defense budget by 18 percent but the Soviet Union has done this.

Of course, everything must be balanced. Today the main thing for us is the economy's recovery and improving the people's lives. The army and navy strength reductions and the military budget reductions are also sound. But we need to do everything rationally without thoughtlessly jumping from side to side.

[Pumpyanskiy] Still, how are they carrying out pressure against the Soviet Union? Is it possible to cite an example for the sake of clarity? To some extent it is this question: a hostile military force was pressing against us or could press against us, there would not be an adequate or superior power in our country, and we as a state would be compelled to conduct ourselves differently. What have we yielded to anyone or could we yield in part to anyone by guaranteeing state interests or even ideological purity? This is a fairly typical theme in the letters which we are receiving: look at Albania or Cuba. For decades, the ruling regimes there have not wanted to yield anything, even trivial things, to anyone. And no force on earth could compel these two not too great powers. What does this say about us?

[Akhromeyev] Today our entire military doctrine and, in part, our foreign policy too are unquestionably peaceful and threaten no one and we have been compelled to structure it taking into account the military might of the United States and the NATO Bloc and the U.S. military bases that surround us. We constantly feel the breath of this might on our back. Yes, the military threat has diminished but it is entirely real and it remains. And naturally we are structuring our Armed Forces primarily taking into account the military might of both the United States and the NATO Bloc.

And I have cited specific examples of pressure. Why should I repeat them?

For some reason, you constantly leave out naval forces. This is a fact. No one wants to demonstratively talk with us about their reduction. Dozens of years.... In your opinion, how is this not a form of military pressure?

[Pumpyanskiy] Say that they have 10, 20, or 30 aircraft carriers. What, have these aircraft carriers compelled us to sell land to the peasants? Or to implement the privatization of industry? Or forced us to become involved in the stupidest war with the green snake? What is the link here?

[Akhromeyev] With regard to U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups, I can say: They are the most dangerous weapon for the Soviet Union that is in the hands of the United States.

As for the link of possible actions of these aircraft carriers with the possible sale of land, privatization of enterprises, or the struggle against drunkenness in the USSR, I cannot establish a link using my certainly limited imagination. The matter is simpler. Aircraft carriers are that U.S. military force that can arrive off the coast of the Soviet Union and create a military threat for us 6-8 days after the order has been given.

And what is more. You are always talking about tanks—you have some kind of hostility toward tanks. And it is groundless. Tanks not only won the Great Patriotic War, but they also saved us from nuclear war.

With regard to Cuba, it is not for me to discuss the issue on its policy. Cuba has lived for 30 years under a blockade from the United States. Do you really not know this?

[Rusakov] Right now the problem of guaranteeing national security is not nearly exhausted by the military factor, it consists of economic, technological, domestic political, diplomatic, and even moral components. Right now our society is very troubled by the problem of a reasonable correlation of these components and their conformity to the country's actual capabilities. Our increasing economic and technological backwardness is becoming a factor that is undermining domestic political stability, the capability to produce modern armament, etc. And militarization of the economy has made and continues to make its weighty "contribution" to economic ruin and the impoverishment of the people. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union is faced with a choice: either continue down the old path or, without forgetting about increasing the defense capability within reasonable limits, concentrate efforts first of all on the fundamental problems of society's life support and search for political methods to guarantee security. Let us recall the invincible phalanx of the Ancient Greeks: would it really have made sense if the soldiers' legs would have given away under the weight of the shields?

About Leaders Who Did Not Trust the West

[Rogov] We are all for strategic military parity, however the country has found itself in a situation when she has been compelled to maintain near equality with America, Western Europe, Japan, and China, taken together. No state is capable of withstanding such exertion. All the more so, according to figures published two years ago,

that we have a significant numerical superiority in the majority of land-based and even aircraft-based weapons.

Now the USSR has been compelled to conduct a significantly larger reduction of weapons than the West, while destroying military equipment that was manufactured using the labor of our people and it has lost touch with the latter.

[Akhromeyev] About parity. There previously was an aspiration to be strong on all axes. Yes, it was until 1985. But that has already been rejected in the doctrine adopted in 1987. We did not only officially announce this, we are also carrying out the new doctrine in practice. Today we are also setting the goal of maintaining an approximate balance between us and the United States in the area of strategic nuclear weapons. And this is necessary. We are not setting this goal for ourselves in the area of conventional weapons. You spoke about thousands of tanks and other weaponry which are being destroyed today. This is a large issue. Today it is frequently being used for speculation.

You need to historically approach examination of the tank issue. After the war ended in 1945 and we came out of it in a condition that you know well, the Soviet Union did not want confrontation. The United States came out of the war with nuclear weapons. Harry Truman and John Foster Dulles at that time were conducting a policy of nuclear blackmail and the arms race against the Soviet Union. The nuclear threat was real. The Soviet Union had to decide: how would it be? The Soviet Union still did not have nuclear weapons. How to respond to this threat? How to prevent nuclear aggression against the Soviet Union?

I have read documents of that time on this issue. At that time the political and military leadership gathered more than once under Stalin's chairmanship and they came to the decision that there was no other way other than to create a mighty armed forces formation (mainly tank troops) in Europe which would not pose a threat to Europe. This was done so that Western Europe would restrain the United States from nuclear aggression against the Soviet Union.

Later the NATO Bloc equaled our conventional armed forces through the deployment of their own armed forces and nuclear weapons appeared in our country. That is the prehistory of the issue and we do not need to present our political and military leaders of the past as such dolts. At that time, they understood the situation no worse than we do.

Of course, later (in the 1960's-1970's) there was an opportunity to attempt to terminate or at least reduce the arms race. I had the opportunity to work in the General Staff for many years. In the middle 1970's, it was completely clear that we could and had to begin serious negotiations on conventional arms reductions and to reduce military expenditures on a unilateral basis. In 1975, a strategic nuclear forces balance was established. As soon as we developed strategic nuclear missiles with

multiple reentry vehicles, it became clear: a nuclear balance had been achieved and the United States would not be able to surpass us in this area. And this was completely clear to the General Staff. Chief of the General Kulikov prepared the appropriate recommendations but Grechko was the minister in 1975. There was no possibility at all to realize these proposals under him. He died in 1976 and Ustinov came into office. The military expenditures reduction variation was made more precise and reported to him. But then Brezhnev became seriously ill. Ustinov looked at the recommendations that Kulikov reported to him and he said: "Well, and where do I go with this? Leonid Ilyich is seriously ill." Everything ended on that note. You need to consider one more thing. When an enormous machine has been wound up and when the people who stand near the leadership have become accustomed to conducting a certain policy, it is very difficult to stop that machine. To do this, you first of all need to replace the leadership and what is more even replace the system.

[Rogov] You said that right now we have rejected that concept of parity that implied maintenance of a balance with everyone in conventional ground-based weapons. In this connection, how do you explain the movement beyond the Urals of two-thirds of those weapons which we had in Europe and which were subject to reduction? Only one fourth of them will be destroyed, another fourth will be refitted, and half will be placed in storage. Why are we creating such an enormous conventional weapons reserve that is equal to several annual production volumes?

[Akhromeyev] Many state and military leaders of the Soviet Union have long considered our country to be primarily European. We have become accustomed to this for some reason. And the primary military threat for us more often arose in Europe, therefore we maintained the best armed forces and the best weapons there. In the east, we had quite a few such divisions where they had automobiles which had been obtained from the national economy during a special period instead of armored personnel carriers or combat infantry vehicles. These divisions had the rest of the weapons. We signed a treaty on armed forces reductions in Europe. It did not prohibit the movement of weapons from the West to the Urals. Why destroy new weapons and be defenseless in the east? In my opinion, no rational man would act that way. And they do not act that way in the NATO Bloc. They are destroying old tanks in Turkey and they are shipping new ones there. And we have sent the new weapons from the groups of forces to the east (but a certain number of the divisions withdrawn from the West have to be totally disbanded). They are tanks, armored vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery. Some of the weapons have been stored in the east so that they can replace broken down vehicles during the next three to four years since we have ceased production but we are still conducting combat training. We officially reported all of this to the West.

[Rogov] Sergey Fedorovich, but why was this letter not published in the Soviet Union? Everyone in the West knows this but our society remains in the dark. This will also confuse the people.

[Akhromeyev] I repeat, reliable figures have been reported to the West. All of these figures were published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI at the beginning of January. You can read them.

Everything that I have said is not a secret. We explained to our negotiating partners: how much equipment is making up for a deficiency today, how much will be destroyed right now during 1991 and what quantity will we replace in the troops during the next three to four years once the old vehicles have been destroyed.

Sometimes I cannot understand the position which some of my opponents occupy. They very soundly demand from me specific data on activities which the Soviet Union is undertaking in strict compliance with the treaty. It turns out that in so doing the moral side of the issue troubles them. But they are not troubled by the main thing—but will the country's defense capability be guaranteed with all of the changes that are occurring? This is also something worth talking about.

[Rusakov] Our country has been in a unique position in recent years. Since the times of the Assyrian, Roman, Charlemagne, and other ancient and early Middle Ages empires, no great power has acted on the world arena without strong allies. After Peter I "cut the window through" to Europe, the Russian State has always had on its side, as a minimum, one great power. After the break with China, we were left once again in proud solitude: we could not consider our Warsaw Treaty partners as strong allies. Although, of course, this issue is sooner for our previous leaders....

[Akhromeyev] Unfortunately, Russia did not always have a great power among her allies. Recall Crimea and the Russo-Turkish War (1850's-1870's) and I do not agree with you regarding unreliable allies but that is another question. You have once again returned me to the question which I touched on in passing. The question of leaders and mistrust between the USSR and the West. Stalin was the leader for almost 30 years. His policy was clear. This leader understood only force both in man's relations with man and in relations between states. But his partners—Chamberlain in Great Britain and Daladier in France—were right for him. The situation was different with Khrushchev and Brezhnev, especially with Khrushchev.

It is as if he was the man who brought about the "thaw" and then they removed him for this. But nevertheless, he is also a son of his time. Those leaders who survived the capitalist encirclement of the 1920's and 1930's, and then experienced the Great Patriotic War, and especially such people as Khrushchev and Brezhnev who experienced it while already in solid positions, had a firmly developed view on our foreign policy. They saw what had been created in 1941 and 1942 in our country when

the Fascists destroyed millions of people and the country collapsed and burned. But Khrushchev and Brezhnev were also patriots. Having survived this entire horrible time, they could not trust the West until the last day of their lives. This was already in their blood. That is my personal opinion but I think there is a serious basis for it.

When I began to work in the General Staff, I often had the opportunity to read and analyze various materials, to participate in conventions, and to see approaches to the solution of important problems. I had the opportunity to meet with Brezhnev frequently. This man did not trust the West and he thought: We will survive if we are strong. They say: the military pressured Brezhnev. That is not true. You did not have to pressure him. We were not required to convince him. Brezhnev positively resolved military issues on his own initiative. He was matured by this and he experienced these lessons of life. That is the matter. Ustinov also survived the Great Patriotic War. It is true not at the front but he saw and knew the front and the rear areas, being a weapons narkom [people's commissar]. Therefore, these peoples' thinking had been completely formed by 1945. We were young then, I finished the war as a battalion commander—my thinking was not so set. We could rethink many things in subsequent years. Older people could not. You cannot hide the Great Patriotic War syndrome. You young people do not completely understand this.

Roosevelt was a man who sincerely wanted to establish relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. In my opinion, sincerely. And Stalin generally trusted him. Who knows how things would have turned out if Roosevelt had lived for about another four years. But anti-Soviets came to power after him in the United States. And they did not trust us just like our leaders did not trust them.

[Pumpyanskiy] Thank you, Sergey Fedorovich. Your historical-psychological excursion was very interesting and actually explains many things. So: there is no threat of war but there is a military threat; pressure is being exerted on us; interference in our internal affairs is being carried out; and, finally, we have interests and ideas that need to be protected. This is how we can summarize the Army's reasons. The readers have listened to the arguments and now can calmly reflect on how convincing these reasons are to maintain the largest army in the world and the most militarized economy that has turned out to be incapable of providing either food, clothing, or shoes to the people.

[Akhromeyev] Of course, the readers need to reflect to ascertain the truth. As for your summarization, I am drawing the conclusion that we are ending how we began. We have not convinced each other.

[Pumpyanskiy] Somehow or other, let us shift to the second large topic of our conversation....

The Army and Domestic Policy. This is the topic of the next discussion (NOVOYE VREMYA No. 15).

Akhromeyev on Military Balance, pt II

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[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev by NOVOYE VREMYA Editor-in-Chief Aleksandr Borisovich Pumpyanskiy, Commentator Yevgeniy Rusakov, and Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov: "Is The Army Protecting Itself?"]

[Text] "The Marshal is becoming angry, therefore the Marshal is incorrect...." After this polemical article, Marshal Akhromeyev proposed meeting at the editorial office for a face to face discussion. NOVOYE VREMYA Editor-in-Chief Aleksandr Pumpyanskiy, Commentator Yevgeniy Rusakov, and Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov participated in the discussion.

From the problem of security and the external threat, the conversation shifted to the topic: the army and domestic policy.

[Pumpyanskiy] Sergey Fedorovich, at the beginning of our conversation, you illustrated your thought about interference in our affairs which we should rebuff with this example: Baker has advocated free enterprise.

[Akhromeyev] Aleksandr Borisovich, Baker expressed his opinion not on free enterprise but on the situation that has developed in our country today. I will read it once again: "In the USSR, we have noted a return to the centralized economy, a less free press, expansion of the powers of the army and the KGB, and the resignation or departure from the government of the main advocates of reform," and he said that all of this was unacceptable to the United States. That is, Baker, while assessing our reality in his own way, enumerated what B.N. Yeltsin and others do not like today. In his opinion, these actions of the Soviet Union's highest organs of power are incompatible with the course toward peaceful transformation in our country. I do not intend to argue with him since this is essentially a useless exercise. In principle, he should not have said this.

[Pumpyanskiy] I also do not like what Baker enumerated. Although we can discuss how appropriate such opinions are from the lips of the head of the foreign policy department. Only why do the military and the army need to draw conclusions from this? Politicians need to draw conclusions from this. You call this ideological interference. Let us assume it is. And you, as I understand it, are proceeding from that quote that, they say, we the army must oppose interference. How? In general, why do we need to provide the army's answers to ideological contradictions?

[Akhromeyev] I was speaking not about "ideological interference" but about interference in our country's internal affairs. These are different activities. If the U.S. Secretary of State is providing assessments of the situation in my country and recommendations of how it

needs to act, then, excuse me, any Soviet citizen (civilian or military) has the right to express his opinion as a result of this.

[Pumpyanskiy] We are not talking about opinions but about military policy.

[Akhromeyev] I did not begin the conversation about J. Baker's statements. There is another example—on the Baltic Region. Naturally, the United States has the right to recognize or not recognize the entry of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union in 1940. But does U.S. policy complicate the situation in the Soviet Union or not? It seriously complicates it. This position is not simply statements. There are cases when American citizens, even those in civil service, are operating on the territory of Lithuania against the interests of the USSR. How can a Soviet citizen regard the fact that a U.S. civil servant is directing the construction of the barricade around the parliament in Lithuania? I suggest that this is intolerable and complicates Soviet-American relations.

Who Is Drawing the Army into Politics?

[Pumpyanskiy] To discover strangers on our native barricades is a matter for the militia or the KGB and, say, a major has adequate authority to deal with the situation you mentioned. In any case, this has no relation to the army or to the problems of military structural development.

Let us pose the question more broadly. When a military man says: "I am defending the Homeland," this is natural and normal. But what does this sentence on the lips of the military mean: "We are defending our socialist values"? People can believe in communism, in free enterprise, or in God. This is a world of ideas. And we can only defend the world of ideas ideologically and spiritually. Where is the army's place here? You said that the army guards the socialist choice. I would like you to explain your position on this issue.

[Akhromeyev] I will try to answer.

First. Today our society is multiparty. The army does not have the right to interfere in inter-party disputes. The army understands and has assimilated this. But the Armed Forces defend the values that are consolidated by the Constitution. That is their responsibility.

There are various attitudes in society toward the Constitution. Some say that it is obsolete and it suits others. But the serviceman does not care about this. He swears an oath to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and he is obliged to protect the existing Constitution of the USSR. In accordance with Article 31, the USSR Armed Forces are obliged to defend our country's integrity. This is especially obvious today when on March 17 the majority of the Soviet people voted for a single renewed Soviet Union. If someone infringes on our country's integrity, the army is obliged to defend the Homeland from these separatist activities. And we need everyone to know this. Using what methods? The army itself will not

determine this. The Congress of People's Deputies, USSR Supreme Soviet, and the President of the USSR will make the decisions on this issue.

Second. Our social system is socialist. It has also been consolidated by the Constitution of the USSR. A certain segment of our society does not like the socialist system. But then let these people seek changes to the Constitution of the USSR. If they amend the Constitution using the prescribed procedures, if the provision on the socialist society is removed from it, the situation will be changed.... Today the Armed Forces must protect the socialist choice. That is their constitutional responsibility. And as long as this provision is written in the Constitution, servicemen will defend it.

Today the Constitution of the USSR has begun, excuse me, to stick in separatists' and "new democrats'" throats. It is no accident that they are conducting themselves as if the Constitution of the USSR does not exist. They are attempting to ignore it. However, it is alive and in force.

They assert that the army is interfering in the affairs of Lithuania. This is untrue. On March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian Council of Ministers announced that the Constitution of the USSR is not in force on the territory of Lithuania. But Soviet troops are on the territory of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. They are guided by the Constitution of the USSR. So, who, you ask, is engendering confrontation? The leadership of Lithuania is engendering confrontation.

And one more thing. Laws have been put into force in Lithuania that discriminate against officer personnel and their families. Let them repeal these laws and the army will return to their barracks and it will not be seen. But the leadership of Lithuania is refusing to repeal them because it is seeking confrontation. The Lithuanian leaders are afraid of the normal constitutional process for a republic to secede from the USSR.

[Rogov] Any measures of discrimination against servicemen are completely intolerable. But the situation under which the internal function of the Armed Forces is being transformed into confrontation between the army and the people is causing concern among many people. This confrontation is frequently being provoked by extremist forces which want to win points on this. Nevertheless it is obvious that if harmony is disrupted in society, it will be impossible to restore constitutional order through the use of force. The thesis that armed force must not be used in foreign policy as a means of achieving political goals is 100 times more true for domestic policy.

[Akhromeyev] I do not agree that it is impossible to restore constitutional order using the Armed Forces. That approach is hypocritical and cunning. It is impossible to trample the Constitution and it is impossible to transform the country's laws into a simple sheet of paper. This is occurring everywhere in our country. The development of society without force is only possible under

the condition of compliance with the country's Constitution and other laws and with normal parliamentary activities.

While society was united, no internal functions arose for the army. But society has split and such forces have arisen which want to dismember the country and forcibly change the social and state system while acting in violation of the Constitution of the USSR and through the force of the crowd and unscrupulous politics but, as the referendum confirmed, it is supported by the people. B.N. Yeltsin states: We need to remove the President of the USSR from his post and transfer the power that was granted to him in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR to the Federation Council. But this is an unconstitutional path to eliminate state rule. This is a speech against the Union Constitution. This statement incited and aroused the country. It created a very acute state in the state. The army also expressed a negative attitude toward this statement.

The Armed Forces will not interfere with anything if the process in society proceeds within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR. But when the political struggle goes beyond the framework of the Constitution, the army and navy will stand in defense of the Constitution in accordance with the decisions of the highest state organs.

[Pumpyanskiy] I think that your opponents could easily challenge some of your positions. Defense of the Constitution is a good but not absolute argument. And not only because it is absolutely clear that our society deserves the best Constitution and will quite rapidly arrive at a new Constitution. Here you say that if they repeal the line about socialist choice tomorrow, the army will immediately cease to defend the socialist choice. But if today the army pours blood on this dubious altar, then how in your opinion will the conscience of the army and of our citizens dressed in uniform be clean tomorrow?

Honestly speaking, I am afraid of all of this rhetoric. Still recently they said: "The army is the leading detachment of the Party!", and now with the same fervor: "The Army defends the Constitution!". I would not begin to place the equals sign between the concepts of the defense of the homeland and defense of the constitution, it is not at all one and the same thing. And I do not like it very much when they make a fetish out of nothing. And you can defend the Constitution in our far from rule-of-law state in such a way that of the state only the Constitution will be left. They wanted to sort of confirm the logic of the Union using military force in Tbilisi but they broke the last ties and prodded the people beyond the boundary that all of us are clearing up right now both in the center and in the republic.

I would like for our disputes to be less about words and more about the essence. The Stalinist Constitution written by Bukharin was completely democratic but shielded the most dictatorial regime. Without a doubt, violations of the Constitution are deplorable. But Stalin

transformed the Stalinist Constitution into a scrap of paper. Brezhnev and his associates made senseless the Brezhnev Constitution. Did the army defend constitutional values at that time—freedom of speech and the right of nations to self-determination? Just General Grigorenko alone....

Is the Constitution—the Fundamental Law? Yes, but only in a normal, that is, democratic, civilized state and in our country always, at any level, the Fundamental Law was the word of the Party or other leadership and even spoken in a whisper, and still not a Constitution. And if we recognize the standard of interference or use of the army in the domestic political process, we will never become a normal state. You can be certain of that.

An opponent will also challenge another of your arguments. You say: enemies are demanding that the president quit and that the prime minister resign. These words sound threatening in our domestic ideological market. But say this to any other person in the West and he will not understand what the problem is. Political opponents have the right to criticize any official and to demand changes while naturally appealing to the voters. If some group of conspirators or some committee of salvation is secretly planning some sort of action and moreover with the use of the Armed Forces, this indisputably is a crime and the punishing right hand of the state must be directed against this crime.

[Akhromeyev] You treat your Constitution very lightly. For you the socialist social system is a "line" and for me it is 70 years of the life and struggle of our people. You can disagree with me but I am expressing my own position. Today three directions of the struggle which is being conducted using anti-communist methods have appeared.

First—against the highest organs of state rule. The expression of this is the demand to dissolve the Congress of People's Deputies, to dissolve the USSR Supreme Soviet, to relieve the President of the USSR of his position, and to delete the union government. The struggle is being conducted against the legally elected highest organs of power. Parliamentary methods are being replaced by the elements of the crowd. One step remains until the use of force.

The second direction is the bitter struggle against the CPSU. I am carefully analyzing it. Besides the beginning of the war in 1941 and Chernobyl, for me the most difficult year in my life was 1988 when they attacked the CPSU from all sides. Secret work went on for its erosion and then its elimination. This activity was carried out both from without and also from within. We still need to find out how this happened and who organized it.

And the third direction of the political struggle is the actions of certain forces for the disintegration the army and navy. I will say more about them.

[Pumpyanskiy] Everything that you are saying sounds very menacing but for some reason I do not want to be

frightened. Well, say, you frighten us with the replacement of the regime. But just what is the replacement of the regime? In 1985, a replacement of the regime occurred, did it not? In any case, I would not like to think that we have the same regime as under Chernenko and Brezhnev.

In fact the question is on a completely different plane. This is a political struggle and it must be conducted using exclusively political means and in so doing it is desirable to use civilized methods. I absolutely do not like how the political struggle is developing in our country. Here there is so much foolishness and so much lack of culture from the various sides: both from the right, from the left, and from everywhere. I am afraid that the public can lodge serious complaints against nearly every leading figure on our stage. Of course, we need to become civilized although this will hardly happen in one year or in one month. But there is one standard that, whether we want it or not, we must recognize as unwavering. This is not a fabrication of bourgeois democracy or of the scheming West.

The army is outside politics. The army must not become a political instrument. Armed people must not participate in the political struggle. A weapon is something completely different and not a political argument at all. A man with a gun is always right. But a man with an assault rifle is even more right.

But right now many people are getting the impression that the army is being drawn into the political process in our country. Not people who serve, not citizens in uniform, but the army as an institution. I do not like a demonstration organized at army higher echelons. This is incorrect.

[Akhromeyev] I do not intend to frighten you. I do not need to add too much to this. I did not talk to you about any sort of replacement of the regime. I talked about attempts to forcibly change the state system in our country. B.N. Yeltsin called for these attempts. And not only called for but also acted in this direction. And another thing. We have left the line of the dispute. I was talking about the unconstitutional methods of the struggle and you were talking about parliamentary methods. That is a substitution of the topic of discussion.

Is There a Threat of a Military Coup?

[Pumpyanskiy] That is not a substitution at all. A substitution is when they substitute the armed struggle for the political struggle and when they replace it with punitive operations. And so that everything is clear, I am not against a pro-army demonstration—this is a matter of citizens but a demonstration from the troops is already not a political demonstration but a military parade. The army can have its lobbyists, its eloquent defenders, and its ideologues, if you like. But when a column of tanks moves out onto the street and when the army seizes a television tower, this is already the refutation of politics and the infringement of social standards and rights. In a society that wants to be civilized, the

argument "the army will protect itself" is improper. The army cannot protect itself, this is a dangerous self-service.

[Akhromeyev] They have been asserting for three years now that the Armed Forces are preparing to and can commit a coup. Who is saying this? You are courteously silent and I am openly saying: B.N. Yeltsin, A.A. Sobchak, and G.A. Arbatov. These assertions are an obvious falsehood. So who is involving the army in the political process? It is these people. With what goal? In the political struggle—to split the army and navy, isolate the generals and senior officers from the rest of the army, and attempt to at least pull some part of it over to its own side. Is this really proper?

But you are not speaking the truth about punitive operations. The army has not conducted and is not conducting any punitive operations.

You express dissatisfaction with the fact that the army is protecting itself. Then appeal to the other side to cease political provocations and speculation against the Armed Forces. Servicemen as citizens of the USSR have the right to defend their honor and dignity. I did not come to see you with a pistol or with an assault rifle that you have talked about but with your weapon—words. In my opinion, I am also conducting myself normally. Let other people also resolve their differences just like we are resolving ours.

I am serving my fifty-first year in the army and I have been educated to respect the state's leadership, the Constitution, and our society (The entire Armed Forces command staff has been so educated). Where did this charge of a military coup come from? Does the threat of a coup really exist? Why are such statements being made? Are these the methods of political struggle against the Armed Forces? But they are absolutely intolerable.

That provocation has disappeared and another has begun—dictatorship is eminent. Whose dictatorship? Someone is inflaming the situation.

[Rusakov] Actually, representatives of a certain portion of society are expressing their concern because of the threat of a military coup and the establishment of a dictatorship. As far as I understand their logic, the question is not one of a home-grown Bonaparte, Pinochet, or Kornilov coming to power. They have in mind the possibility of an attempt of certain political forces or of some sort of influential unconstitutional figure to turn back the process of democratization and reform of society while relying on the military which has so aggressively begun to participate in the country's political life. What do you think, do these types of conversations have nothing in common with reality?

[Pumpyanskiy] I could also submit the "creeping coup" variation: exertion of pressure by the military on the President of the USSR for the purpose of terminating reform and the utilization of the army's capabilities as a

powerful independent political force to exert this pressure jointly with other forces who have positions close to it.

[Akhromeyev] I do not understand why you are saying "certain political forces" or some sort of "unconstitutional figure" will attempt to rely on the military. Right now such figures (and this is reality) are relying on other forces.

The military, while actively participating in the struggle against the anti-army campaign, is defending the army and navy from the destruction which G.A. Arbatov, OGONEK magazine, and certain others are carrying out. It is they who are attempting to carry out a "creeping coup" using military demonstrations and political strikes and they are striving to change the state system in our country through force.

Far from everyone can rely on the Armed Forces but only those to whom they are subordinate in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR. No social forces are able to rely on the army and navy. For some reason, you are displaying a special tact by not naming these forces by name.

[Pumpyanskiy] You were speaking about such an army tradition as boundless loyalty to the Politburo....

[Akhromeyev] I was talking about respect. The Politburo previously was the highest power. But right now this respect has been transferred to the highest organs of state rule.

[Pumpyanskiy] We see the processes that are occurring in the highest echelons of the CPSU. For example, many people think that the CPSU is moving to the right. I am afraid that it is already time to say so: The CPSU is on the RSFSR Communist Party platform.

At first we were struck by the divergencies between Gorbachev's pragmatism and his political and state actions and Polozkov's views. Let us assume, although it would seem that right now this hypothesis is not too relevant, that the Politburo ultimately decides that Gorbachev went too far in his reforms, rapprochement with the West, and in rocking the system, that Gorbachev's policies are promoting the breakup of the Union and it is no wonder that Yakovlev and Gorbachev inspired Lithuania's separatism....

[Akhromeyev] You do not need to place these leaders side by side. The emergence of the Lithuanian problem is the result of A.N. Yakovlev's errors, if you take only the subjective reasons.

[Pumpyanskiy] Well, that is what you think but others think differently. In any case, this is a question of an ideological and political dispute—and not about personalities but about the nature of processes. But here the Politburo makes a decision: Enough! You need to stop! And it is naturally appealing to the army. Help, comrades! In the kind traditions which have existed for 70

years. You need to save the Homeland! You need to save the socialist choice! Will we save?

[Akhromeyev] I cannot agree with you with regard to the situation in the CPSU and in the Central Committee Politburo. Here you and I have opposite opinions. "The CPSU is on the RSFSR Communist Party platform," as you say—this is an attempt to make two leading Party organs clash. Why? The CPSU and its component the RSFSR CP is a political force which is carrying out perestroika under M.S. Gorbachev's guidance. It makes up the foundation of the center, that is, of that political force on which the President of the USSR relies.

Let the suggestions expressed by you about possible CPSU activities with the indication of the names of several leaders also remain yours. I will refrain from discussing them. Today the CPSU Central Committee Politburo does not command the Armed Forces and cannot issue any type of orders to them.

You, dear comrades, while discussing democracy, are stubbornly proceeding from durable, established democracy. Then provide the country a normal situation and respect for the Armed Forces. Now you have it in for the army that is defending the people in ethnic conflicts with weapons in hand, eliminate the ethnic conflicts. Insure that Armenians do not kill Azeris and that Azeris do not kill Armenians and that airborne troops are not sent to a conflict area on alert. They will send, excuse me, not you but troops.

In your complaints, you proceed based on theoretical democracy which we do not have in this country and I proceed based on society's real state and the army's role in our society and not in some sort of model democracy. I would like you to express your attitude toward this problem. It turns out strangely: You only criticize, you do not like anything, but you do not propose anything specific.

The army does not operate anywhere without permission. They talk about Tbilisi. Take the USSR Procurator's conclusion on the events in Tbilisi. It states who was at fault. The army was not to blame for the events in Tbilisi. We had this procedure: The Politburo was the highest organ of state rule. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the Georgian CP Central Committee Bureau decided that the troops would act.

[Pumpyanskiy] Sergey Fedorovich, I agree with you that the army has real grounds for dissatisfaction and not only on the level of every day life but also on the political level.

Take these same Tbilisi events. Right now we will not discuss how the army acted there. But it is clear that the army did not arrive there on its own. Of course, Rodionov had the appropriate order. Of course, these decisions were made at the highest political levels and in the Politburo. And those people who made the decision must bear the primary responsibility for this turn of events and not the soldier or even the general. Here it is

the system, the regime, and the method of rule that we need to blame. Although complaints to that side are muffled. OGONEK is guilty of conducting an "anti-army line." But then those people who placed the army in Tbilisi or Baku are not even named.

Sergey Fedorovich, I also caught a certain displacement of emphasis in your words. You said, and the very idea made an impression on me, you said you civilians—the three of us specifically—ensure that we abide by the Constitution, mature democracy, and so forth, and then we, the army, will return to our barracks. But I must say that the three of us can only ensure more or less proper journalism in NOVOYE VREMYA magazine. You can submit such a massive complaint to society as a whole or to the powers that be.

[Akhromeyev] But today you are also submitting complaints to the army.

Can the Army Be a Constitutional Court?

[Pumpyanskiy] I will not argue with you here, I am precisely for ensuring order, democracy, and human rights in society. Only this complaint is not military to civilians. It is, if you like, general complaints to the regime and to our respected leadership. But in any case all complaints, problems, and contradictions must be solved using political means.

You spoke about a triad of principles on which Soviet foreign policy is based: demilitarization, democratization, and deideologization. Do these three "de's" apply to army policy within the country? Can the army be offended by the people or by the state or by democracy, even if it is underdeveloped democracy? Can the army assume a political role?

Yes, the Constitution is not perfect and society has become entangled in contradictions. But can the army assume the role of a constitutional court and the interpreter of the Constitution? Can the army be an ideological judge? Decide just what the socialist choice is? And having pronounced sentence—execute it themselves. Without delay....

[Akhromeyev] You are once again raising the issue about the Armed Forces' independent political role in society. But to respond to the activities of the forces that are conducting the anti-army campaign and to rebuff them still does not mean that it is assuming a political role. The army is not playing such a role. It cannot solve anything independently. It does not pretend to a political role in society.

You mentioned the committee of national salvation in Lithuania. But why did you not cite the example of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet which "seceded from the Soviet Union" during the course of a single night? What was that, in accordance with the Constitution? Then you should place these unconstitutional activities side by side—the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and that same committee. Why did that committee come into the

world? Because of the separatist policy of Landsbergis and the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet which are operating unconstitutionally!

[Rogov] The army has an internal function. And actually, when some citizens kill others, the army must stand between them while receiving blows from both sides. But when the army itself formulates its position on some political issue or other, the country will not move toward democratization but toward the creation of a regime close to those that exist in a number of countries of Latin America and the Near and Middle East.

[Akhromeyev] I repeat, our army never occupied and does not occupy the position of a political force in society. It states: its duty is to protect the Constitution and our values and it is subordinate to the highest organs of state rule.

[Rogov] But you say: the army agrees or the army does not agree. What does that mean? Or: the army states. Who is that—the minister of defense? The chief of the General Staff? Who speaks for the army?

[Akhromeyev] Of course, the minister and the chief of the General Staff speak for the army. Other military personnel also speak—deputies and other servicemen who speak in the press but already in their own names. If political charges (a plot, coup, etc.) are pressed against the army and navy, they must also respond to them in the appropriate manner. And here's who they are: Yazov, Moiseyev, and Akhromeyev. But, since the anti-army campaign is continuing, Petrushenko and Alksnis have appeared. Yes, they have appeared. Action causes reaction.

Accusers are acting and defenders have also appeared. And if political speculation and activities to destroy them continue to be conducted against the army and navy, then Ivanovs, Petrovs, and Sidorovs will yet appear. They will not let the Armed Forces be pushed around. It is time to end the anti-army campaign.

[Rogov] There are differences in the positions of Petrushenko and Akhromeyev, Alksnis and Yazov. Does the worsening of the political struggle within the Armed Forces really correspond to democratic standards? And, in my opinion, it is illegitimate when independent positions arise on any issue among those figures of ours who are simultaneously professional politicians and retain certain positions in the army.

[Akhromeyev] Differences in opinions and positions and the worsening of the political struggle are mainly occurring around and not within the Armed Forces. And this worsening has been engendered by the forces about whom I have already spoken. The primary reason you raise the issue about military deputies is because a political struggle for power using unconstitutional methods has flared in society. What can the army do when the matter is reduced to the fate of the Homeland and its own fate? Of course, the army will not remain a bystander to the solution of these issues. If the issue is

raised about the integrity of the Homeland and the processes are unguided, if they try to dismember the country through force, then just who will remain a bystander?

[Pumpyanskiy] Well, thank you, Sergey Fedorovich. In my opinion, we have expressed ourselves in sufficient detail. One sad observation.

The second half of our discussion on the army's internal functions in the USSR turned out to be a bit longer than the first in which we touched on problems of external security. I am afraid that even in life that turn has occurred where the internal function outweighs the external function. And this is dangerous. If we proceed from the fact that only the army can keep the state and our society from falling, this is evidence of an incurable disease.

The second observation is more cheerful. While proposing the idea of a discussion, it seems to me that you willingly or unwillingly proceeded from the fact that you were dealing with an enemy who, using his own editorial advantages, was attempting to score a few more points or even simply trying to talk a bit more. It is no wonder you stubbornly stressed that parity was necessary in the dialogue—just like during negotiations with the Americans. Now I hope you have become convinced that we sooner profess the principle of reasonable sufficiency. We are not at all embarrassed that your line will occupy more space and ultimately we also invited you to listen to your arguments. It is true that someone might say precisely this: "The Marshal certainly advocates parity but that parity where he has one-and-a-half to two times as many—tanks or lines." I am afraid that I will not be able to object....

Somehow or other, we provided our readers what we had to give them: information and the opportunity to compare positions on this vitally important topic.

[Akhromeyev] Military force does not keep our society from falling. There is an enormous potential of other forces in it. They will bring the country out of the crisis and they will heal society. The army and the navy are aides in this important matter. I am neither sad nor happy with regard to our polemics. We conducted the ideological dispute properly and as equals. Thank you for providing me the opportunity to completely set forth my views. However, in the end it turned out: My views are known, I am for a united Federated Union and for the socialist choice. You did not set forth your views. That is too bad.

[Pumpyanskiy] Really? I do not think that the readers really need loud declarations from us. Our views on these and on other problems are in every issue of the magazine and far from everything that is printed in the magazine reflects precisely our views. Yes and they are from identical among us. If you wish, our choice is freedom of choice. And we are striving not to confuse glasnost with soglasnost [harmony].

Once again thank you for visiting us with the "weapon of words" although we must admit that I like one of the words in this word combination more than the other....

The editorial staff invites readers to continue the discussion on the topic "The Army and Society."

Dep Minister For Nuclear Energy on Weapons Industry

91WC0092A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK in Russian No 12 Mar 91 p 12

[Interview with Professor Viktor Nikitovich Mikhaylov, deputy minister of nuclear energy and industry, by L. Chernenko under rubric "Without the Stamp 'Secret"'; place and date not given: "The Keys From the Nuclear Arsenal"]

[Text] "If we had begun work on developing the atomic bomb today, with the present state of our economy and society, more likely than not we would never have built it." This statement by one of the developers of Soviet nuclear weapons shocked me. How come? We could do it in the hungry post-war years, in conditions of devastation and hunger, but not now? True, then the society was in a state of moral euphoria, we were ready to endure hardships for the sake of "never ever having war." And now we attack our military-industrial complex much more vehemently than we once did the American. Our once closed "model" cities have now become coupon cities. And the builders of the nuclear-missile shield, people who had once been our national pride, feel themselves far from comfortable in the wake of surprise attacks by politicians of the new wave. Yet even in this difficult situation they continue to work. On what? This was the subject of our conversation with Professor Viktor Nikitovich Mikhaylov, deputy minister of nuclear energy and industry.

[Chernenko] So what are the scientists and specialists in the field of nuclear weapons working on now? After all, it would seem that we have built a huge arsenal possessing tremendous destructive force. What else do we need?

[Mikhaylov] Although our task is to develop weapons we are, nevertheless, engaged in pure science. For nuclear weapons are based on highly complex physical phenomena which are extremely difficult to calculate. This requires fundamental knowledge, flight of the imagination, and high intelligence. That is why in this work we need leading scientists, who even today are continuing research in this field. Now, thanks to the efforts of science and industry, we have built a large arsenal, thousands of nuclear warheads. But to maintain it we must work constantly to increase the safety of nuclear weapons. This is one of the most important problems on which we are working. We must ensure the safety of nuclear weapons in storage and transportation, moreover, with due consideration of all possible emergency situations, even the possibility of unauthorized access. For that we are developing special designs to increase the

safety of nuclear munitions, using insensitive explosives, special locks, refractory casings, and materials with longer shelf life.

It should not be forgotten that the US and its NATO allies are continuing to improve their nuclear arsenal and develop new types of weapons. This is, primarily, development of third-generation nuclear weapons. Obviously we, too, are working in this area.

[Chernenko] What are third-generation nuclear weapons?

[Mikhaylov] First of all, I would like to say that any sensible professional, whether a military man or a nuclear scientist, realizes that fighting with weapons that now constitute our nuclear arsenal is tantamount to suicide. They are not so much combat weapons as deterrents, weapons of global politics. A nuclear warhead's target may be very small, but the blast will nevertheless cover a large area and the territory contaminated by radioactive fallout will be even larger.

Unlike today's warheads, third-generation weapons will have a small fraction of the yields global contamination effects, but with the same destructive capability. They will be weapons of directional, selective emission of energy on a target. Such a weapon works like a scalpel. A laser beam, electromagnetic, X-ray or microwave radiation, a shock wave: the force of any of these factors is concentrated in the direction of the target.

In other words, third-generation nuclear weapons constitute a special danger, because, in view of their local, directional capability, high accuracy and small radioactive contamination, the temptation may rise to use them globally without the risk of global consequences. They no longer are a deterrent, but a combat weapon, and that is the primary danger. In other words, this is a weapon possessing new qualities in respect of safety, effectiveness, reliability and global consequences. Its development is now underway, and it may well appear within ten years or so. The only barrier to this would be the total prohibition of nuclear tests.

[Chernenko] Isn't it possible to improve nuclear weapons without carrying out tests? After all, there are methods of mathematically simulating the most complex processes on computers...

[Mikhaylov] Of course, we use computers to mathematically simulate processes taking place during explosions, but they are based on data from previous explosions. Incidentally, the computer capabilities of our centers are one-tenth of those of similar centers in the US: Los Alamos and the Livermore National Laboratory. Nevertheless, our experts have been obtaining a high level of research results with this hardware. But this cannot go on for long. Sooner or later quantity turns into quality.

Firstly, it should be understood that modern nuclear weapons constitute a highly complex scientific and technical system and not all the processes on which its

functions are based can be studied in laboratory conditions. How, for example, can you reproduce the conditions of an explosion in a laboratory? It requires enormous temperatures of hundreds of millions of degrees and tremendous pressures of tens of millions of atmospheres. It is simply impossible to reproduce all this in laboratory conditions. That is why we go from experiment to experiment, from test to test. Because physics is an experimental science. For us a theory is a bridge between two experiments. Their results are used to verify a theoretical model.

Without tests it is also impossible to make nuclear weapons safer, improve the design of nuclear munitions, test the effects of a nuclear explosion on weapons and military materiel, and gain a deeper understanding of the mechanism of the process. Also, time to time it is necessary to check nuclear munitions stored in arsenals. And this, too, requires tests.

[Chernenko] In other words, tests are essential to maintain nuclear arsenals in combat readiness, to improve and develop nuclear weapons. Now it is clear why, against the background of other major disarmament agreements, there has been virtually no progress on the problem of banning tests.

[Mikhaylov] If the US would accept the Soviet proposal and agree to a complete ban on nuclear tests then it would be simply impossible to improve atomic weapons or develop new types of them. It would be an important step along the road to a nuclear-free world. But so far our proposals about a complete test ban remain unanswered.

Lately the Soviet Union has repeatedly declared unilateral moratoriums on nuclear blasts. Since 1985 our test sites have remained silent for a total of two and a half years. However, the Soviet initiative has met with no response from the US or other nuclear powers. During the Soviet moratorium nuclear tests continued in Nevada, Lobnor and Murorua Atoll. Can we accept a unilateral test ban or nuclear disarmament in such conditions? This would disturb the existing parity between the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the USA.

[Chernenko] Viktor Nikitovich, as you yourself said, nuclear weapons constitute a complex scientific and technical system. Its development requires the participation of leading scientists and specialists of the highest class. They also supervise industrial production. And then what? You hand the finished product over to the military, and that's it! Do you maintain author supervision at the stage when nuclear munitions have been handed over to the customer, or is he the unchallenged owner of the "goods"? What, in general, are the relations between the scientists, the manufacturers and the military?

[Mikhaylov] Together with them we are tackling the same task: working to strengthen the country's defenses. And in this we have good, business-like relations. It should be noted that the military know how to listen to the

views of science. True, not always. Sometimes they don't like the scientific-technical approach we try to implement in tackling all issues. Of course, when there were few nuclear munitions we were able to keep them constantly in our field of vision and implement a kind of "author supervision." But as the number of weapons in the nuclear arsenal increased it became harder and harder for us to do this. The nuclear weapons stored in arsenals are becoming less and less under our control, while the military are striving to assume full control. Yet questions of maintenance and storage of nuclear munitions require a scientific and technical approach, the participation of scientists and specialists. After all, military decisions are based on orders, while for us every decision is based on knowledge of the physics of highly complex processes, extensive discussions in commissions of experts, calculations and experiments.

At present, working with customers we see their desire for greater independence from science. We, on the other hand, strive for our word to be decisive in questions of nuclear armaments. It is quite clear that this cannot be left to the military alone. The army, science and industry must work together on this. The "keys" of the nuclear arsenal should not be only in one hands.

[Chernenko] Nowadays theft of weapons has become fairly common. Isn't there the danger that nuclear weapons may end up in the hands of extremists?

[Mikhaylov] This is absolutely impossible. Nuclear weapons are kept in special depots and are guarded extremely reliably. It should also be noted that there are no such depots in areas of ethnic conflicts. Although, of course, in principle nowadays the question of where and how to store nuclear weapons is becoming no less complex than questions of their development and manufacture. To resolve it we need not only technical but also organizational and political measures. And additional investments are, of course, also necessary.

[Chernenko] Lately there have been calls to "divide" nuclear weapons among the republics.

[Mikhaylov] The nation's nuclear arsenal was created by the entire people, all republics contributed to it. The idea of dividing it is quite absurd from the political, economic, scientific and technical points of view. No single republic has either the economic or the scientific and technical capabilities for this.

And then, imagine that instead of one nuclear power—the Soviet Union—there would suddenly appear fifteen states possessing nuclear weapons. What about international law, the non-proliferation treaty? It is hard to even imagine the possible consequences of this in conditions of mounting ethnic strife. Incidentally, political instability in a country possessing nuclear weapons is fraught with serious consequences and cannot fail to alarm the world community. And the following question may also arise: does a country in which political instability is mounting have the right to possess nuclear weapons? Shouldn't international control be established over them?

We must foresee any possible scenario and not allow such a development of events, because that would mean the collapse of our state. The nuclear-missile shield was built by the efforts of the entire nation, the entire

country. This mighty potential makes us an influential world power, serves as a guarantee of our safety, a guarantee of the integrity of the state. It is one of the forces cementing the federation.

Origins, Specifications of ZSU-23-4 "SHILKA"

91UM0436A Moscow TEKHNIKA I MOLODEZHI
in Russian No 12, Dec 90 pp 18-19

[Article by Sergey Gryankin, under the rubric: "TEKHNIKA I MOLODEZHI Historical Series": "ZSU-23-4"]

[Text] While analyzing the results of the 1973 Middle East War, foreign military commentators have noted that Syrian missileers destroyed nearly 100 Israeli aircraft during the first three days of fighting. In their opinion, this was explained by the fact that the dense fire of the Soviet-made automatic ZSU-23-4's forced Israeli pilots to depart low altitudes and precisely into the surface-to-air missiles' engagement envelope.

The appearance in the 1950's of surface-to-air missile complexes that were capable of destroying air targets at medium and high altitudes resulted in the fact that ground attack and bomber aircraft pilots mastered a new tactical technique—flying to surface targets at low, down to 300 meters, and extremely low altitudes. Antiaircraft missile and gun crews simply could not manage to destroy a fast-moving aircraft that attacks during a period of 15-30 seconds. New equipment was needed—mobile, quick-response, highly automated equipment that is capable of conducting fire from a halt and while moving. Soviet designers, who immediately encountered a series of serious problems since they had never before worked on anything like this, also began to work on these anti-aircraft weapon systems.

First of all this concerned the layout. At first, they proposed installing the comparatively light but cumbersome electronic apparatus inside the self-propelled weapon's hull but this variant was rejected for a number of reasons, first of all due to the radar unit's long wave guides. Then they decided to mount the weapon, equipment, and crew seats in a large, closed turret. It is true that the tactical technical task permitted it to be restricted to a semi-closed vehicle however, a roof was needed to protect the electronics from humidity and dust.

The 37- and 57-mm cannons that were in the inventory at that time did not suit the designers because of their cassette loading mechanism (hence, the low rate of fire) and the great weight that required powerful heavy duty actuators. It is another matter that the belt-fed 23-mm automatic cannon, incidentally, permitted them to get by without a loader. And the comparatively low firepower of its fragmentary round was entirely compensated for by the significant weight of the projectiles fired in one second—this method has long been used in fighter aircraft.

ZSU-23-4 "SHILKA"

Weight in tons	20.5
Target detection range in kilometers	12

Target detection range using automatic tracking	10
Vertical firing range in meters	100-1,500
Slant range	2,500
Horizontal firing range	2,000
Vertical angle of fire	-4° ...+85°
Horizontal angle of fire	360°
Azimuth elevation speed	70° per second
Quadrant elevation speed	60° per second
Rate of fire	Not less than 3,400 rounds per minute
Projectile muzzle velocity in meters per second	950-1,000
Combat load	2,000 rounds
Engine	V-6R, 280 horsepower
Maximum speed in kilometers per hour	50
Range in kilometers	450
Crew	four men

Selection of the location for the radar antenna caused quite a few problems. If the barrels are placed to lead the target before firing, a discrepancy arises between the lines of fire and the radar's electronic axis because of the fact that they, the barrels, can become interference for the radar beam. At first they thought of installing the canon in pairs along the sides of the turret and the antenna and optical sight ahead of them. However, the spaced artillery systems would have increased the rotating turret's inertia factor and asymmetrical loads on the actuators would have arisen if one had failed. Furthermore, the antenna dish would have blocked the gunner's vision of the forward hemisphere. Therefore, space for the barrels was allocated in the center of the vehicle and the antenna was mounted ahead and to the side of them. However, the muzzle wave destroyed the radar dish during firing at a test range....

In the final variant, the antenna is mounted on the aft portion of the vehicle on a high stand (the radar dish is folded down over the roof of the power plant in the travel configuration) and the barrels—ahead, in two tiers between which is located a box with the combat load.

The manufactured turrets were broken in on movable mock-ups that were made based on the SU-85 which they proposed using as a chassis for the future vehicle after having removed the organic cannon and reduced the armor plating. They managed to save four tons and the weight of the completely equipped turret exceeded eight tons! The PT-76 was more appropriate but a basic transformation of the hull was required to install the heavy and complex 2,700 mm diameter race under the turret. It was best of all to design a special hull. And that is what they did—the turret was supported on a T-54 race that was dropped lower than the upper edge of the sides and that was supported on a light box-like frame

that insured the durability of the lightly-armored hull. Its lower cylindrical section was successfully mounted on a tracked chassis.

The overall layout was classic—the command and control section in front, the combat section behind it, and the motor and transmission section in the aft portion. An ejection cooling system was used to increase the specific power of the V-6R augmented engine. It required a total of 2.2-2.5 percent of its output (versus 10-12 percent for a fan). The engine's air intake was equipped with a labyrinthine system of partitions where large particles of dust were trapped and then the air passed through the tunnel along the side and ended up in the primary filter with ejected suction of the remaining dust with the exhaust gases. Torque was transmitted from the engine to the drive wheels through a change-gear train, the main clutch, the five-speed synchronized transmission, planetary turning gears, and side transmissions. They borrowed the drive train with six single-line support rollers from the PT-76 and the high action torsion suspension and powerful shock-absorbers on the first, fifth left, and sixth right assemblies insured a smooth ride. The service life of the tracks has been increased by installing face joint rubber bushings so that abrasive particles do not end up in the friction parts. The fuel supply is located in internal tanks: One in the engine compartment and the other to the driver's right.

The electrical supply operated off of the primary engine during a march on a good road and a DT-4 80-horsepower gas turbine generator turned on automatically on hard dirt roads or in a stationary position which, although it consumed a lot of gas, on the other hand provided a load one minute after it was turned on. Mobility and off-road capability equal to tanks permitted the combat vehicle to cover troops on the

march—effective fire was conducted thanks to a line of fire and sight stabilization system.

The radar unit provided automatic search, detection, and destruction of air targets at altitudes from 100 to 1,500 meters. While operating in the combined mode, when radar provides the range and the optical sight provides the angular coordinates, fire is conducted against aircraft flying at extremely low altitudes. If they use jamming or fire radar beam-riding missiles, the radar is turned off and the gunner carries out aiming using the optical sight.

The ZSU-23-4 "SHILKA" self-propelled antiaircraft system was accepted into the inventory after comprehensive testing. It has been modernized several times during the production process. In particular, the radar instrument air feed system has undergone significant changes. Since cooling for it (and consequently for reliable operation) required a constant stream of especially clean air, an air intake with an efficient cleaning system has been installed in the forward section of the hull. At the same time, the ventilation capacity of the combat section has also been increased.

The possibility of replacing the four-barrel 23-mm gun with a six-barrel 30-mm cannon with rotating barrels has been studied which would allow a sharp increase in the density of fire. However, this artillery system, developed for the navy, turned out to be too finicky for ground conditions.

Furthermore, comparative testing of various antiaircraft systems has demonstrated that, even with its organic weapons, the "SHILKA" does not lag behind an S-60 four 57-mm cannon battery consisting of 12 combat vehicles and a crew of 57 officers and men.

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Investigation of Mi-8 Crash

*91UM0558A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Apr 91 First Edition p 4*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel N. Astashkin: "Mission Accomplished—Not All Back"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] As reported in the mass media, on 4 April an Armed Forces Mi-8 helicopter belonging to the North Caucasus Military District crashed in the Prielbrus Mountains while performing a rescue operation. The crew and four passengers were killed. The accident is under investigation by the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Our correspondent visited the site of the accident. Presented below are details of the tragedy that occurred in the mountains.

They were friends. They often flew together on rescue missions in search of people who were killed or in distress. That was true for the Far East, where they served in a separate search-and-rescue detachment, and here, in the Prielbrus Mountains.

However, on that day Military Pilot 1st Class Major Aleksandr Karyagin was on a somewhat different mission: leading a search for persons who lost their lives, including his friend, Military Pilot 1st Class Aleksandr Skiba.

On that day—4 April—the helicopter, belonging to the Nalchik Air Detachment of the North Caucasus Directorate of Civil Aviation, was in the process of landing tourists onto a mountain. The craft suffered engine failure during the flight. The crew had to go for a forced landing at a height of 3,600 meters. The fate of the people aboard is unknown. Especially alarming was the fact that there were too many people present in the mountains. That is why Kh. Metov, commander of the Nalchik Combined Air Detachment, requested assistance from the North Caucasus Military District, which responded by mounting a search-and-rescue operation in the Prielbrus area. The mission of search and evacuation was assigned to the squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Nikolayenya.

"When the question arose of whom to send on the mission," said Anatoliy Konstantinovich in our conversation, "I picked the crews of Majors Skiba and Karyagin without hesitating. They had acted in a calm and collected manner in extremely difficult situations, working in harmony without the need for preliminary explanations. Judge for yourself. In May of last year, mud flows carried away two villages and covered eight kilometers of a road. We were faced with the task of evacuating the populace, who were in dire distress. The crews of Skiba and Karyagin flew out more than 80 persons."

In March of this year, a group of tourists was lost in the mountains. A search team called together for this purpose was unsuccessful. Then the crews of Skiba and

Karyagin entered the picture. They soon detected the tracks of the mountain climbers, who had been overtaken by an avalanche in the gorge. The site where the people died was located.

Thus, once more they had searched together for people who suffered a disaster.

"The weather had been good since early morning," A. Karyagin explained to me. "We took off from the airfield and assumed flight level. He was flying at 4,200 meters, I, at 4,500. We arrived at the search area. Major Skiba took the rescuers aboard and took off. I spotted the helicopter in the gorge as it was executing a forced landing and communicated its coordinates to Aleksandr. He rose to a safe altitude and performed a 360-degree banked turn to follow the tourists' tracks, which led into the gorge of Kuban River. He radioed me the message: 'On the way to check out the gorge.' The people were soon spotted as they fired signal flares. Major Skiba landed his craft and took the people aboard to evacuate them to a safe place. Some time later I departed from the search area and headed toward the airfield."

That was the last time the two crews flew on the same mission. The helicopter piloted by Major A. Skiba crashed in the last half of that day. Three crew members and four passengers died. What happened?

"We still do not know the exact cause of the accident," said Colonel General of Aviation Ye. Rusanov, chief of Flight Safety, USSR Ministry of Defense. "One thing is sure: The weather was such that the crew had every right to refuse to go. Two tourists watched as the helicopter flew overhead and started a turn to reduce speed prior to landing. The weather was deteriorating by the minute. It seems that the rotary wing craft hit a cliff. This of course is only a guess."

PVO Establishes Commission to Investigate Missile Explosion

*91UM0558B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Mar 91 First Edition p 5*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col A. Yurkin in the "Incidents" column: "Echo of an Explosion"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] An explosion occurred in an Air Defense Forces unit stationed near the settlement of Chernogolovka, Noginskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast. Our correspondent requested Colonel General V. Litvinov, first deputy chief of the PVO [Air Defense Troops], to render an explanation of what occurred on that small installation.

"We have organized a commission to investigate the incident," said Vladimir Vasilyevich. "I was placed in charge. I immediately went to the site of the blast, then I and the other commission members set out to ascertain the cause. I can tell you that on 22 March, at 1600 hours, there was an explosion of several surface-to-air missiles

fitted with conventional warheads. They were located on a vehicle parked in a special area and were awaiting storage."

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Why were they located on the vehicle?

[Litvinov] They were about to be unloaded.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Were there any victims, and what damage was caused?

[Litvinov] A sentry was killed. There were no other damages or victims. The blast wave blew out windows of some Chernogolovka buildings. The explosion was

directed upward by a high embankment; the force of the blast was also reduced by thick forest bordering the unit.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The mass media—the "free and independent"—accused the Army of covering up the incident.

[Litvinov] I immediately submitted all the results of preliminary investigation to the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center. Press representatives could obtain complete details there. We will make all the facts available upon completion of the investigation. We have no intention of keeping anything secret.

Navy Experiment in Professionalization Viewed

91UM0578A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1,
Jan 91 pp 21-25

[Interview with Rear Adm V. Zatula, chief of the ship combat training department of the navy, and his deputy, Candidate of Military Sciences Captain 1st Rank V. Dobrovolskiy, by KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL correspondent under the rubric "Military Reform—Problems and Opinions": "Will the Experiment Produce Anything?"]

[Text] *An experiment that has begun in the navy, connected with the idea of conversion to a professional army, is attracting the attention of many today. Our correspondent discussed the essence of this experiment and the problems that are coming to light in the course of it with the chief of the ship combat training department of the navy, Rear Adm V. Zatula, and his deputy, Candidate of Military Sciences Capt 1st Rank V. Dobrovolskiy.*

[Correspondent] What is the essence of the experiment?

[Zatula] The essence is that the principle of manpower acquisition of ship crews on a volunteer basis, *i.e.* by contract, will be implemented in some organizations in all four fleets. The contract can moreover be concluded only by those sailors who have served no less than six months. These specialists, having signed a contract with the navy and receiving up to 250-300 rubles a month, will continue to fulfill their obligations (for up to three years) with the rights of conscript servicemen. The goal of the experiment is to check how viable the principle of acquisition of ship crews with volunteer servicemen is, what it will provide for combat readiness.

[Correspondent] And how did the idea for the experiment come up? Was any research done, was any experience taken into account?

[Dobrovolskiy] Unfortunately, no research has been done on this problem, as far as I know. And based on what, anyway? We have acquired experience only in the acquisition of warrant officer personnel. Many of them serve conscientiously and handle their duties, *i.e.* they are professionals.

[Correspondent] What is planned to raise the qualifications of those who will complete their service under contract?

[Zatula] Nothing yet. Those who come to serve under contract should already be excellent specialists. And later we will see.

[Correspondent] That means you feel that it is enough to offer a sailor 250-300 rubles a month, and he will come in to volunteer?

[Zatula] No, I do not think so. The question of conversion to a professional army, I am convinced, has to be resolved as part of a whole. Provide a person with

housing, and not in a barracks but in an apartment, give him a hospital, his children a school or kindergarten, provide something for culture and leisure. The 250 rubles mean nothing today. People receive several times more in the co-ops. And without such hellish tension. Will we be able, with our disordered economy, to provide much, if not all, of the aforementioned? Frankly speaking, I am not so sure. We have thousands of officers and warrant officers who have not had their own nook for years... I feel, in short, that a person who comes to serve under contract should have everything for efficient labor and normal human relaxation. Nothing will come of it otherwise.

[Dobrovolskiy] Yes, the warrant officers are professionals. But we are over 50 percent understaffed with warrant officers on surface ships alone today. Why? The people don't come in. Due to poor social protections and lack of everyday amenities. And I am deeply convinced that until these problems are solved, we can scarcely hope for the full manning of crews with professionals. Look, after all, at how they approach pay in the British Navy. There, as we know, the sailors are the highest-paid category.

As for the professional training of specialists under contract, our task, in my opinion, is to select the best specialists.

[Correspondent] But won't the transition from three-year to two-year terms of enlistment affect the proficiency of the sailors that you want to invite to become professionals?

[Zatula] I feel that this transition is not quite correct. After all, it's not because of the good life in the navy that they serve three years. The equipment is exceptionally complicated. Various types of economic and construction operations to which the personnel are constantly being diverted—both from the training subunits and the ships—also need to be taken into account here. And sometimes it happens that there is not enough time to teach professionalism, or that which is needed for war.

[Dobrovolskiy] I also feel that the decision to convert to two-year service is in no way justified. Let's proceed from this—does the combat readiness of the ships, units and formations gain from it? The discharges of the two- and three-year terms will coincide, after all, and at some time the percentage of personnel discharged will be very large. And take the decisions of the supreme soviets of the Baltic republics, Georgia and Armenia banning their youth from serving outside the borders of their own regions. Some of our ships are manned at 60-70 percent at best. The crew is often hastily filled out, without the proper checking of the newcomers, before a cruise to perform combat training missions at sea. What combat teamwork can we talk about here?

[Correspondent] You think that the situation will improve with the coming of professionals?

[Zatula] I should tell you this. Everything that exists in society—slovenliness, irresponsibility—we also have in the navy. Remember the explosion of the gun turret on the cruiser Admiral Senyavin that occurred, it was established, through the fault of the personnel? And then what? After the gun turret was repaired, on the very next firing, another attempt to violate the instructions for executing the firing. And note that the personnel there were well trained, we ourselves had tested them repeatedly. I don't even know how to explain it.

In the U.S. Navy, by the way, which we hold up as a model, there are no fewer accidents. Here are the facts. An explosion in a main gun turret occurred during firing on the battleship Iowa off Puerto Rico in 1989, as the result of which 47 people died and 12 were injured. The destroyer Kincaid hit a merchant vessel in the Malacca Strait, and people were killed. On the training aircraft carrier Lexington, a crash of a trainer aircraft when landing on the deck, as the result of which five were killed and twelve injured. They also have accidents on submarines. There were more than 20 major accidents in all that year on the surface vessels and submarines of the United States, as the result of which more than 60 people were killed and 90 injured. The year 1989 saw one of the highest accident rates in the last twenty years for the Soviet Navy. We had 45 people killed (counting the submarine Komsomolets) over the year, and there were three major accidents.

Another fact. Five support vessels were disabled as the result of accidents during the major Team Work 88 naval maneuvers of NATO in the Norwegian Sea. The exercises had to be curtailed. We have not had a single serious accident or breakdown in five years of exercises conducted by the Ministry of Defense and the naval commander-in-chief, with the participation of about 1,000 ships overall.

Briefly speaking, when we have true professionals, that will not mean that we will be able to avoid unforeseen situations, but I am sure that there will be fewer accidents.

[Correspondent] We probably should also talk about the ships that await the professionals.

[Zatula] We have very good ship systems [sistemy korabley]. As for their quality, there are many shortcomings connected with production flaws and the low level of maintaining the ships in their proper condition.

[Dobrovolskiy] It must also be acknowledged that a portion of the ships are now functionally obsolete, and some are being operated with run times between servicing that have been lengthened many times over. The poor ship-repair capabilities of the fleets is aggravating the picture still further. The crews thus have to spend much of the time relegated for combat training to keeping the ships afloat. Take our aircraft-carrying cruiser Minsk, very much needed by the fleet. Its time period between servicing has expired, the ship requires serious repairs both to the hull and to systems... The

crew, however, due to the overloading of the shipyards, is repairing defects in worn-out equipment virtually 24 hours a day, instead of combat training.

[Correspondent] You don't envy the hired sailors that will end up serving on that ship...

[Dobrovolskiy] No, of course not. Who wants to be sharpening and tuning all the time?...

[Correspondent] And you feel that things will get better with the transition to the principle of manpower acquisition under contract on the ships?

[Dobrovolskiy] Before answering that question, I want to recall one episode. I had some reason to become acquainted with two curious documents from an American aircraft carrier. One of them was discussing the conviction by a court-martial of a contract serviceman, who had failed to pass examinations for reaching the level of independent work in the stipulated period of time due to a lack of personal discipline. What punishment do you think he received?

[Correspondent] A fine, probably?

[Dobrovolskiy] Demotion to enlisted rank—and he was at a rank equal to our warrant officer—a fine of 600 dollars and a prison term of three months. In the other case, a sailor, also a professional, who was 45 minutes late to the ship was demoted to enlisted rank, fined 400 dollars and sentenced to six months in prison.

Why am I bringing this up? Our army, of course, is strong in moral spirit and discipline should be maintained first and foremost by awareness. But if a person does not have the necessary awareness, what happens? The corresponding material actions must take effect. And if we borrow the volunteer principle for manpower acquisition of crews from the Americans, then perhaps it makes sense to take their techniques for reinforcing discipline as well. I feel that a professional army must be taken on as a whole, with its whole mechanism. Individual links of it will not take. And as for the functional mechanism of a professional army—I personally am not sure that it has been sufficiently studied here or will find application. Which gives rise to the apprehension that our volunteer contract sailor will be working in construction, mowing hay, delivering something instead of combat training as before... But now he'll be getting 250-300 rubles instead of 5-8.

[Zatula] Of course, the people engaged in combat training should be protected against fatigue duties with the conversion to a professional navy. Let the corresponding rear services take that on.

[Correspondent] And have those services been created?

[Zatula] No, they have not.

[Correspondent] And?...

[Dobrovolskiy] Understand, it is not that important if there are fatigue subunits [khozyaistvennye podrazdeleniye] or not during the course of the experiment. They could, after all, be replaced with other ones, not active-duty crews. And I personally am worried in that regard that "hothouse" conditions could be created for the experiment such that the outcome is the best of all results. And life then shows something quite different. We must create the corresponding fatigue subunits, build additional housing, schools and hospitals, adopt some standard documents that socially protect the rights of the contract sailors. I am thus deeply convinced that the experiment is needed, but only on the scale of the whole navy. So as to ensure the **purity** of it.

[Correspondent] Will the introduction of any corrective measures in the training of ship personnel be needed, in your opinion, with conversion to a professional basis?

[Dobrovolskiy] We have developed and incorporated a new system of crew training in the navy. The training exercises used to be rehearsed by elements, in isolation, at different times and often not under the same conditions that could be encountered in battle. It was felt that the fulfillment of these elements was able to ensure the needed readiness of the ship. I would note that this concept has existed for as long as our navy. From a scientific point of view, however, it is not valid. And with the conversion to a volunteer principle of manpower acquisition, when professionals will be coming to the systems and mechanisms right away, it could even be harmful, in my opinion. The exercises will thus now be run in their entirety, as part of a whole set.

[Correspondent] You feel that will occur painlessly?

[Zatula] No, I don't. I am sure that it will require that people have not only excellent special training, but good moral and psychological tempering as well. High tension will be needed. A professional, I feel, will have to be dealt with as a professional, and not as a young sailor would be. Otherwise there's no point in tackling this at all. And it seems to me that this aspect deserves attention. It is not easy for many commanders to force themselves to see in their subordinate not only a sailor fulfilling his duty to the state, but also a person who has come voluntarily to serve on the ship. Yesterday's methods of many officers will prove simply unacceptable under the new conditions.

[Correspondent] Just so. So I understand that the proficiency requirements for the officer corps will increase with the coming of the volunteers?

[Zatula] The demands will doubtless be raised on officers in training. But the question arises once more of when an officer can be improving his proficiency if most of them, and first and foremost the ship's commander, are busy shaking loose the materials and spare parts needed to keep the ship afloat. The support workers do not supply all of this to the ship at the assigned times, as is done in civilized armies, and the officer himself, often the commander (many shore officials won't even talk to those

lower in rank), has to go through purgatory instead. Will we achieve much, even with professional sailors, if the commander is burdened to the utmost with extraneous matters? I am not sure. In the fleet, the commander is a central figure. I am not diminishing the dignity of the other branches and arms of the service, but while a regimental commander can be replaced in battle, it is very hard to do so with a ship commander at sea. That is the nature of our service. It is no coincidence that pay supplements for command work existed up until recently. This has been reduced to the level of the average officer.

[Correspondent] A sailor who has signed a contract, by the way, will receive almost as much as a lieutenant, a graduate of a higher school. Is a pay raise planned for officers and warrant officers?

[Dobrovolskiy] The question, as far as we know, has not been put that way yet.

[Correspondent] Won't that attitude toward the labor of officers lead to an outflow from the navy, people being drawn to the civilian sector? The conditions are better there, and the pay is higher.

[Dobrovolskiy] Personally I am not afraid. I can say frankly, without posturing, that our officers have a very highly developed sense of duty. Here is an example. I recently had occasion to work on a ship where a serious accident had occurred. The vessel had now been removed from the fleet, written off as scrap, and the crew disbanded. We had expected to be showered with reports requesting discharge into civilian life, but no. Only one officer did not want to continue his service.

The restriction of service on ships by age is another matter. I feel that this seriously undermines combat readiness. I think that these time frames must be reconsidered with the conversion of manpower acquisition to a professional basis. Tell me—what is the expediency of discharging officers, 2nd-rank captains, at 45? It is right during those years, after all, that maturity and wisdom come. And we turn these people over to the civilian economy. And who will be in the navy? Perhaps we have a lot of accidents because we entrust the bridge to those who have not grown into it? I am sure that this must be approached in selective fashion. Look at what a person can do, what his health is like. That is what they do, by the way, in the American Navy. They have commanders of nuclear-powered vessels at 55 years of age. And they handle it fine.

* * *

So an experiment has begun that should answer the question of what our navy will be like tomorrow. What it will show, whether the predictions of the skeptics or the optimists will be justified, is difficult to say. One thing is certain—the results, whatever they may be, will help us determine the direction in which military reform should proceed. The editors will therefore come back to discussing this topic more than once. We invite you, dear readers, to take part in it.

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Arzamas Nuclear Weapons Development Center
91UM0453A Moscow *PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK* in Russian No 49, Dec 90 p 12

[Article by G. Lomanov: "A City That Is Not on the Map—Report from Arzamas-16"]

[Text] The train stopped, and we got off the car right at the crushed stone embankment. There was forest all around, and at some distance in the gray twilight of dawn one could see the control checkpoint. We—the first journalistic "assault" on an installation of special state importance—were met by representatives of the VNII [All-Union Scientific Research Institute] for Experimental Physics. Within a quarter of an hour, the bus was already moving along the streets of Arzamas-16, the "Soviet Los Alamos," a secret city in which our first atomic and first thermonuclear bombs were created. A city in which nuclear weapons are also being improved right now.

Our readers certainly know a lot more about Los Alamos than about Arzamas-16. Therefore, here is a little history to start with. The installation is situated on the lands of the famous Sarovskiy monastery, which was eliminated, like many others as well, in 1927. Afterwards, there was a children's work colony here for homeless children, and a small mechanical plant that made presses for tractor production, and which before the war produced large-caliber shells. In 1946, by a governmental decree, the so-called KB-11 [Design Bureau-11] was organized here; it was assigned the task: to eliminate the United States monopoly in nuclear weapons. In a very short period, a lot of talented scientists were sent here. The result is well-known—in 1949, the first Soviet atomic bomb was exploded on the Semipalatinsk test range.

Now the former KB-11 is turned into a large multipurpose scientific research center, and dozens of its sections are engaged in various theoretical and applied problems—from the physics of super high pressures and temperatures to the technology of new building materials. There is a strong collective in the institute: At work here are two academicians, two corresponding members of the USSR AN [Academy of Sciences], about 50 doctors and 500 candidates of science, and 250 laureates of the Lenin and State prizes of the USSR.

We became acquainted with the laboratories, we talked to dozens of people, and listened to very interesting recollections of the 80- year-old patriarch of our nuclear physics and the scientific manager of the institute, Yu. Khariton, we saw the little house in which the first bomb was assembled, and the outwardly plain van, exactly like the one from which the command was given to detonate the charge during the last tests on Novaya Zemlya. There are numerous impressions, and it is impossible to talk about all of them. I will try to highlight the most important ones.

Life here is not easy. All food products, manufactured items—including matches—are purchased with coupons. Each person has 40 of various types. It is easy to

get mixed up, one of the employees said. Because he is a mathematician by profession and performs complex calculations, it would be possible to think that his words were a joke, only the truth is that this is not a joking matter. Four hundred grams of meat per month and a liter of milk per week per person is received by scientists and engineers who are creating, grandiloquently speaking, the atomic shield of the country. And they work, and, take note, they do not complain. They make a go of it as best they can: They plant potatoes in garden plots, and they pickle cabbage for winter.

The domestic disorder is distressing, but, speaking honestly, the specialists are troubled by other far more fundamental difficulties: There is a lot of routine work, the personnel are aging, and there simply is nothing to entice young people to come here, to a closed area. Previously, there were at least some advantages in salaries and in provisions. Now the only advantage of a closed area is that there is a very low rate of crime in the city. This is comforting, but it is not enough to make a vital choice. Especially because powerful pressure in the mass media compels young physicists, mathematicians, and engineers to doubt the necessity and utility of that which the VNIIIEF [All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics] is engaged in.

"About a year ago, we began conversion in real earnest," says V. Belugin, the director of the institute. "The VNIIIEF has a powerful intellectual potential. For example, S. Fedorov, the famous ophthalmologist, needed an instrument to measure the curvature of the eye right during the course of an operation, and not before and after it, as now. As far as I know, he asked foreign firms, but they did not take it on. We made an instrument that measures the curvature in a tiny three-millimeter field of view of a microscope with an accuracy of up to one micron.

Among other "state" developments, it is worth mentioning the camera KIT-2F for the diagnostics of the radiation of infrared lasers. Its capabilities are such that it can measure... the temperature of a bullet in flight. Or the world's most compact X- ray apparatus "Kobra." It is an excellent mobile device for the village—to perform a diagnosis, a person from a remote area does not even have to be taken to the rayon hospital. Or the technology of cutting old ships, aircraft, and locomotives for scrap metal by means of extended cumulative charges. I could enumerate further, but I think this is enough to understand that the product of the VNIIIEF is necessary most of all to state enterprises and organizations. It is not possible to trade with it according to the principle of our current barter in the manner of the Zulus—I give you pipes, and you give me potatoes. But this means that conversion, at least for now, will not substantially improve the quality of life in the city. Perhaps, later, when the VNIIIEF comes out with products on the world market. But, in the meantime, the question comes up, which, willingly or not, many are asking in the institute—but is the basic work of the VNIIIEF necessary to the country?

The sharp debates in parliament and the discussions in the press regarding the last nuclear explosion on Novaya Zemlya are still on everyone's mind.

We understood that even if we achieve brilliant scientific results, the radiation products of the explosion will come to light, and there will be a demand to close the test range," says V. Zharkov, the test director. "Therefore, safety measures were of the most stringent kind. It is sufficient to say that the adit was considerably deeper than usual, and the concrete and crushed stone plugs were one and a half times stronger. The requirements that were laid down in the project tests were very strict, and the test turned out to be the cleanest for the entire time of the existence of this test range."

Well, everything went well this time, and passions abated, but where is the guarantee that they will not flare up again?

Unquestionably, it would be better if we could do without such ranges, without tests, and, indeed, even without nuclear weapons. But is this possible now? This is now the main question, and it disturbs very many people in our country. As a matter of fact, why test nuclear charges, when so many of them have been accumulated that it is possible to burn the entire planet? Why perfect them?

"People who are far from our kind of work sometimes ask me: How could you, a woman, be involved for so many years with a frightful weapon that carries death?" says Doctor of Technical Sciences L. Fomicheva. "And I answer them: It is owing to our work that you have lived for 45 years without war. Because nuclear parity is not a fiction of strategists, but a real factor in deterrence. And I will also say as a woman who is simply obliged to be thrifty that tests are necessary at least for the sake of economy of resources. Everything ages, weapons also, and this means that it is necessary to check on their efficiency, in order to produce fewer new charges. Do many know that, owing to the work of our institute, we more than once increased the guarantee period of warheads?"

"And it is also necessary to improve them," joins in Yu. Trutnev, a corresponding member of the USSR AN and first deputy scientific director of the institute. "The Americans are doing this. Last year, the U.S. Department of Energy sent a report to congress on the need to modernize their nuclear military complex. The report indicates that the demand for perfecting nuclear weapons as a basis of national security will grow.

But Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Science R. Ilkayev, deputy to the chief designer, expressed himself even more frankly:

"I am troubled by our emerging lag in this field. Incidentally, it did not exist before we declared a unilateral moratorium on testing."

"Do you consider this decision to be erroneous?

"I think that a brief unilateral moratorium, which demonstrates our goodwill, is a good and useful thing. But to stretch it out for a long time, demoralizing the work of huge collectives, is intolerable. Unfortunately, specialists are practically not consulted, when such important political decisions are made. We are happy that you came here, and that we are able, finally, to talk about this openly. By far not all scientists who come out in the press on this problem analyze it at a professional level. For example, the statement that it will be possible to turn over nuclear weapons to the Army without on-site testing, and on the basis of calculations alone, only brings out a smile among specialists. Although, honestly speaking, it is no laughing matter—one wants to cry. Because we know very well that without rigorous experimental tests, including range tests, we will lag hopelessly behind."

I would like the reader to consider these statements as not in the least a purely departmental position—it is said, what else can you expect from people who work in the military-industrial complex? They know what they are saying. They are very alarmed by the political instability in the country and by the centrifugal tendencies. What will happen if the Union really breaks down into "appanage principalities," in whose hands lethal nuclear arsenals will end up? The Americans, for example, by no means treat their own lightly. By ratifying the treaty between the United States and the USSR on limitations on underground testing, the Senate noted: Guarantees are needed against unexpected political or technical events that affect the military balance.

But what are these guarantees? Here are just a few of them. "Retention of the current nuclear laboratories and programs in the area of theoretical and research nuclear technology, which will ensure the mobilization, maintenance, and support of the continuous use of our scientific human resources for these programs, on which the permanency of the progress of nuclear engineering depends.

"The preservation of a base for the renewal of activity prohibited by the treaty in the field of nuclear weapons in the event that the United States will no longer be bound by obligations to observe such treaties."

As you see, the Americans intend to maintain their intellectual potential in this field. Do we really have a right to squander our potential?

Same Consumer Goods Problems Plague Military Personnel

*91P50159A Moscow TORGOVAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Apr 91 p 2*

[Interview with Lt. Col. M.V. Bovchenko, chief of the trade administration of the Far Eastern Military District, by I. Badarin: "It is No Easier than for Civilians"]

[Text] A large detachment of trade workers serves the military personnel of the Soviet Army. Their stores and kiosks are not only in the cities, but in the most distant garrisons. How do military trade personnel work, and what are their problems today? TG's [TORGOVAYA GAZETA] correspondent discussed this with chief of the trade administration for the Far Eastern Military District Lt. Col. M.V. Bovchenko.

[TG] Mikhail Vasilyevich, trade which serves the civilian population is currently experiencing difficult times. What is the situation in military trade?

[Bovchenko] It is exactly the same. Commodity coverage is no better for us than it is for any civilian store. We fight with our suppliers in order to conclude contracts, but we get the goods with great difficulty. Our funds, like those of civilian trade organizations, are allotted by the local soviets. And just like civilians our workers are running around the country searching for goods for decentralized procurement. We have no kind of advantages in comparison with civilian trade. Military personnel receive products for ration cards in those stores to which they are assigned.

[TG] Aren't there special food rations for servicemen?

[Bovchenko] For a serviceman, yes. But in addition to the officer himself there may be two or three people in his family. A wife, children. And there are no rations for them. It is particularly difficult for those who serve in distant garrisons. In the city it is possibly to buy products in the market, or in cooperative stores. But in the taiga garrisons there are no markets, no cooperative stores. The situation is also serious regarding manufactured goods in high demand, and this includes almost all products today, from socks to refrigerators and televisions. The distribution system works just the same for us as for everyone else. A command unit and a commission of people's control handle this. There are thousands of

people on the lists. We try to provide privileges for Afghan veterans, families with many children, and invalids.

[TG] In addition to trade, your administration also produces goods. You have your own workshops for making clothing and shoes. Why can't these help add to the supply of goods?

[Bovchenko] These workshops are set up, as a rule, in faraway places, where people cannot make use of civilian service enterprises. These are small workshops, and they have difficulty coping with even individual orders. They also have problems with raw materials. They simply do not have the ability to produce goods for the stores.

[TG] The opinion exists that the army is a wealthy organization.

[Bovchenko] This is not the case. Money goes first of all for constructing housing. This is a serious problem for servicemen, especially now with the withdrawal of troops from foreign countries. However, we are doing the building. Last year alone we opened up 23 new stores with an area of 2,275 square meters. In the Maritime Kray and Amur Oblast, in Chukotiya and on Kamchatka we opened up new modern trade bases.

[TG] Your shoppers are military personnel, and therefore, disciplined. It is probably easier for salespeople to work with those kind of shoppers.

[Bovchenko] It's not officers, but more often their wives who go to the stores. The fatal shortage of goods upsets and embitters any person, whether military or civilian.

There are also no fewer auditors in our stores. From the trade inspectorate from [organs] of the BKhSS [Combatting Embezzlement of Soviet Property and Speculation], commission of social control, and so forth. Military controllers, just like workers' controllers, are not always competent regarding trade issues. We also have to confront lack of objectivity and unfairness.

[TG] It seems that both military personnel and civilians deserve better trade services.

[Bovchenko] It is difficult for everyone today. It is not easy for military personnel. However, we do not ask for any kind of special benefits or privileges. Let the economic situation in the country improve and the shelves of our stores will become richer.

Revised DOSAAF Regulations

91UM0441A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 2, Jan 91 pp 7-10

[“USSR DOSAAF Charter with the Partial Changes Adopted by the 6th Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee”]

[Text] The All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy (USSR DOSAAF) is an independent mass patriotic defense organization of citizens of the USSR.

USSR DOSAAF operates in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR and Soviet legislation on the basis of its own charter and program documents, strictly observing the rights and legal interests of the citizens of the USSR and state and public organizations.

The organizations of DOSAAF implement all of their practical activity in close interaction with the appropriate state, public and other organizations and labor collectives.

The principal task of USSR DOSAAF is the training of workers and youth for labor and the protection of the socialist homeland.

USSR DOSAAF independently determines the long-term and current guidelines and forms of work, and collaborates with the defense and sporting organizations of foreign countries.

I. The Members of DOSAAF and Their Duties and Rights

1. Membership in the defense society can be both collective and individual.

2. Any citizen of the Soviet Union who recognizes the USSR DOSAAF Charter and pays membership dues may be a member of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy.

Plants, mills, sovkhozes and other enterprises, kolkhozes, institutions, educational establishments and public and other organizations may be collective members of USSR DOSAAF.

3. The question of acceptance for DOSAAF membership is reviewed and decided by a committee (meeting) of the primary organization by oral request of the person desiring to enter into DOSAAF membership. The decision is considered accepted if more than half of the members present at a session of the committee (meeting) vote in favor of it.

4. The question of the acceptance of collective members for DOSAAF is decided by the corresponding DOSAAF committee by motion at a general meeting of the labor collective.

The members of USSR DOSAAF have a uniform type of membership card.

5. DOSAAF members are obligated to:

- a) fulfill the requirements of the current charter and take part in the work of the primary organizations;
- b) be concerned with the reputation of the defense society and propagate its ideas;
- c) prepare themselves constantly for the protection of the homeland, study military science, perfect their military and military-technical knowledge and skills and physically hone themselves;
- d) display initiative in the activity of the organizations of DOSAAF in the further improvement of mass defense work, develop criticism and self-criticism, uncover shortcomings in the work of organizations of the society and fight determinedly for their removal; and
- e) set an example in labor and study, and display a lofty awareness in the fulfillment of their social duty.

6. The DOSAAF member has the right:

- a) to nominate, elect and be elected to the supervisory bodies of DOSAAF;
- b) discuss all issues of the practical activity of the society, and submit proposals and defend them until the organization makes a decision at assemblies, conferences and congresses of the society and sessions and plenums of DOSAAF committees;
- c) study in educational organizations, courses of study, circles and sports and motor-sports clubs of DOSAAF under established procedure; and
- d) be a member of sports and motor-sports clubs, sports sections and DOSAAF teams, enjoy the use of sports facilities, equipment and implements under stipulated procedure, and take part in sporting competitions, meets, exhibitions and other functions arranged by DOSAAF.

7. DOSAAF may employ the following incentive measures for DOSAAF members for their active participation in work to reinforce DOSAAF organizations and for good educational, sporting and other achievements: declaration of gratitude, entry onto Board of Honor and Roll of Honor, awarding of testimonials, certificates and medals of the society, prizes, memorial gifts etc.

II. The Organizational Structure of USSR DOSAAF

8. The All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy structures and organizes its activity on the basis of the following principles of national life:

- a) respect for the personal dignity and opinion of each member of the organization;

- b) collectiveness in the work of all organizations, collegiality in the making of decisions and personal responsibility of DOSAAF members for the matters entrusted to them;
- c) the electability of all supervisory bodies of DOSAAF from below to above;
- d) periodic reporting of DOSAAF bodies to their own organizations, and those organizations informing higher bodies of their activity;
- e) freedom of debate and full glasnost in the work of all DOSAAF bodies and organizations;
- f) respect for the rights of the majority and minority members of DOSAAF, right up to the holding of all-union, republic, kray and oblast referendums, where necessary, on the most important issues of the activity of the defense society; and
- g) the mandatory nature of the decisions of higher bodies for lower ones, if those decisions were made by them within the limits of the authority vested in them by the lower organizations.

9. The All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy, for the performance of its principal mission:

- a) works to propagate the provisions of the Constitution of the USSR on the protection of the socialist homeland, the role and place of DOSAAF in actively assisting the reinforcement of the defense capability of the country and training youth for service in the armed forces of the USSR;
- b) takes part, in conjunction with state and public organizations, in military, patriotic and internationalist education of the workers and youth; implements measures to raise the effectiveness of military and patriotic propaganda;
- c) issues newspapers, journals and supplements to them, books and pictorial products, as well as organizes the output and sale of teaching and technical propaganda and advertising film, video and recorded materials on mass defense, military, military-technical, sports and other topics;
- d) trains specialists for the armed forces of the USSR at the training organizations of DOSAAF in accordance with the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation;
- e) takes part, in conjunction with state bodies, civil defense and interested public organizations, in eliminating the consequences of emergencies and the rendering of aid to the stricken;
- f) conducts the training of core personnel for mass technical professions for the national economy;
- g) creates (opens), re-organizes and dissolves teaching, instructional, sports, motor-sports organizations (academies, schools, clubs, offices, courses) under stipulated

procedure; production, publishing, transport, construction and repair, trade and supply organizations (associations, trusts, plants, printers, workshops, groups, sections, detachments, combines, stores and yards); scientific-research, design-engineering and technological organizations (bureaus, laboratories); DOSAAF halls; communal organizations (dormitories, hotels, offices, administrations); amateur associations, special-interest clubs; and, sports facilities (shooting ranges, target ranges, towers, proving grounds, stations, stadiums, swimming pools, halls, centers, complexes, bases, tracks, motor raceways, motorcycle raceways, horse tracks, raceways etc.), among others; determines the procedure for their operation and subordination.

The opportunity is offered for the creation of small DOSAAF enterprises and cooperatives at enterprises and organizations, and the necessary aid is rendered in their practical activity.

The activity of the indicated organizations, enterprises and sports facilities should meet the goals and missions of the society. They are created (opened), dissolved or re-organized in accordance with this charter by decision (decree, order) of higher committees and organizations of DOSAAF under stipulated procedure;

h) selects, trains and cultivates in the staff workers of the society a spirit of high responsibility for matters entrusted to them, develops initiative and spontaneous action of the members of DOSAAF and involves the society's active membership in the work;

i) supervises the development of motor sports and applied-military types of sports in the country; organizes the work of sports federations, sections, collectives and teams in motor and applied-military types of sports; holds Olympiads and sporting competitions, exhibition and meets, as well as other mass sporting functions; records and confirms sports records and achievements established for those types of sports;

j) develops the design, invention and innovation activity of DOSAAF members aimed at improving mass defense work and perfecting the production activity, teaching materials and sports bases of the society; and

k) establishes and reinforces ties with public organizations, ministries, state committees, associations and agencies in the interest of raising the level of mass defense work.

10. The All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy is structured according to territorial and production traits.

The primary, teaching, instructional, motor-sports, sports and other organizations comprise the foundation of USSR DOSAAF.

The primary organizations are created according to the place of work, schooling or residence of the members of DOSAAF and are united according to territory. The

organization uniting the members of the society on a given territory is superior to all of the DOSAAF organizations that make it up.

The procedure for the work of teaching, instructional, motor-sports, sports and other organizations comprising the foundation of the defense society is determined by the corresponding standard documents (charters, statutes, manuals, guides etc.) as developed by the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF.

The structure of the defense society also includes the rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray and republic (autonomous and union-republic) organizations.

11. Councils of representatives of the primary organizations, special-interest clubs, associations for the realization of various USSR DOSAAF programs and other forms of association of the members of the defense society may be created and operate at the initiative of DOSAAF members.

The procedure for their work is determined by the corresponding standard documents of the given organizations and associations. They, based on the provisions of the USSR DOSAAF Charter, discuss various issues, devise stances on them and submit proposals and drafts for the consideration of DOSAAF committees of any level.

12. The higher supervisory bodies of the society are: general assemblies of members or conferences for the primary organizations; the corresponding conferences for the rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray or autonomous-republic organizations; the all-union republic DOSAAF congresses for the DOSAAF organizations of the union republics; and, the All-Union Congress of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy. A meeting, conference or congress may conduct business with the participation of more than half of the members of the DOSAAF organization or its elected delegates.

The general assembly, conference or congress elects a committee, which is the executive body and supervises all routine operations of the DOSAAF organization.

Audit commissions (auditors) may be elected for the corresponding organizations in order to monitor the financial, business and production activity of the committees (chairmen) and organizations of DOSAAF, the time frames and validity of the authorization of proposals, applications and complaints and the organization of visitor reception.

The quantitative composition of the supervisory bodies of DOSAAF is established by the general assembly, conference or congress.

13. The elections of the committees (chairmen and their deputies), audit commissions (auditors) and primary, rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray and republic organizations of DOSAAF and the Central Committee and Central Audit Commission of USSR DOSAAF, as well

as the elections of delegates to higher conferences, DOSAAF congresses of the union republics and the All-Union DOSAAF Congress, may be held using either open or closed (secret) ballot at the corresponding assemblies, conferences and congresses of DOSAAF by resolution of the majority of participants at the assembly, conference or congress.

The election (or dismissal) of chairmen and their deputies on the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics, the kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon committees of DOSAAF, as well as the chairmen of the USSR DOSAAF Central Audit Commission and the audit commissions of the corresponding DOSAAF organizations, along with their deputies, may be carried out using either open or closed (secret) voting.

The election of the committees and audit commissions of DOSAAF and their leaders at all levels is carried out, as a rule, on an alternative basis with the free discussion of the candidacies, assurance of the right of unlimited nomination of candidates and their challenge and criticism. The voting may be conducted on each candidacy separately or by list as decided by the assemblies, conferences or congresses. Those candidates who receive more than half the votes of the participants in the assembly, conference or congress are considered to be elected.

The question of dismissing the chairmen of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics or the kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon DOSAAF committees and their deputies, as well as the chairmen of the Central Audit Commission of USSR DOSAAF and the audit commissions of the corresponding DOSAAF organizations and their deputies, is resolved at plenums of the committees and sessions of the audit commissions. A decision is considered to be accepted if more than half of the votes of the members of the committee or audit commission of DOSAAF are cast for it.

14. The principles of the regular turnover of the composition of all supervisory bodies of DOSAAF and the succession of leadership are observed in their election.

15. The committees and audit commissions of DOSAAF may draft or dismiss the staff workers and active members of the defense society at plenums and sessions where necessary.

16. The committees (presidiums) of DOSAAF provide for broad glasnost in their activity, report regularly on their work at assemblies and plenums, the fulfillment of their resolutions and the resolutions of higher bodies of DOSAAF and the realization of the critical observations and proposals submitted by society members. The members of the committees report regularly to the members of the society at assemblies (conferences).

17. The members of the elected bodies of DOSAAF should justify the high trust placed in them in all of their activity.

If a member of a committee or audit commission of DOSAAF has diminished his honor or dignity, performs his duties poorly or has lost touch with the elected bodies, he may be removed from the corresponding committee or audit commission.

The question of removing members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics or kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon committees is decided by open ballot at a plenum of the corresponding committee. The question of the removal of a committee member in a primary organization is decided at a general assembly or at a session of the committee. The decision is considered to be adopted if more than half the votes of the members of the committee or organization are cast for it.

The question of removing members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Audit Commission, as well as members of the audit commissions of the republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city, rayon or primary organizations of those commissions, is decided at their sessions under the procedure stipulated for the members of DOSAAF committees.

An apparatus is created under the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics and kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon DOSAAF committees for routine operations in the organization and verification of the execution of decisions, as well as for rendering assistance to lower organizations and supporting the activity of the elected body.

The structure and staffing of the DOSAAF apparatus are determined in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

The elected bodies of DOSAAF supervise the activity of the corresponding apparatus and its workers, and carry out their certification.

III. The Supreme Bodies of USSR DOSAAF

18. The congress is the supreme body of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy. Regular congresses are convened by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee no less often than once every five to seven years.

The decision of the Central Committee to convene a congress, along with its agenda, are announced no later than three months before the congress. The norms for representation and the procedure for electing delegates to the congress are established by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

19. The All-Union Congress of DOSAAF:

- a) hears reports from the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the USSR DOSAAF Central Audit Commission, adopts decrees and gives an evaluation of their work;
- b) adopts the Charter of USSR DOSAAF, and reviews and alters it;
- c) defines the basic guidelines for the work of DOSAAF organizations, considers and resolves the most important issues in the life and activity of the defense society and plans its next tasks; and
- d) elects the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the USSR DOSAAF Central Audit Commission.

20. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee may convene an All-Union DOSAAF Conference during the period between congresses in order to discuss urgent national problems and vital issues in the practical activity of the defense society.

The conference is empowered to call for reports from the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the USSR DOSAAF Central Audit Commission on their work, partially (up to one third over the period between congresses) re-elect their composition, make decisions on the most important directions of the activity of the defense society and submit changes to the Charter of the USSR DOSAAF.

21. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee supervises all of the activity of society organizations during the period between all-union congresses. A plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee is convened no less often than once a year.

22. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee elects a presidium composed of the chairman of the Central Committee, his deputies and members of the presidium, in an amount determined by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, to supervise the work of the society between plenums.

The presidium is convened at times stipulated by the presidium itself.

The presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee elects a buro from among its members, in an amount determined by the presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, to supervise routine operations of an organizational and executive nature and to monitor and verify the execution of resolutions that have been adopted.

23. During the period between congresses and conferences, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee:

- a) organizes the implementation of the decisions of the congresses and conferences of USSR DOSAAF;
- b) coordinates and directs all of the activity of DOSAAF organizations on the territory of the USSR; calls for

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presentations and reports by the committees of DOSAAF, selects and places the supervisory personnel of the society, and represents USSR DOSAAF at state and public institutions and organizations;

c) approves, in coordination with other founders, the activity program (basic principles) and editorial charters of the newspaper SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, the journals of the defense society and the charter of the Patriot Publishing House of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, and designates (approves) and dismisses the editors-in-chief of the publications of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the director of the Patriot Publishing House in accordance with the USSR Law on the Press and the Other Mass Media.

d) creates a Bureau of All-Union Federations and Federations for Motor Sports and Applied-Military Types of Sports and directs its practical activity; develops and approves plans for international, all-union and all-Russian competitions, Olympiads, meets and exhibitions for those types of sports, and organizes and monitors their fulfillment; records and confirms all-union and all-Russian sports records and achievements;

e) organizes and implements international contacts under stipulated procedure, and performs work to solidify the position of Soviet sports in the international arena;

f) approves the centralized budget, the composite annual accounting report, the balance sheet of the financial and business activity of DOSAAF and the principal planning indicators and standards, monitors the execution of approved plans and estimates, determines the subordination of the enterprises, organizations and sports facilities in the society to committees and establishes the procedures for their operation;

g) makes decisions and adopts decrees on partial changes to the Charter of USSR DOSAAF, promulgates orders and directives, approves statutes, guidance and instructions on the basic guidelines for the activity of the society, charters (statutes) on teaching and sports organizations, production enterprises, workshops and other economically accountable organizations of DOSAAF; develops and approves plans and programs for military motor sports and sports training of DOSAAF members; and

h) determines the standards for deductions to the centralized allocation of the society and the procedure for expending it in accordance with prevailing legislation.

24. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee regularly informs the organizations of the society on its work.

IV. The Republic, Kray, Oblast, Okrug, City and Rayon Organizations of DOSAAF

25. The republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon organizations of DOSAAF and their committees conduct mass defense work, and provide for the fulfillment of the decisions they have made and decrees of the higher

bodies of DOSAAF made in accordance with the Charter of the USSR DOSAAF, within the limits of the union or autonomous republic, kray, oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, city, rayon or city rayon.

26. The supreme body of the DOSAAF organization is the congress in the union republic and the kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon DOSAAF conference in the autonomous republic, kray, oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, city, rayon or city rayon; it is the corresponding DOSAAF committee in the period between them.

27. Regular congresses of the DOSAAF organizations of the union republics and kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon conferences are convened no less often than once every five years. The decision to convene a congress or conference, the agenda and the requirements for representation at them are made by the corresponding committees of DOSAAF;

28. The congress of a DOSAAF organization of a union republic or kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon conference:

a) calls for reports from the corresponding committee and audit commission, adopts decrees and gives an evaluation of their operation, as well as projects the next tasks for the DOSAAF organization;

b) elects a DOSAAF Central Committee for the union republic or the kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon DOSAAF committee and its corresponding audit commission; and

c) elects delegates to the All-Union DOSAAF Congress or the congress of DOSAAF organizations of a union republic to a higher-level conference.

29. The DOSAAF central committee of a union republic or a kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon DOSAAF committee is the executive body and, during the period between congresses or conferences, supervises all the work of the corresponding DOSAAF organization.

A plenum of the DOSAAF central committee of a union republic or a kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon DOSAAF committee is convened no less often than once a year.

30. In order to supervise the daily operations of DOSAAF organizations between plenums, the corresponding committee elects a presidium composed of the chairman of the committee, his deputies and members of the presidium in an amount determined by the committee itself.

The presidium is convened at times stipulated by the presidium itself.

The presidiums of the DOSAAF central committees of the union republic or a kray or oblast DOSAAF committee elect a buro from among their members, in an amount determined by the presidiums of the indicated committees, in order to supervise routine operations of

an organizational and executive nature and to monitor and verify the execution of decisions that have been made.

31. The DOSAAF central committee of a union republic or a kray or oblast DOSAAF committee:

a) coordinates and directs all the activity of oblast, okrug, city and rayon DOSAAF organizations, analyzes their work, renders practical assistance and implements the selection and placement of key personnel of the society;

b) represents the republic, kray or oblast DOSAAF organization in state and social organizations and institutions of the republic, kray or oblast;

c) supervises the activity of teaching organizations of DOSAAF in the training of specialists for the armed forces of the USSR;

d) organizes and conducts training of key personnel for the mass technical professions in the national economy;

e) organizes work to develop motor and applied-military types of sports in the republic, kray or oblast, and creates a bureau of federations and a federation for motor and applied-military types of sports;

f) approves the structure of the DOSAAF committee and the financial plans, staffing and estimated expenses for the maintenance of its apparatus, as well as the yearly accounting reports, monitors the execution of approved plans and estimates and establishes the standards for deductions from subordinate committees and organizations;

g) creates (or dissolves) committees, sports and motor-sports clubs (or schools), children's and youth motor-sports schools, amateur associations, special-interest clubs, sports facilities, clubs for service dog breeding, production enterprises, joint ventures, including with foreign firms, workshops, small-scale wholesale stores and other operational organizations of DOSAAF in accordance with the provisions approved by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, as well as holding sports events, including those requiring payment;

h) may create associated DOSAAF organizations on the territory of several city or rural rayons, as well as on the scale of a city or rayon, through the defense collectives located on their territory;

i) conducts work to create and reinforce the material and technical base of the primary, teaching and sports organizations of DOSAAF; and

j) organizes the receipt, accounting, operation, storage and write-off of material and technical resources being released for the development and activity of the corresponding DOSAAF organization, as well as administers the stipulated reporting, in accordance with the provisions approved by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

32. The okrug, city and rayon committee of DOSAAF:

a) creates the primary DOSAAF organization, coordinates and directs its activity, renders practical assistance in operation and conducts an accounting of society members;

b) conducts instruction and teaching of the chairmen and active members of the primary organizations of DOSAAF, and organizes the exchange of experience in mass defense work;

c) organizes work in the development of motor and applied-military types of sports in the okrug, city and rayon, supervises the work of city (rayon) motor-sports clubs and answers for their practical activity, and creates amateur associations, special-interest clubs, courses, circles, sections and teams in motor and applied-military types of sports;

d) approves the staffing and financial plans of its own committee and the organizations that are on its balance sheet;

e) organizes the training of key personnel for the mass technical professions of the national economy, public instructors, trainers and sports referees, as well as the leaders of circles, on the basis of the teaching organizations and motor-sports clubs of DOSAAF;

f) develops the material and technical base of the primary organizations and the motor-sports clubs, allowing for the maximum utilization of local opportunities, in the interests of the broad involvement of DOSAAF members in mass defense work; and

g) represents the okrug, city and rayon DOSAAF organization in state and public organizations and institutions of the city (okrug) or rayon.

V. The Primary Organizations of DOSAAF

33. The primary organizations of DOSAAF are created by place of work, teaching or residence of the members of DOSAAF: at plants, mills, sovkhozes and other enterprises, kolkhozes, institutions and teaching establishments, as well as among the workers and office personnel of military units, at military training establishments, arsenals, bases, plants, communications centers, hospitals and other institutions and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR KGB, the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the like.

34. The decision to create a primary organization is made by the founding assembly, and recorded by the corresponding rayon committee or city committee of DOSAAF.

Primary DOSAAF organizations may be created, in individual cases and with the permission of the okrug, city or rayon DOSAAF committee, within the framework of several enterprises that are part of a production association and are located, as a rule, on the territory of a single rayon or several rayons of a single city.

35. The primary organizations of DOSAAF, in order to conduct routine business, elect committees (chairmen and their deputies) for a term of two or three years and, where necessary, audit commissions (auditors) in an amount determined by the general assembly (conference), at their assemblies (conferences).

Work is conducted in the committees of the primary organizations of DOSAAF, as a rule, by non-exempt workers. Major primary organizations may establish the positions of exempt workers for the DOSAAF committee using the monetary funds of the given organizations.

36. The primary organization of DOSAAF may independently create DOSAAF organizations based on shops, shifts, sections, farms, teams, departments, faculties, courses of study, teaching groups, classes and the like that are part of it, and grant them the rights stipulated by the DOSAAF committee.

37. The supreme supervisory body of the primary DOSAAF organization is the general assembly of DOSAAF members, which is convened to the extent necessary at times stipulated by the DOSAAF committee.

38. The primary DOSAAF organizations conduct work on the basis of the development of democracy, criticism and self-criticism, creative energy, initiative and spontaneous action by the members of the society in close contact with public organizations.

39. The primary organizations of general schools and other educational establishments, with the permission of the rayon and city DOSAAF committees, may unite with the primary organizations of major enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the interests of improving mass defense work.

40. The frequency and size of dues for entry and membership in the society are established at general assemblies of the primary and other defense collectives. The collective membership dues are set at a size that is determined by the council (board) of the enterprise or the assembly of the labor collective. Dues receipts remain at the disposal of the corresponding DOSAAF organizations. Part of the dues, by their decision, can be transferred to a higher DOSAAF committee to reinforce the material and technical base and further develop mass defense work.

41. The primary organization of DOSAAF:

- a) independently resolves all issues of its life and activity, aside from those whose resolution it has referred to the authority of a higher body;
- b) provides for the participation of workers and youth in mass defense work and propagates the aims and mission of DOSAAF;
- c) conducts mass military-patriotic and defense-sports functions;

d) works on the training of youth for service in the armed forces of the USSR, involving veterans of war and labor, the army and navy and young soldiers in the reserves in it;

e) works on the organizational reinforcement of defense collectives, and independently determines the frequency for holding assemblies (conferences) and committee sessions;

f) has the right to devise drafts of documents for the consideration of all issues by higher bodies of DOSAAF;

g) may create (open) teaching classes, offices, technical laboratories, amateur associations and special-interest clubs, courses of study and technical circles, sports sections and teams, as well as acquire the necessary teaching and sports assets, in accordance with the missions of DOSAAF; and

h) organizes and hold mass competitions in motor and applied-military types of sports, and involves the members of DOSAAF in individual pursuits of technical creativity.

42. The decision to disband a primary organization is made by the general assembly of the given organization. The decision to disband a DOSAAF organization is made by a higher body in the event of an actual cessation of its activity, or if its activity contradicts the DOSAAF Charter.

VI. *Ad Hoc* Commissions and Sports Federations of DOSAAF Committees

43. The DOSAAF central committees of the union republics or kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon DOSAAF committees of the society may create commissions in accordance with the basic guidelines for the practical activity of the defense society, as well as federations for motor and applied-military types of sports whose activity is coordinated and guided by the corresponding DOSAAF committees, for the purpose of raising the role of social principles and the development of democratic foundations at all levels of DOSAAF.

Commissions of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics or kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon DOSAAF committees may be created in the interests of making the activity of the members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics or kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon DOSAAF committees more active in the fulfillment of the resolutions of the congresses, conferences and plenums of the DOSAAF committees and the rendering of practical assistance to the organizations of the society and participation in their inspections.

44. Federations for motor and applied-military types of sports, in conjunction with the DOSAAF committees, take part in the development of mass sports, raising the skill level of sportsmen, the training of social key sports personnel and all-star sports teams; the organization and

holding of competitions, the preparation of organizational and instructional materials (curriculums, texts and instructions for sports work).

45. Sports clubs, amateur associations and special-interest clubs are created at the teaching organizations of DOSAAF for the holding of mass sports functions. The councils of the sports clubs of teaching organizations and motor-sports clubs are elected by open voting at the general assemblies of club members.

46. The procedure for the work of the commissions, sports federations and councils is determined by the corresponding DOSAAF committees.

VII. The Audit Commissions

47. The Central Audit Commission of USSR DOSAAF audits the financial, business and production activity of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee apparatus and the enterprises and organizations directly subordinate to it, verifies the execution of the financial and production plans of the society, the time frames and correctness of the resolution of proposals, applications and complaints and the organization of receptions for visitors.

The Central Audit Commission reports to the All-Union DOSAAF Congress.

The Central Audit Commission of USSR DOSAAF submits the results of its audits and proposals to eliminate any shortcomings ascertained for the consideration of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee in the period between congresses.

48. The financial and business activity of the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics, kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon committees and the primary organizations of DOSAAF is monitored by the corresponding audit commissions (auditors) operating under a statute approved by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

49. The audit commission (auditor) reports on its activity to the corresponding congress or conference (assembly), and operates under the guidance of the higher committee of DOSAAF.

50. The audit commission elects a chairman, his deputies and a secretary.

51. The members of the audit commission may not be members of the corresponding committee of the society. Members of the society who occupy supervisory or business positions on a given committee of DOSAAF may not be elected to the audit commission.

The members of the audit commission take part in the sessions of the corresponding DOSAAF committee with the right of voice but no vote.

52. The audit commission (auditor) audits the financial and business activity of the corresponding DOSAAF committee and the enterprises and organizations directly

subordinate to it no less often than once a year under the procedure and in the amounts specified by the instructions for the performance of audits in the DOSAAF system, and verifies the time frames and correctness of proposals, applications and complaints and the organization of receptions for visitors in the DOSAAF committee apparatus.

The audit commission (auditor) reports the results of audits and practical proposals to eliminate shortcomings to a higher DOSAAF body. The committee being audited is obligated to make the appropriate decisions with regard to the conclusions of the audit no more than a month later.

VIII. The Monetary Funds and Property of the Society

53. The activity of USSR DOSAAF and its organizations is supported by financial and material-and-technical resources through the income of committees, enterprises and organizations of the society.

54. USSR DOSAAF may own its own buildings, structures, housing stock, equipment, implements, monetary funds, shares of stock, other securities and other property necessary for the implementation of charter missions in the interests of the members of the society. Enterprises, business organizations, publishing houses, periodicals and printing plants, teaching, sports and communal organizations, sports facilities, DOSAAF halls and scientific-research, industrial-design engineering and other organizations may also be owned by the defense society.

55. The funds of USSR DOSAAF and its organizations are obtained from the entry and membership dues of the members of the society and the members of DOSAAF clubs; income from the publishing and business activity of production enterprises and workshops, construction and repair, trade and supply, teaching, sports and other organizations, courses, transport and other services; paid sports events, income from the holding of DOSAAF lotteries, foreign economic activity, the sale of securities, participation in joint-stock companies and other receipts not prohibited by law, as well as through receipts from state and public organizations as envisaged by the legislation of the USSR and the union republics and the voluntary contributions of citizens with an interest in the development of mass defense work.

Income from the production and financial activity of enterprises and organizations of DOSAAF may not be redistributed among individual members of DOSAAF, and is used only for the performance of the charter missions of the society.

56. The funds of the society are expended according to financial plans (estimates), approved under stipulated procedure, for the pursuit of mass defense and sports work, the construction of buildings and structures, their equipment, the acquisition, repair and operation of equipment and property, the maintenance of DOSAAF committees and organizations, improvements in the

social and domestic conditions and bonuses for the workers of the defense society, as well as for incentives for active DOSAAF members and for other measures in accordance with this charter and prevailing legislation.

Special centralized allocations and reserves may be created by decision of the corresponding DOSAAF committees for the purpose of creating opportunities for financing all-union, republic-wide, regional and dedicated programs for the development of the defense society.

The procedure for utilization of the monetary funds of the defense society is defined by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics and the kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon DOSAAF committees.

IX. The Rights of the Society

57. The All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy enjoys all of the rights envisaged by the legislation of the USSR.

58. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics, the kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon DOSAAF committees and the committees of the primary DOSAAF organizations, as well as associations, enterprises, organizations, scientific-design bureaus and other institutions created by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the central committees of the union republics and the kray and oblast committees of the society in accordance with the provisions and charters for them, having their own separate property and on an independent balance sheet, are legal entities. They have the right, in accordance with prevailing legislation, to dispose of that portion of the property, assets and funds of USSR DOSAAF that has been acquired at their level, to open and close business and current accounts at credit institutions, to conduct monetary transactions using them, to conclude contracts and agreements, to institute foreign economic activity, to issue powers of attorney, be plaintiffs and defendants in civil court or arbitration, sell and lease assets, hold paying events connected with the activity of the society, and implement the construction, repair, expansion, modernization and technical refitting of enterprises, teaching organizations and sports and other structures in the name of their elected bodies.

Enterprises and organizations (production workshops, detachments for underwater technical operations, clubs, DOSAAF halls, firing ranges etc.) that do not have a separate balance sheet accomplish their monetary transactions through the corresponding legal entities on whose balance sheet they are listed.

All of the organizations of DOSAAF, being legal entities, are independent in the disposal of their own budget and the resolution of structural, staffing, production and business issues.

59. USSR DOSAAF represents and protects the legal interests of its members in state and public bodies.

60. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics, the kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon committees and the committees of the primary DOSAAF organizations, as well as organizations and enterprises that are legal entities, may print a depiction of the emblem of the society and its name.

61. The All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy has its own flag and emblem.

Supplement to the USSR DOSAAF Charter

Description of the Emblem of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy

The emblem of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy is a white oval framed by a gilded wreath of laurel leaves.

The center of the oval contains crossed carbines and an automatic rifle. There is a five-pointed star at the point of crossing with a hammer and sickle in the middle. The lower portion of the oval contains an anchor, and above, over the star, is a flying aircraft. The upper part of the oval has a red ribbon with the inscription "USSR DOSAAF."

The emblem is intended:

- for printing by all organizations of DOSAAF;
- for the decorations for DOSAAF members;
- for depiction on banners; and
- for depictions on posters, in books and periodicals, and on the assets and signs of DOSAAF.

Description of the Flag of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy

The flag of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy consists of a section of red fabric in the shape of a rectangle with the ratio of 3:2 in length to width.

The front of the flag has, in the upper left corner, a depiction of the emblem of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy in a size equal in diameter to $\frac{1}{8}$ of the width of the flag.

The lower portion, at a distance of $\frac{1}{4}$ of the width of the flag from the lower edge, is a white stripe across the entire length of the flag 1/20th the width of the panel; white stripes 1/40th the width of the flag run above and below it at a distance of 1/20 of the width of the flag.

Alternative Service For Conscientious Objectors

Soviet, World Practice Compared

91UM0572A Moscow NOVOYE VREMENYA in Russian
No 10, Mar 91 pp 32-35

[Article by Aleksandr Pronozin: "The Third Basket: Army and Society—Alternative Service"]

[Text] Aleksandr Pronozin is 20 years old. Three years ago, he wrote a letter to the USSR Minister of Defense in which he refused to serve in the army on account of his pacifist and political convictions. In December 1989, criminal proceedings were instituted against Aleksandr. He waited for them to come for him and even prepared a statement to deliver in court. But law-enforcement agencies seemed to lose all interest in him. Pronozin's current status does not allow him to either continue his studies or get a job. For this reason, he took up political activities in the Transnational Radical Party and set about the theoretical substantiation of alternative service.

In civilized countries, those who, by virtue of their religious convictions or world views, cannot take up arms choose alternative service. In the USSR, people are still debating just what this unfamiliar term could mean.

If a young man of conscription age belongs to a religious sect that forbids army service and is a Tolstoyan and pacifist, society has no right to compel him to act against his conscience—much less punish him for his convictions with jail or the camps. The young man could meet his duty to society by becoming a nurse in a hospital or for invalids or by joining an environmental protection detachment. This is how it is done throughout the world.

In our country, a man's personal convictions do not constitute grounds for releasing him from military service, which is an obligation assigned him by the country's constitution. Evasion of conscription is an act punishable under Article 80 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (and under similar acts in the republics' Criminal Codes) by deprivation of freedom for a term of up to three years. But even after serving his punishment, the young man receives a new draft summons. A second refusal entails a harsher punishment—up to five years in the camps.

The document of the Copenhagen meeting of the 1990 Conference on the Human Dimension devoted to alternative service says that member states "agree to consider the question of introducing, where this has not been done already, various forms of alternative service that are compatible with the motivations for conscientious objection, and that such forms of alternative service will not, in principle, involve service in combat units or will be of a civilian character, will be socially useful, and will not be of the character of any sort of punishment." The Soviet Union signed this document.

When Conscience Forbids.

In a recent sociological survey, the Research Center for Social and Psychological Problems under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy concluded that society's attitude toward the army is "predominantly negative." The reasons? Afghanistan. The fading image of the external enemy. The growth of national self-determination movements in union republics. Mass violations of human rights in the army. The use of soldiers to deal with domestic political problems. These sentiments have also had an impact on the growing number of young people unwilling to take up arms.

According to official data, 1,044 men refused to perform military service in 1988, and 6,647 in 1989. In the spring of 1990 alone, the number of objectors increased by 400 percent in comparison with the entire preceding year. As of January 1 of this year, the conscription plan for the fall of 1990 was fulfilled at a level of 78.8 percent.

In the Leningrad Military District, the number of men unwilling to go to the barracks in 1989 was 20 times greater than the figure for 1988. According to Leningrad Military Commissar Anatoliy Obukhov, 214 cases involving evasion of military service were forwarded to the city's rayon procuracies following the spring conscription of last year.

Moscow Military Commissar Vladimir Bespalov said that while there were 67 evaders in the capital in 1988, in 1989 the rayon military commissariats forwarded the cases of 323 conscripts to the procuracy. And in the spring of 1990, more than 1,500 men of preconscription age failed to report, in accordance with summonses from military commissariats, to the city's conscription offices to register with them.

If You Don't Want to, We'll Make You!

The growing number of men who refuse to parachute, fire weapons, and march has been paralleled by an increase in the number of cases forwarded to procuracy offices. True, the number of convictions is not growing at the same rate. Law-enforcement agencies cite the worsening crime situation in the country and do not seek to prosecute all objectors without exception.

It cannot be ruled out that these considerations account for a certain mitigation of punishments that is in no way legally codified. A first refusal to live in the barracks usually entails 18 to 24 months of forced labor at "national-economic construction projects." A second refusal to serve can bring two years in the camps. As of fall, 38 of those who had refused to serve in the spring of 1990 had been convicted.

Both law-enforcement agencies and the military, in referring to all those who fail to report for conscription by the general words "objector" or "evader," have never drawn any distinction among the three schools that exist among them.

One could assign to the **first group** young people from several republics in which the Soviet Army is often viewed as the army of a foreign power—an army that, moreover, maintains a regime that infringes on the republics' state independence. The absence of normal relations between the republics and the center and the war of laws are prompting conscripts to join national militarized formations under the slogan of creating national armies and to evade conscription into the all-union army. Until relations between the central and local governments are clarified, objectors under this category will inevitably exist and, moreover, will enjoy the support of their people and local governments.

In April of last year, the Estonian Supreme Soviet repealed the articles of the Estonian SSR Criminal Code that punished citizens for evasion of army service, and subsequently adopt the law "On Labor Service in the Estonian SSR." In May, the Armenian parliament adopted a resolution that suspended conscription for military service and released from criminal liability those soldiers from the republic who had left their units without authorization. In September, the Moldovan parliament suspended on Moldovan territory the corresponding articles of the USSR Constitution and of the laws "On Universal Military Service" and "On Criminal Liability for Military Crimes."

On January 7, 1991, the USSR Minister of Defense issued the well-known order under which airborne troops were to forcibly round up recruits in Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, and certain oblasts of the Ukraine.

Hugo Paas, a consultant to the Estonian state chancellery's department of defense and state border security, gave the following description of the picture that has emerged in the republic following the adoption of laws on alternative service:

"Although some people object to military service for reasons of a religious and philosophical nature, the main reason for evading service for the majority of our republic's young people is their unwillingness to wear the insignia of the Soviet Army.

"Under the law, a petition from a conscript who wants to perform alternative service is now considered by a special commission created under the local Soviet of People's Deputies. If the young man disagrees with its conclusions, he can appeal its decision to a republic commission on alternative service or to the courts. But I don't know of any such cases.

"As of January 1, 1991, there were 9,102 people on the list of those wanting to perform alternative service. Of this number, 6,617 are already performing such service, 2,144 youths received deferments on grounds of illness, study, or family situation, and 340 withdrew their original requests.

"The decision as to where labor service will be performed is made by local Soviets. Such locations can be

social services and health care enterprises or construction projects. Some Soviets enlist young people in maintaining public order, assisting the police, and patrolling streets. The alternative service term has been set at 30 months; for people with a higher education, it has been shortened to one year.

"Preliminary calculations show that nearly 70 percent to 75 percent of all Estonian youths could be supporters of alternative service. The situation might be different had the principle of Soviet Army manpower acquisition been changed several years ago—i.e., had the principle of extraterritoriality been replaced by the principle of territorial service. I am convinced that had this been done, the number of people seeking alternative service would be smaller."

The **second group** of people evading army service is not very large. It is made up of members of various religious sects and pacifists who, on account of their convictions, cannot take up arms.

The **third group** is made up of those who evade army service in the direct sense of the word and who reject the possibility of any socially useful labor or fulfillment of their duty to society. Under present law and existing procedures for army recruitment, there is no one to sort out the question of who doesn't want to become a soldier and why.

You Can't Jail Them All.

If a state considers itself civilized and governed by the rule of law, it cannot forbid conscientious objection to military service. Compromises must be found. Such compromises could be a transition to a professional army or the introduction of alternative civilian service. The first option will hardly become a reality in the near future. Therefore, the only realistic solution to the situation is the second—the introduction of a civilian alternative to military service.

Until recently, Defense Ministry spokesmen contended that, in the first place, there is no special need for such a type of service, and second, that such service essentially already exists in the country—the construction battalion. For example, adherents of religious sects were given the opportunity, on an individual basis, to serve without arms in military construction units.

In November of last year, the USSR Supreme Soviet Youth Affairs Committee submitted the draft "Basic Principles of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on Alternative Service." In the bill, the decision as to whether to allow a conscript to perform alternative service is assigned to a special commission. But "convictions of conscience" is a subjective notion, and no commission can ascertain whether they are genuine.

The draft of a new USSR law on universal military service drawn up by the Ministry of Defense also provides for the possibility of performing "nontroop service." The military department proposes to increase the

term of nontroop service by 50 percent and to make it contingent on passing an examination and receiving authorization. The screening function would be assigned to local Soviet executive committees. No provision is made for the possibility of appealing decisions.

USSR Alternative Service Bill

91UM0572B Moscow NOVOYE VREM'YA in Russian
No 10 Mar 91 pp 35-36

[Interview with Viktor Minin, USSR people's deputy, and Mikhail Timofeyev, a student at the Frunze Military Political Academy, by Irina Lagunina: "But Not Local Construction Battalions!"]

[Text] **A draft law on basic principles of alternative service has been drawn up in the USSR. Viktor Minin, a USSR people's deputy, and Mikhail Timofeyev, a student at the Frunze Military Political Academy, discussed the bill, which they helped draft.**

[Lagunina] What is your concept of alternative service?

[Timofeyev] We adhered to the concept of universal civilian service. A child is raised and nurtured by society from birth. At some point, a time has to come when a person has to repay his debt to society. Military service, maintaining public order, ecological detachments, social assistance service—all these things are equally important to society.

[Minin] A law is needed so that a young man can have the right to choose. I think that this law is for a small number of young people. Most will always prefer to serve in the army.

[Lagunina] Will our state be able to provide work for all who opt for alternative service?

[Timofeyev] Local Soviets will set up commissions made up of people who are very familiar with area problems. And the principle itself of filling jobs with alternative service workers will be territorial.

[Minin] There is a Soviet Army statute under which a soldier is not supposed to serve in the area where he lives. For alternative service workers, this approach is inadmissible. It would create unnecessary housing difficulties. In addition, oversight of service would be reduced.

There are regions where, by virtue of already existing unemployment, the creation of additional jobs for alternative service workers is impossible. But this problem must be solved as well. For example, there is already an agreement under which the Nuclear Power Machinery Construction Association [Atomstroymash] will provide jobs to alternative service workers from the Urals and the Central Asian republics. Russia has areas that have become depopulated altogether. Alternative service could be one way to revive these areas.

[Lagunina] Those who object to army service will have to be paid for their work somehow; otherwise, this would be akin to slave labor. Where will the money come from?

[Timofeyev] First, there are production facilities and municipal services that do have the money. Second, there exist a great number of various foundations and charitable organizations whose funds are currently being spent without any specific purpose in mind. If these funds were to be redistributed, it would be possible to pay partial wages to people performing alternative service.

[Lagunina] What threatens your draft?

[Minin] Officials of local Soviet agencies have an interest in the establishment of alternative service, but solely in the form of local construction battalions. This is the greatest danger. Apart from all else, alternative service must also serve to promote a person's development, train him for a future vocation, and develop his interests. If we talk about a normal state policy with respect to young people, this is the way it should be.

[Timofeyev] We discussed our draft law in the USSR Supreme Soviet Legislation Committee. Doubts were voiced there as to whether the Defense Ministry would be able to meet the conscription quota if everybody were to opt for alternative service, whether there would be enough money, and whether we wouldn't be wrecking the army. Meanwhile, the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, for example, hoped to use this to provide manpower to hazardous production facilities. Unfortunately, we were forced to explain that this would be at odds with all norms and all notions of the observance of human rights. All the same, our draft was adopted as a basis and in all likelihood will soon be discussed at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Even our own country has experience in providing jobs for alternative service workers and paying them wages. In the mid-1920s, the Council of People's Commissars adopted Directive No. 422 on assigning jobs to people who objected to army service on religious grounds. The directive spells everything out very well.

[Lagunina] Many republics have already adopted laws on alternative service. You were able to use their experience, too, in your draft.

[Minin] Unfortunately, many republics simply sought to keep their own young people on their own territory or pursued other, political, objectives. Experience has shown that in the absence of oversight, alternative service workers simply stop meeting their obligations and shirk their work. So far, all this is more like pseudoalternative service.

[Lagunina] How will service locations be determined?

[Timofeyev] There are two approaches—examination and registration. We favor the second. The examination principle is a relic of the past. A person has to prove to a commission that he truly cannot serve in the army. But

how can this be done in practice? By bringing an affidavit from a clergyman? Under the registration principle, a person would go and register, and the commission would decide where best to put him to work. Its decision could be appealed to a higher authority. But we've proposed only the basic principles of the legislation; it is up to the republics to choose.

Numbers of Draftees With Police Records Declining

91UM0608A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Reader's question and response by Major V. Zolotukhin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Matters of Army Youth and Reserve Servicemen: "Numbers of Individuals With Prior Convictions Declining"]

[Text] *My son is serving his regular term of active duty in the Kiev Military District. In a letter home, he wrote that several soldiers in his company were convicted prior to serving in the Army. What are the country-wide statistics regarding conscription of such people for military service?*

[Signed] *S. Metlitskaya, Vladimir Oblast*

Major V. Zolotukhin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Matters of Army Youth and Reserve Servicemen, replies:

Yes, people with previous convictions are indeed also serving in our Armed Forces. But their numbers are declining. For example, whereas in 1988, 48,852 such individuals were called up, only 31,722 were recruited in 1990.

As far as statistics for various regions of the country are concerned, we can say that 2,626 of these individuals arrived in troop units of the Kiev Military District during last year's conscription. The least number of such individuals recruited for service was observed in the Transcaucasus Military District—135. The greatest number was 7,250—to troop units in the Volga-Urals Military District.

DOSAAF To Aid in Reserve Officer Training

91UM0608B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[Article "prepared" by Lieutenant Colonel A. Plotnikov under the rubric "News Service": "Resolved, Signed..."]

[Text] It is noted in an order of the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Troops that, in execution of a directive of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and order of the USSR Ministry of Defense, missile men have released military-technical assets worth about 30 million rubles for sale on preferential terms to the population, kolkhozes [collective farms], sovkhozes [state farms], enterprises, and construction organizations.

The USSR minister of defense and chairman of the central committee of the country's DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] signed the joint order "On the Training of Naval Reserve Officers in DOSAAF Officer Courses." The officer courses referred to here will be established based on naval schools the defense society has in the cities of Petrozavodsk and Mariupol. Undergoing training here will be Naval Reserve officers eligible for call-up who have the most critical shortage specialties.

**VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL:
1990 Index of Articles**

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ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 90 pp 92-94

[Unattributed index of articles published in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in 1990]

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Germans' Role in A-Bomb Project Recalled

91UM0552A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 14, 10 Apr 91 p 5

[Letter to the editor from P. Boltyanskaya, participant in the Great Patriotic War: "Who Made the Bomb?"]

[Text] Leningrad—Quite a few publications have appeared recently on the creation of our atom bomb. And you also wrote about this. But all of the publications are silent about what is quite fundamental in this story: Germans took part in its creation. Do not be surprised: Indeed, there were Germans at special purpose facility "A" of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] in Abkhazia.

I will set forth briefly what I know about this. In April of 1949, I, a non-party specialist, was mobilized by the GK VKP(b) [City Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party (Bolshevik) of Leningrad for an indefinite term, a so-called "special assignment." As I later learned, many personal files were looked over at my enterprise and at others. In our enterprise, they dwelt only on my file. They did not even ask for my consent. (Incidentally, one of the Leningraders who dared to refuse to go on this "assignment" was discharged from his enterprise and went two months without work—he was not accepted anywhere—and, anyway, he ended up going to the "facility.")

Within several days after talking with the second secretary of the GK VKP(b), in the presence of a colonel, who studied me silently through a hole in a newspaper, I was issued detailing orders and a ticket to my place of assignment. I was met at the station in Sukhumi, I was driven somewhere, a road barrier was raised, and I was in the "zone." This was the settlement of Agudzar, 17 kilometers from Sukhumi. An institute was situated here in the building of a former health center, where Soviet specialists from all corners of the Union and German physicists were working. Another part of the institute (chemistry) was situated in a closed area in Sukhumi itself.

Beriya was the sponsor of the creation of the atomic institute in Abkhazia. It was he who ran it from the Politburo, and he visited us frequently, since the settlement of Gulripsh, his native village, was not far away.

How did the Germans end up there? In the postwar-destroyed Germany in the Soviet occupation zone, the Soviet Government concluded contracts with eminent German specialists for a specific term, and they arrived with their families, equipment, apparatuses, and even a library. At the "facility," each family lived in a Finnish cottage with all conveniences. They received a significantly higher salary than the Soviet specialists. All conditions were set up for them for living, working, and relaxing (including tennis courts).

In addition, there was a large group of prisoners of war there that worked in the shops. These really were experts, "worth their weight in gold." They lived in special barracks.

For the managerial German specialists at Sukhumi, the Germans built marvelous homes that to this day adorn the Sinop coastline (Numbers 21 and 23).

The Germans had everything except freedom. They were not able to communicate with us, except for work, and they did not have the right to leave the zone without permission and escorts (these mainly were trips once a week to the city market).

The scientific director of the institute was the well-known scientist-physicist Professor Hertz, who was barred by Hitler from work on the atomic bomb because of his Jewish origin. Many of the Germans knew the Russian language well; however, it was psychologically difficult for us, Soviets, to work normally with the

Germans, especially since there were two from the SS [Schutzstaffel] troops among the chemists.

The chief of my laboratory was Doctor Garbman, an excellent specialist, and his coworker was Doctor Zenskiy, who previously had worked in Potsdam on a cyclotron.

The administration of the "facility" was made up of former workers of the GULAG [Main Administration for Corrective Labor Camps]. They were easily recognized from the way they communicated with people and from a kind of emptiness and cruelty in their eyes.

Before my assignment to the laboratory, I worked for a month in a diffusion unit without appropriate safeguards, and, apparently, this affected my health. I began to lose my hearing badly and, on the decision of physicians, I was reassigned to Leningrad within a year and a half. After a certain time, I learned that a large group of workers of the Abkhaz institute received the Stalin (State) Prize First Degree (secret) and was decorated with orders for successful work on the atom bomb.

Subsequently, the German specialists left for the GDR on a special train to work in a corresponding institute, taking with them everything that they had previously brought.

I ask: Why is no mention made now of that contribution that the Germans made to the work on the atom bomb? It does not matter what reasons brought them to our country; it is important that there was this contribution. They worked honorably and conscientiously, and this is worthy of recognition and respect.

Association of Military Historians Formed

91UM0495A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by V. Runov: "There Shall Be an Association!"]

[Text] The intentions of certain military historians to create their own association (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 February 1991) was received with great interest by both professionals and "informal" students of the military past. The numerous letters delivered from all areas of the country to the organizational commission attest to this fact.

Such an enthusiastic reaction is encouraging and makes discussion of the viability of the future association realistic. At the current time a set of draft regulations has been worked out, which, after discussion and reworking, will be presented for ratification at the constituent conference.

The Association of Military Historians (AVI) is seen as a voluntary, independent, professional organization having juridical and financial status. Publishing, scholarly, and business manufacturing activities are proposed for the organization. The profits from these as well as member dues, deductions from authors' honoraria, voluntary contributions and donations from organizations and individuals will be used to conduct the programs of the association.

Those wishing to familiarize themselves with the draft regulations should write to: 119255, Moscow, Devichego Polye Prospect No. 4, The M.V. Frunze Military Academy, The Department of the History of Military Art, The Organizational Commission for the Association of Military Historians. We request that those interested also send to this address their suggestions and comments for the draft regulations.

Army Journal Editor Comments on Gulf War

OW2504051091 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 2230 GMT 13 Apr 91

[Interview with Colonel General V.I. Filatov, chief editor of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, by correspondent A. Korshunov: "Oil Washes Away All Traces"; from the "Radar-TV" program]

[Text] You are viewing a story which is one and one-half to two months old. This is Iraq, a country that is still in a state of war with the multinational forces headed by the United States of America. Bombs and highly accurate laser-guided missiles, the pride of the technotronic civilization, fell not only on Saddam's troop positions and on his guards in occupied Kuwait, but also on the heads of Iraqi civilians and their houses.

In these clips, which incidentally have not been shown by anyone, not even by the all-seeing CNN [Cable News Network] or TSN [Television News Service], we see how the United Nations Security Council's resolutions to punish the aggressor have materialized—an exemplary thrashing in full swing. But what do we know of events which happened literally only yesterday? Iraq could not hold Kuwait, which it occupied since August of last year. The Western Coalition, through predominant opinion formed by the victors themselves, its press and its military, achieved a brilliant, simply unprecedented victory. Monopolization of information by anti-Iraqi coalition countries became absolute. There was nothing to oppose it. Our corps of journalists in Baghdad was practically nonexistent. Soviet correspondents made a timely exit. When the Desert Storm operation was at its peak, only one Soviet journalist chose to go in the opposite direction. [Video shots of destroyed buildings, wounded civilians, burnt bodies; video cuts to studio to show Korshunov interviewing Col. Gen. V.I. Filatov]

[Begin recording] [Korshunov] Today, our guest in the studio is Viktor Ivanovich Filatov, chief editor of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL. Viktor Ivanovich was in Iraq at the peak of the war, so to speak. Recently, in the third issue, the current issue, of your journal there was a column with your byline in which you share your first impressions of what you saw. I must admit that what caught my attention was your conclusion that the United States had essentially lost the war against Iraq. This sounded somewhat paradoxical to me because regardless of the apparent variety of information on the war between the multinational coalition and Iraq during the actual days of the war, it was obvious that all this information was still insufficient.

A chain of continuous victories in the air, and later on the ground, formed a satisfactory picture for the multinational forces. Moreover, what you wrote compels us to look somewhat differently at what has transpired all the more since you were in Iraq from February to March. Would you share your impressions as a man who was at

the center during the most tense moments? What was the war like for Iraq through the eyes of a witness?

[Filatov] Well, first of all it was a victorious war. Why was it victorious?

[Korshunov] For Iraq?

[Filatov] For Iraq, of course. Before the war, the Americans had several aims. The first aim was the elimination of President Husayn; the second aim was the liquidation of the regime; the third, the destruction of the Ba'th Party; and the fourth, the destruction of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Today, President Husayn is alive and well and is leading the country quite satisfactorily. The Ba'th Party is in every province, city, and village. I toured the cities, visited the provincial committees, and met the secretaries of the Ba'th Party. The work is carried out efficiently. The people support the party, this means...

[Korshunov, interrupting] Did you travel along a planned route, or were you free to see what you wanted?

[Filatov] I was free to go anywhere I wanted. So, the regime has not been toppled, the army has remained at combat readiness, and the air force has been preserved, as were the tank troops and the infantry.

There was an incident with nine tanks, and it turned out to be a victorious skirmish after all. The Iraqis, as I was told by a general, adopted the following tactic. They rolled out their tanks with the turrets facing the rear and began to advance. The Americans decided they were coming to surrender and allowed them to come right up close. Once the tanks were very close to the U.S. positions, they turned their turrets and opened fire. The Americans suffered great losses. To counter the attack, the Americans rolled out 90 tanks, the general said. Of course the Iraqis took advantage of the surprise, and subsequently, of course, they withdrew. This was the nine tank incident.

[Filatov continues] However, the skirmish with the T-72's was a night battle. The general said that when the T-72's appeared, the Americans were completely startled because they did not even think the Iraqis had tanks in this area. U.S intelligence analysts had overlooked them. So tell the Americans that everyone knows their intelligence analysts messed up. Anyway, the Americans declined getting into a nighttime tank battle, and the Iraqi tank commanders understood that the Americans were waiting for daylight to destroy them with fighters and helicopters. We withdrew the tanks before dawn, the general said, and after this no other tank battles took place. The Western press said that 500 tanks that were deployed in line crushed everything. This is a lie, a complete lie. The Americans never deployed 500 tanks. The fact that they spread this false report while trying to kill two birds with one stone is another matter. First of all the Americans spread the lie that this battle was much more grandiose, more frightening than under Prokhorovka [site of a major World War II tank battle].

[Korshunov] Well, comparable, at least.

[Filatov] Well, yes, something of the sort. That is understandable. The 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II and the 50th anniversary of the battle of Kursk is also approaching. Of course they would like to belittle our victory. The Americans simply want to be the first in everything, but it will not work because those tanks were not there. Secondly, they needed to justify themselves to their people on why they brought in all this equipment if they were not going to use it. So, they invented these 500 tanks which supposedly took part in a gigantic battle. The Iraqi's are laughing over this.

[Korshunov] Let us agree that despite all the tactical episodes that you spoke about, which could be evaluated as tactical, Iraq was forced to leave Kuwait. The fact that Saddam Husayn's republican guards and army are presently taking part in combat against the Shi'ite rebels and the Kurds indirectly confirms that the main army was preserved.

[Filatov] Now, wait a minute. War is a complicated phenomenon—there are victories and defeats, advances and withdrawals. In this instance, no one forced any particular corps from Kuwait. It was a planned, systematic withdrawal, a natural device in war. Nothing happened, there was no battle. In the first instance, if a clever general ever wants to achieve a victory he must preserve the army, and he did that.

[Korshunov] So, you consider that the Americans stopped combat actions after this withdrawal and did not advance. Why did they not go on to Baghdad?

[Filatov] I think that the Americans did all they could, and the Iraqis did all they could. They wanted to do this, and they did it. Who said that all is finished in the Persian Gulf? It has only just begun in the Persian Gulf. The withdrawal from Kuwait is absolutely not the end of the war. It is not a defeat. Therefore, to speak of some sort of defeat is only to delude civilians. That is very easy to do.

[Korshunov] As far as of your word delusion is concerned. Your trip was also unique in that you are a journalist, and before your trip and of course after it, you were familiar with material that has appeared concerning the war, and you have had an opportunity to see the reality of events from the inside. What was the specific role of the press and the mass media in this war?

[Filatov] You have touched upon a very basic problem, a fundamental phenomenon which has surfaced in this war. The journalists acted like a company of U.S. Army troops in this war. Planned, precise military objectives were set for them. They were divided into precise sub-units. Channels for passing of information were set up...

[Korshunov, interrupting] Do not forget that the role of the press was included in certain operational plans in advance.

[Filatov] Without fail. I am absolutely convinced that combat actions were initially spurred by the journalists.

[Korshunov] When will the Iraq war articles which you spoke about in the third, March issue appear in your journal?

[Filatov] I think possibly in the fifth issue. They will be articles under the general title "The Unknown War in Iraq."

[Korshunov] Will it be a series of articles, or will it appear only in this one issue?

[Filatov] I think it will be a series because I have collected a lot of material. The Iraqis gave me a huge amount of material, and I myself have seen a lot, too.

[Video shows a crawl saying that views expressed in the program may not necessarily reflect the views of "Radar-TV"] [end recording]

Gerasimov Views Lessons of Gulf War

Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 10,
8 Mar 91 p 12

[Article by Gennadiy Gerasimov: "At the End of the Week": "War in Pursuit"]

[Text] Recently in this column I maintained, citing authorities and agreeing with them, that wars are not won from the air and that ground transport is needed for the wings of victory. And that a difficult, bloody ground war, which it would be well to prevent, was coming in the Persian Gulf.

I confess the mistake in the forecast. I would note in mitigation that the author was in influential company here. The specialized DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY publication, with the subtitle of "Journal for World Leaders," had written in the final issue for last year, for example: "While the air war may be won with relative ease, the ground battle will cause problems unless the United States has considerable armored power."

This power was amassed, but it was barely needed. The Iraqi "Guard" surrendered to journalists even.

All this came as a pleasant surprise. We would recall that General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the international coalition force, had himself constantly warned against euphoria and expectation of an easy victory.

Which he in fact obtained.

In the quiet that has descended it is time to ponder the lessons of the war.

First, to ponder the role of air defenses, particularly against missiles of a low-angle trajectory checking their flight against a terrain map embedded in their "memory," circumventing obstacles and moving accurately toward the selected victim. Fifty of the 51 sea-launched Tomahawk missiles fired at the start of the war

hit their target. They cost over a million each, but the missile passed its baptism of fire, as did another, the Patriot, highly praised by the press. This antimissile missile shot down the Scud missiles like an accurate skeet shooter shoots down clay pigeons.

One further praiseworthy weapon is the high-speed anti-radar HARM missile "taught" to locate and destroy working radar installations.

So the failure of Iraq's air defenses led to defeat. Are sufficiently effective air defenses possible today?

Second, the end of the war invites reflection also on the role of tanks in the future. For the reason indicated above large-scale tank battles did not eventuate. Nor did it even come to hand-to-hand fighting. The air attacks had the enemy on the ropes and had him groggy, as they say in boxing.

Third, the so-called "peace dividend" from an improvement in the world situation and disarmament negotiations even could prove casualties of the war. The NEW YORKER magazine wrote: "Saddam Husayn's aggression has, it would seem, made the world safe for a continuation of the Pentagon's astronomical budgets." Yet just two days prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait officials in the U.S. Defense Department had notified journalists of a plan for a 10 percent reduction in the military budget over the next five years. Secretary Richard Cheney and Colin Powell, chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had presented to President George Bush proposals for a 500,000-man reduction in the armed forces by the mid-1990's. The outcome of the war will most likely make adjustments here.

The corporations connected with electronics are the biggest winners. During the war the Pentagon was already pushing Raytheon to speed up the shipment of Patriot missiles. The General Dynamics and McDonnell-Douglas corporations manufacturing the Tomahawk missiles are quite happy. And so forth.

On the other hand it is by no means obligatory from the viewpoint of military organizational development to race after quantity in respect of the weapons of new quality. It is simply that changes are coming in this development in the light of the results of the desert campaign.

They threaten a new ruinous twist of the arms race spiral. The expert Theodore Gold writes in the magazine WORLD LINK: "In a number of areas the achievements are so revolutionary that we can only make a very approximate guess at the consequences." He writes about the possibilities of the creation of missiles with inexpensive but powerful engines with an inertial guidance system based on a location-finding global satellite system affording an opportunity for the accurate destruction of the most remote targets. Gold even conjectures that the Soviet peace initiatives reflect primarily our "nervousness over the military consequences of the emerging technology gap."

But is military competition necessary in that "new world order" for the sake of whose creation Desert Storm officially burst?

Implications of Gulf War For French Forces

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Mar 91 Union Edition p 6

[Yu. Kovalenko report: "Reform With an 'Overload'"]

[Text] Paris—The cannonade in the Persian Gulf had barely subsided before President F. Mitterrand proposed that parliament study a broad range of issues connected with France's defenses and its army.

The president himself specified quite precisely the framework of the reforms in the defense sphere: modernization of the army with regard for the latest achievements of science and technology and preservation of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the principle of general military service. But within this framework the opportunities for maneuver remain very extensive.

The war with Iraq revealed, in specialists' opinion, weak spots in France's armed forces. Among these are certain types of combat hardware, specifically the Jaguar bombers, which were taken on board almost 20 years ago. The insufficient power of the armored resources. And, what is particularly important, the lack of reconnaissance data obtained via satellite. F. Mitterrand, the press wrote, could only familiarize himself with the photos sent him by the White House.

Many of these gaps will be closed in the next few years—the armed forces will acquire the new Leclerc tank, the Rafale aircraft, the French-German Tigre helicopter, the Charles de Gaulle nuclear-powered carrier, and the Triumphant submarine, two spy satellites—Syracuse and Helios....

But it is not only a question of provision of the army with the latest arms. Throughout the postwar decades Paris has consistently prepared itself to ward off a threat on the part of the East (and, to be more specific, the Soviet Union) with a strategy of deterrence—of the "weak" in respect of the "strong." Now the threat from the East has diminished in seriousness, although some politicians are continuing to emphasize that the USSR remains the leading military force in Europe. As far, however, as the deterrence doctrine is concerned, Paris does not, as F. Mitterrand has just confirmed, intend abandoning it. But it cannot be ruled out that there will be a reorientation of military strategy. As the newspaper LE FIGARO, for example, proposes, the doctrine could henceforward be geared to deterrence of a "weak" or "medium" potential enemy at the planet's flash points.

But does France today have the resources necessary for the modernization of defense, primarily its nuclear components, which eat up approximately one-third of all military credit? Many politicians have called for advantage to be taken immediately of the "peace dividend"

obtained as a result of the end of the "cold" war era. But the trend toward a reduction in defense spending which had emerged will hardly continue under the new conditions. The opposite will occur, rather. According to the calculations of the well-known political scientist Pierre Lelouche, in order to acquire all the latest equipment within 10 years it will be necessary to spend from 40 billion to 50 billion French francs annually.

However, the country's budget, which is currently oriented toward the development of science and technology and education, could hardly sustain such additional "overloads." In all probability the army will be modernized thanks to a cutback in conventional armed forces. In accordance with the "Army-2000" plan, the ground forces will be reduced by approximately 35,000 men—thanks to the withdrawal of forces stationed on German territory.

The conflict in the Persian Gulf once again brought to the forefront the question of what kind of army is needed—professional or based on a draft. In the president's opinion, the army should preserve the present mixed system. It is proposed using conscripts, who constitute approximately half the armed forces, only for the defense of France and Europe (they did not participate in the war with Iraq, incidentally), and the professionals in remote theaters. The length of army service for conscripts would be reduced from 12 to 10 months.

On the banks of the Seine the results of the conflict are being analyzed from all-European positions also. It is believed here that the European Community looked very "insipid" militarily and politically compared with the United States, which demonstrated an enviable firmness and consistency. For this reason France and Germany once again during the fighting presented an initiative concerning the creation of European defenses.

Would not the formation of defensive European structures lead to a diminution of the role of NATO? This cannot be ruled out in the distant future. As yet, however, Manfred Woerner, general secretary of the North Atlantic bloc, is insisting on the need for a "synthesis" of NATO and Eurodefense. In his opinion, NATO is now undergoing a considerable transformation with regard to the appearance of European military structures, but will remain the pivot of security of the old continent.

France, Britain, Italy, and Spain recently signed an agreement on the creation of an air defense missile of the American Patriot type. Former minister E. Balladur, a leader of the French right, has just proposed the creation over Europe of a space shield—like the American "star wars" project—which would protect the continent against a missile attack. There is another project—the formation of a European rapid deployment force based on existing French units, which proved their fighting capability in the war against Iraq. To all appearances Paris, and its EC partners also, intend increasingly to examine questions of security through an all-European prism.

Japanese Contribution to Gulf Electronic Weaponry

91UM0609A Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 24 Apr 91
Second Edition p 5

[Article by Valeriy Kistanov, candidate of economic sciences, researcher in the Center for Japanese Research, Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the rubric "Viewpoint": "Bombs with 'Japanese Brains'"]

[Text] One of the characteristics of the war in the Persian Gulf that struck the imagination was the large-scale use by the multinational forces, first and foremost by the American forces, of the newest types of weapons based on the latest achievements in the sphere of advanced technologies. As a matter of fact, millions of television viewers in all corners of the globe, sitting over a cup of tea at home, could witness the realization of combat episodes from the so-called star wars, with which they had until then been familiar with from science fiction novels and movies, or at the very best, from computer games. But from the standpoint of influence on the further development of promising weapons systems, and, consequently, on military-strategic and political processes, a far more important aspect of this war was the fact that it was in essence a prototype of the American strategic defense initiative that put powerful trump cards in the hands of the supporters of developing it further and adding to the weapons inventory. After all, certain SDI elements were tested successfully in practical work during the military operations.

In a wave of patriotism and pride in the United States over the super efficiency of American weapons, the question could not help but come up about the degree of dependence of these weapons on Japanese technology. This question also came up in arguments between Japanese and American electronics companies, which are in a competitive struggle with each other on the international markets. Here, the Japanese side emphasized its "contribution to the victory of the allies," and the American companies, pointing to the danger of Japanese penetration of the U.S. defense industry, called for its restriction and the need to increase the competitiveness of the country's electronics industry.

Thus, the presence of such a dependence is recognized by both sides; however, there is quite a high variation in the estimates of its degree. So, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE newspaper wrote that there are no Japanese troops in the Persian Gulf, but if it were not for the trademark "made in Japan" American high-tech weapons would not exist either. On the basis of materials gathered in Tokyo, the newspaper reported that, among the components of certain types of precision guided bombs, up to 80 percent of the parts used were made by 200 Japanese companies, such as Toshiba, Mitsubishi Denki, and others. REUTER also claimed that 20 percent of the semiconductors in the Patriot surface to air missiles and devices for electronic jamming are of Japanese production.

Kyosera, Hitachi, and Sony are among the other Japanese companies which supplied key parts and components for American precision weapons employed in the Gulf war.

In light of this, it seems natural that immediately after the start of the war in the Persian Gulf there was a jump in the price of shares of American firms that produce weapons which were employed in this war, and that stock speculation also spread to Japan, despite the fact that the export of weapons is officially prohibited by the Japanese Government. Here there was a sharp rise in the price of shares of companies that produced components under American license for Patriot missiles, which, incidentally, are also in the armaments of the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces."

Commenting on the annual report of the Department of Defense presented on 1 March to the U.S. President and Congress, the Japanese newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN wrote that the report acknowledges the great contribution of Japanese technology to the work of ensuring the security of the United States. One cannot help but recall the words of S. Ishihara, a Japanese writer and member of parliament, and one of the authors of a book that was

a sensation both in Japan and the United States—"A Japan That Can Say No," that if Japan starts to sell its semiconductors not to the United States but to the Soviet Union, then this, he said, will affect the accuracy of America's nuclear weapons, and it will change the strategic balance between the two military superpowers in the USSR's favor. And while earlier these words, even though they irritated Americans, were nonetheless perceived as political discontent mixed with nationalism, then the war in the Persian Gulf showed that Ishihara's threat is not meaningless words.

And finally. In connection with the fact that the Japanese press persistently brings up the idea that Japan, as a result of a voluntary ban on export of its weapons, did not supply them to Iraq, and, having "clean hands" with respect to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, thereby distinguishes itself favorably from other leading powers of the world, I would like to note that when an American "smart bomb" accurately flies through the entrance to a bomb shelter and takes away the lives of several hundred civilians, from a moral standpoint, it is of no principal significance whether its "brain" consists of 80 percent Japanese components or one percent.

Lack of General Conversion Program Poses Problems

PM2904131591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Apr 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by M. Nikulin, identified by caption]

[Text]

[Announcer] "Conversion—Problems and Solutions" is the title of a report by our Moscow correspondent.

[Nikulin] Medical, information, and measuring instruments and computer equipment of world class or even higher standards, the most progressive technologies, the brightest minds and the most skillful hands—at present all this still exists at enterprises serving the defense industry. This also applies to the Moscow "Mars" Experimental Design Bureau of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, where we filmed this reportage.

A microprocessor intraocular pressure-measuring instrument, a unique blood transfusion pump, a thermovision apparatus, mouse input devices with a standarized interface—all this is badly needed by our medical services, industry, and science and our sick economy.

The problem is that all this exists and at the same time it is not available. The "Mars" Experimental Design Bureau could get down to work, but...

[S. Polezhayev, chief of the bureau, identified by caption] For the time being there is no coordinated conversion program. There are specific problems with funding. What is needed are joint efforts, this does not depend on our enterprise alone.

[Nikulin] Should your ministry intervene perhaps? What is your ministry doing?

[V. Sergeyev, department deputy chief, identified by caption] Because there is no coordinated conversion program for the Union as a whole, our ministry cannot do much, as far as I understand.

[Nikulin] So you are the baby, as it were, whom everyone neglects.

[Sergeyev] Well, you could put it that way.

[Nikulin] The example of the Moscow "Mars" Experimental Design Bureau is a sad illustration of the unreadiness of the conversion program. But there is a way out. It is necessary, as a matter of urgency, to compile an all-union database of this type of development work available at military-industrial enterprises. Then we will be able to physically demonstrate the goods at fairs and exhibitions and it will no longer be necessary for authors to try to find companies prepared to implement their ideas, but quite the reverse. And sophisticated and unique technologies will at last find their application. Otherwise, all but the last category of skilled, talented, and thinking people in our country may begin to dispair.

Aviation Sector Holds Conversion Exhibition

PM2404152991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0600 GMT 19 Apr 91

[From the "Innovation, Marketing, Results" program presented by Aleksandr Yemelyanov, identified by caption. Report on USSR Aviation Ministry's Aviakonversiya-91 Exhibition "Materials, Technology, Equipment"]

[Text] [A.G. Bratukhin, USSR deputy minister of the aviation industry, identified by caption] We are at the Setun exhibition where the military-industrial complex has held secret technological exhibitions for more than 20 years. Only individual, selected specialists—not even all specialists in the military-industrial complex, only those with the requisite security clearance—were able to visit this exhibition. Today with our perestroyka, the openness of our society, and with our transition to a market economy, we are allowing all our economy's specialists to familiarize themselves with our achievements in the sphere of aviation technology and technological materials. The tasks facing the sector are now resulting in the diversification of production. Virtually every enterprise and association in the sector has been diverted, that is, they produce simultaneously aviation equipment, consumer goods, and manufacturing equipment.

[Yemelyanov] Highly varied exhibits are on display at the "Aviakonversiya-91" exhibition: tools, processing centers, technologies, construction materials. Many of these are only of interest to specialists. We decided to display those things that will help fill the stores with industrial goods, those things that consumers are waiting for, those things for which we are prepared to pay. [sentence indistinct]

Laser pattern-cutting benches can perform splendidly at a giant plant, at a private enterprise, and at a sewing workshop. The laser can cope with any material from paper to fabrics, metals, and plastics. And the laser cutter operates rapidly, accurately, and cleanly.

Plasma generators are totally indispensable in automobile workshops and at machine and tractor stations—everywhere where components have to be restored to working order. Series production of plasma generators as a general source of current for welding is under way [Rzhev "Elektromekhanika" Production Association logo appears in right-hand corner] and buyers are awaiting them.

Motoring enthusiasts will certainly linger at the All-Union Institute of Light Alloys [VILS] stand, where wheel disks, in particular, are displayed. They are not only elegant but can even be said to be beautiful. That is not the disk's only merit. Obtained by casting, its dimensions are more accurate and the disk does not require additional balancing. There is no need for quality control as they leave the factory.

Visitors to the exhibition are shown technologies they can introduce. Nearby stands also have exhibits of interest for automobile owners. Light, reliable springs [“VIAM” Science-and-Production Association logo appears in right-hand corner] made from composite materials will oust steel springs in time. Special coatings render silencers long-lived and prevent corrosion. The widely renowned shatterproof glass for museum display cases is by no means the only use of this kind of glass. Extrastrong glass for automobiles attracts attention to this stand. This kind of glass will not withstand a bullet from a Kalashnikov. But pebbles—of which there are so many on our highways—will not harm it in the least. The glass protects you both from injury and from shock. Bankers, cashiers, janitors—all those people who view visitors through glass—will undoubtedly appreciate glass capable of changing in opaqueness. First you’re there, then press the button and you disappear.

Needless to say, everyone wants to have these kind of skillets. You can carry out fat-free frying in teflon-coated skillets. Skillets covered with a layer of stainless steel are very hygienic. They are manufactured at VILS from bimetallic—aluminum plus stainless steel—billets. But an irritatingly small quantity are manufactured. As yet it has no partner ready to turn the billets into the sought-after commodities on a commercial basis.

[V.Ye. Kotov, “Soyuz” Science-and-Production Association, identified by caption] We wandered around the exhibition today and looked at the exhibits. Some we liked —there are some valuable things here that may attract our attention and that we might introduce at our enterprise. The units to purify oils and other liquids, for instance. We also liked the consumer goods at the exhibition today—the woodworking equipment, for instance. Unfortunately, there are three samples here and they have already been sold. For some reason they are not on sale elsewhere.

[Yemelyanov] We have shown you some of the exhibits at this exhibition in order to ensure that you realize what there is for you—what ideas, technologies, and materials—to ensure that you find out whom to contact and are aware that the military-industrial complex is ready to cooperate with any enterprise today, ready to cooperate at the most diverse levels. Ranging from the sale of technologies and ideas to joint the production of various goods, various machines, and various components.

Military at Odds With Gorsovets Conversion Plan for Semipalatinsk

91UM0513A Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 27 Mar 91 p 2

[O. Kvyatkovskiy and Yu. Shaporev report: “Scandal at the Nuclear Test Site”]

[Text] Kazakh SSR—A briefing that took place recently at the headquarters of the “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” movement evoked great interest in Kazakhstan among journalists. Yevgeniy Chaykovskiy, chairman of the city executive committee in Kurchatov, “capital” of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, spoke at that briefing.

He talked about a concept for conversion of the test site adopted by a session of the Kurchatov City Soviet. Proposing this scenario, the deputies made the centerpiece of the project the construction of a large and safe nuclear power station [AES] on the site, along with a research center for fundamental and applied physics. In the opinion of Ye. Chaykovskiy the scenario had been well developed and was “linked” to the problems of the economy in the region, where there is palpable shortage of electric power. The mayor made reference to the opinion of the inhabitants of Semipalatinsk: 60 percent of those polled favored the construction of an AES instead of a new heat-and-electric power station, but only at the site itself.

“In January of this year I spoke at a meeting of mayors of cities in the United States that have dealings with the defense industry,” Ye. Chaykovskiy said. “The idea of building an AES at the Semipalatinsk site evoked great interest.”

Conversion will also make it possible to open the republic’s first physics and technical institute in Kurchatov.

The program for the conversion of the nuclear test site was presented to the USSR defense minister.

“His response,” Ye. Chaykovskiy said, “was to acquaint me with the draft documents whereby it is proposed to end tests in Semipalatinsk Oblast beginning 1 January 1993 and transfer them to Novaya Zemlya.

“Meanwhile, a session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet has already reached a final decision to halt explosions at Semipalatinsk. But we see that the “top people” in the Union have their own opinion.”

And indeed, at the “lower level,” in Kurchatov City itself, right from the start the deputies’ project was greeted with opposition from the main bosses at the test site—the military. Even during the course of the session, the test site chief, Lieutenant-General A. Ilenko, offered alternative proposals. They were not accepted, although many did support them. Notwithstanding, on his return from Moscow the mayor of Kurchatov was called in a categorical manner to explain himself to a meeting of officers with respect to his “anti-Army sentiments.”

Chaykovskiy spoke both to the officers and the warrant officers. He reported that the conversion plan makes provision for social safeguards for all “people at the test site,” and proposes that use be made of the enormous experience and knowledge of the test people for peaceful purposes.

"Unfortunately," Ye. Chaykovskiy says, "the reaction of the military, particularly the top army people, was negative. General Ilenko believes that our program is nonsense. So I am raising the question of having Ilenko replaced."

Positions have been clearly marked out. Time will soon tell if any rapprochement is possible. Or if the scandal about the nuclear land mine will start to expand.

Chief of Estonia's Arsenal Plant Interviewed

*91UM0513B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 19 Feb 91 p 1*

[Interview with Boris Kondrashov, chief of the Estonian Arsenal Plant, by A. Yakovleva; place and date not given: "What Is in Arsenal?"]

[Text] **Conversion.** There is something in this beautiful word, which reflects the spirit of the times, that is nevertheless somehow arch, somehow excessive in its sense of the bucolic. Well, they say, we shall soon be beating the swords into plowshares in abundance. And the plants with the most complex equipment will start in this business by making iron bedsteads and carving bookcases. While industry in the developed countries will continue to be highly specialized.

The Arsenal plant, which we name not out of any desire to discuss just its name, is no exception to this complex and contradictory process. One of Estonia's oldest plants (at which at one time Estonian money was minted), with its solid reputation and well established base, is today trying to join this sharp change. Not out of stupidity, but out of poverty, our first steps toward conversion have been saucers and bedsteads. If the stores are quite empty and every single nail is a problem, then any contribution that can be made is a blessing. Plant chief Boris Kondrashov talks about the contribution that Arsenal is able to make in the production of consumer goods.

[Kondrashov] This subject is quite new for us, although last year we did produce consumer goods worth R240,000. The figure is itself, perhaps, not very large, but for our small plant it is not so small either. At least we are now complying with the decision reached to pay our own workers at their homes—with consumer goods.

[Yakovleva] How is the range decided?

[Kondrashov] According to opportunity. We analyze our base and our forces. For example, we work with metal. We make the best metal furniture in the republic for recreational areas in enterprises. This first prompted the thought to make benches for garages to our own design. At least, we did not find any in the catalogues from abroad. We are now producing them and marketing them through the Volga store. It is going very well. Then we decided that we could add equipment for benches, and we are now starting to produce an entire line of convenient and compact metal garage furniture that can hang on the walls of a garage to save space.

[Yakovleva] How close are these plans to realization? What numbers are possible?

[Kondrashov] We start production in a week or two. The question of numbers is more complicated. We are working with imported raw materials. In particular, metal from Leningrad. And they are very reluctant to let us have it because of the unstable situation in the republic. Estonia itself has no desire to sign contracts, make deliveries, or in general export finished articles. So people have the same attitude toward us. The normal ties are being broken. We would be able to make 60 benches each month, but we shall probably not be able to obtain the raw materials.

We also have other opportunities that are offered by the optics section—we are making binoculars (also from imported subassemblies). And as you know, we have no need to advertise this item.

We have made two experimental stethoscopes [stetoskop] for mines for the Estonian Academy of Sciences. Based on the principle of the periscope [periskop], they are screwed into the upper layer of a shaft and make it possible to observe ground movement. A very fine instrument. We are making ready to go into series production, although this is not quite the subject of our conversation as much as of production. Consumer goods include training gear for sports facilities, whetstones, remote cutout switches for automobiles, and various other kinds of attachments and instruments. We are still making excellent targets for biathlons. They are better than many foreign models but are not enjoying the demand they deserve. And here we come back once again to the question of specialization. Because of what it is, our plant does not engage in marketing or advertising; that is not our business. But it is mere amateurism to become involved in market-and-commodity relations. Such relations assume serious study of the market and its prospects. For example, we can assemble and adjust television sets, video tape recorders, any kind of electronics. We might decide to do this, and purchase millions of rubles worth of equipment... And meanwhile the Japanese are throwing their electronics at us. And what electronics! Any specialized plant that produces saucers is for us an unbeatable competitor in the market because it is specialized. The more so today, when, just like a subsistence economy, each enterprise wants to do everything itself from start to finish because it does not trust its suppliers and the plants that produce parts for it.

[Yakovleva] So what will happen—you will not be distracted from the main course?

[Kondrashov] Yes we will. But we have assumed that no one will export two kinds of output to us—wood and metal. We shall handle the metal ourselves.

[Yakovleva] And are you making anything for your own people at the plant to ease their lives in these difficult times?

[Kondrashov] For our own people we have, first of all, very good working and leisure conditions, some of the best in the republic. An excellent dining room where many workers now eat without payment, and from April everyone will be eating free. We compensate them from our own assets for the increased prices for food and essential goods. Our experts are very good and it is worth showing concern for them. It seems to me that today it would be a most terrible, a most unforgivable mistake to separate the production facilities that have been set up into clusters of shops and workshops and lose our present workers.

Civilian Products From Voronezh Missile Fuel Plant

Moscow GUDOK in Russian 6 Feb 91 p 4

[Article by O. Stolyarov: "A Turtleneck From...Missile Builders"]

[Text] Voronezh—This enterprise stirs up unpleasant associations in people from Voronezh: No wonder—it is a chemical plant. The people say various things about it. But the main thing is that there, under the ground, they make substances that are harmful to humans. The curtain of silence over the closed facility has fed these rumors. And there was no one to refute them: For during the almost 35-year history of the plant's operation, which involved missile construction, the foot of a journalist, as they say, never stepped inside.

It turns out that the chemical plant was not a chemical plant at all. Located there is test equipment from liquid propellant engines. Well, let's go in.

...Silver firs, lime trees that have shed their attire, rose bushes prepared for the winter cold. All this caught my eye. And I automatically asked the deputy head designer of KBKhA [Chemical (Equipment?) Design Bureau], A. Skrypnik:

"Aleksey Ivanovich, if I am not mistaken, these plants are indicators of air purity."

"You are not mistaken. Silver firs and lime trees react sensitively to the appearance of harmful impurities in the air and begin to be ill. If they are developing normally, human beings have nothing to worry about."

It was the beginning of the sixties. Many people who live in Voronezh remember how a red "fox tail" from one of the rocket fuel components rose out of the pipes over the chemical plant. This has not happened for many years: During the tests the evaporated components go through the drainage system to the burning facility, and the discharges from its smokestacks are considerably purer than the ones already in the atmosphere. But before such a facility existed the trees lost their leaves long before autumn. And in the engine tests the fuel is burned completely. Therefore even the water fowl like the neighboring water reservoir. The chemical plant does not

discharge any industrial wastes here: After their effective local purification the water is pumped to the city purification facilities.

As I conclude the "ecological themes," let me note that A. Skrypnik, head engineer M. Budarin, and worker V. Shipitsyn were awarded the USSR State Prize for the creation of the complex of protective measures and the corresponding technical equipment for protecting the environment.

But still chemicals are produced at the enterprise. This includes the manufacture of polyurethane foam for upholstered furniture. Incidentally, polyurethane foam pillows are in great demand on the world market. For example, the Turkish industrialists who came to Voronezh were not very interested in space but they immediately declared their readiness to buy materials for upholstered furniture from the plant. The production is being expanded and improved, and the former testers of complicated technical equipment, A. Fokin and A. Koltsov, have already completely mastered their new role and are "baking" hundreds of snow-white polyurethane foam pillows per shift.

If in this section one can still smell the chemical components of the future polyurethane foam, true, within the limits of permissible concentrations, in another section where they test ozonizers the air is as fresh as after a storm, invigorated from the ozone.

One must say that now the KBKhA is filling a large order from the Nizhnekamsk petroleum combine—it is manufacturing an ozonizer with a module that produces five kilograms of ozone per hour. A unit which consists of eight of these devices will make it possible to purify the water for the 250,000 residents of Neftekamsk. At one time the Voronezh authorities would have refused such an order. And yet in the KBKhA swimming pool they do not have to use chlorine—it is successfully replaced by the use of ozone. This is why the swimmers' eyes do not burn.

Ozonizers of various capacities are being developed here: They can be used as sterilizers for medical instruments or for poultry farms. It is no wonder that foreign businessmen are so interested in them: It turns out that our ozonizers are more effective than the French.

Many truly highly qualified electronics workers are working at the plant. Several years ago the former Moscow Soviet ordered the development of fire alarms for the high buildings in the capital. The systems they had could not stand up under any criticism—they were cumbersome and unreliable. I had chance to hold a SPDU-32 on my finger—it was a miniature development by the lead designer B. Kushko and his colleagues.

And here is another innovation created in conjunction with the Krogenmash NPO [scientific production association].

A KamAZ refrigerator car just returned from Astrakhan with experimental engineer A. Ivanov. He drove into the city on the Volga very capriciously while transporting a product—yeast. He delivered all of it in good condition. And nothing would seem to be unusual here were it not for one circumstance: The refrigerator car works not on freon but on liquid nitrogen. And Avtotrans is extremely interested in automotive systems with the new cooling agent. Obviously it is time for the railroad refrigerator cars to be changed over to it. It goes without saying that conversion was painful for the KBKhA and its subdivisions. But here it would seem that they have found a real way out of the difficult situation and have not begun to lay off people who have truly golden hands and brilliant minds. They have tried to find worthy work for them.

But what does knitwear have to do with space technology? But for some time now the chemical plant has been preparing for the output of men's and women's woolen turtlenecks. To do this they have installed Spanish knitting machines with electronic control. And it was not without pride that the section chief, former experimental engineer Ye. Tkachenko, and technologist N. Yeremenko demonstrated their product with its mesmerizing pattern which programming engineer M. Sabelnikov programmed into the electronic equipment.

But where are these products? All are going to the trade base. The turtlenecks are lost after that. True, they have already been seen on the black market with Yugoslav labels. But that is a subject for another discussion. We have tried to dispel the rumors about the "top secret enterprise."

Aero-Engine Test Center Finds Few Customers

PM2404134591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0600 GMT 19 Apr 91

[From the "Innovation, Marketing, Results" program presented by Aleksandr Yemelyanov, identified by caption]

[Text]

[Yemelyanov] A branch of the Central Institute of Aircraft Engine Production [TSIAM] is located just 20 minutes' drive from the Moscow Beltway. It is a unique institute virtually unparalleled anywhere in the world. The institute has unique test-beds which can be used to test aircraft engines, cars, and trucks. They can be tested in wind tunnels. High and low temperatures can be

created. Any climatic conditions can be modeled. Tests can be carried out to breaking point and under high pressure. [Video shows institute interior] In short, it is a huge testing complex staffed by skilled testing workers and an elite group of people who rig up unique experiments.

Georgiy Konstantinovich, we have often visited shops at various enterprises and I have to say that those places are far noisier. We usually have to film our interviews in offices. We can hear the noise of some kind of rigging work, but nothing much is happening even though it is not lunch hour. What's going on at your enterprise?

[G.K. Vedeshkin, deputy director of the TSIAM branch, identified by caption] You know, this is a very common phenomenon these days, unfortunately. If you had come to see us a year ago, we could not have heard ourselves think for the noise from the units and the compressor station. Unfortunately, because of the reduction in the amount of testing being done—we are doing three or four times less now—we've got very little work at the moment. And our unique complex is virtually standing idle. We have taken many steps to attract work from other sectors of the national economy. So far without any success. First, in my opinion, because nobody has any money anyway. And everyone we approach says "we would if we could, but..." Second, people are simply not used to working under the new conditions. They are not used to thinking of this complex as a necessary and indispensable part of the engine development process. Everybody is looking to produce their output more cheaply nowadays and they think they can fix any faults when the engines are in operation. People are wasting millions, many millions, tens of millions. But if they spent substantially less on using our test-beds here, where we can reproduce virtually any operating conditions, these defects could be brought to light at a far earlier stage.

[Yemelyanov] In the West no machine goes into series production and no engine is fitted to an aircraft without testing of this kind. If this state of affairs continues much longer, the institute could probably disappear. The elite working at the institute would be able to find other work. But would we be able to find replacements for this elite? How much time would it take us to recreate what we already have today? The people this program is aimed at will no doubt make a note of the address, and—who knows—may help the institute get its second wind. [Video ends after 10 minutes 40 seconds elapsed time]

Interview With Chief of Fire, Rescue Service

91UM0602A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel V. Savkov, chief of the Fire and Rescue Service of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Lieutenant-Colonel N. Poroskov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Until the 'Red Rooster' Pecks"]

[Text] *According to last year's data the number of fires in the USSR Armed Forces increased one-and-a-half times, and the number of people who perished in these fires by 22 percent. The average "cost" of a fire was 75,300 rubles. Total annual damage is in the tens of millions of rubles.*

Army and Navy firefighters answer about 70 calls a day. Over the year the number came to 2,500. Fire inspection organs prohibited the use of 723 objects and installations that present a fire hazard.

These are troubling statistics. What is the explanation for them? This was the question our correspondent asked Colonel V. Savkov, chief of the Fire and Rescue Service of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Savkov] There has been an increased number of arsons in supply and food warehouses lately, aimed at covering up theft. Peak activity is usually during the fall and spring—the time of transfer to the reserves—and at inspection time. The escalation of this generally new phenomenon is, in my opinion, the result of growing shortages, slackening of control, and misinterpretation of the notion of economic freedom. As a result, small personal gain results in millions of rubles in losses to the state.

Military families brought back from Eastern Europe often live in quarters that have been hastily refitted for residential use; they have no choice but to use electric heaters. There are also cases of fires breaking out in places where property removed from groups of forces was hastily stored in new deployment places.

Of all the fires, 67 percent took place in the Ground Troops. The "record" was set by the Transcaucasian Military District, with Turkestan not far behind. The Pacific Fleet sustained considerable damage. There are frequent fires in the PVO [Air Defense] Troops. I must also add that not everything gets reported. Quite often an inspector does not want to put himself at odds with the local command, on which he depends for an apartment and a promotion in rank.

[Poroskov] Still, what are the reasons for the frequent fires?

[Savkov] Fire safety is not a thing in itself. It is a reflection of the state of affairs in Army and Navy collectives, of the degree of orderliness there. People smoke in no-smoking areas, light campfires, do not check on the condition of electrical wiring—these are the reasons. Add to this a lack of lightning protection,

insufficient water supply, blocked passageways, and personnel that are not prepared to deal with extreme situations.

[Poroskov] As far as we know, the technical level of equipment of the fire brigades used to leave a lot to be desired. Have things changed lately?

[Savkov] Very little. The situation is still difficult. We have a little more than 46 percent of the required number of firehoses, 68 percent of automobiles, 65 percent of motor pumps, and only one-third of needed fire extinguishers.

There are only two models of heavy tank trucks in our country; in other countries there are 13. The automation level of fire engines produced by leading world manufacturers reaches 90 percent, while ours is only three to five percent; the power supply is, correspondingly, 25 and five kilowatts per engine. In short, what we have is a deep qualitative gap between foreign and domestic fire-fighting equipment industries.

But this is not all. We are cutting the production of fire engines modified for use in northern regions; the production of insulated gas masks fell from 22,000 to 12,000 a year. Now we have to take into account the Montreal Agreement of 1987 signed by 25 countries, including ours. The purpose of the agreement is protection of the ozone layer. This means that we have to sharply curtail the production of coolants that are the basis of most automatic fire extinguishing devices in the Army and Navy. We need new technologies.

[Poroskov] Everything you have said, Valeriy Yevgenyevich, does not sound optimistic, to put it mildly. If everything is so bad, what can be done in case of events of the kind that took place in Arzamas, Sverdlovsk, and Chernobyl?

[Savkov] A year ago an Interagency Council on Fire Safety of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] was created in accordance with a decision of the national government. The bureau of the new organization is headed by the minister of internal affairs; other participants are representatives of the Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the Main Administration for Fire Protection of the USSR MVD, state committees on science and technology, people's education, inspection of work safety in industry and atomic power, some others, and civil defense. Union republics also sent their representatives as delegates. The council analyzes fire statistics, develops recommendations on improvements in fire protection, and summarizes domestic and foreign experience.

[Poroskov] Are there any results yet from the council's activities? For the firefighters, it is probably not the recommendations that are important—they are not worth much without the material supplies.

[Savkov] At the request of the Interagency Council, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers made a decision to include firefighting equipment in state orders, with centrally

administered distribution through the USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply]; this eliminates many problems.

Contracts have been signed with a number of enterprises to produce hydraulic rescue tools, four-hour-action insulated gas masks; regenerating cartridges, insulated breathing devices that work on compressed air, and fire helmets...

Our fire brigades are already receiving mechanized tools—pneumatic drills, disk saws, traction mounting mechanisms—for opening up burning objects, as well as rack-and-pinion jacks and portable radio communications equipment.

Unfortunately, many things still remain on paper. Our service has no influence over manufacturers. Supply logistics are complicated by different jurisdictions: We receive automobiles through the Main Automotive Administration; ladders and hoses are delivered through the Main Administration of Housing Utilization, etc.

[Poroskov] Now, with the conversion in progress, some orders can probably be placed in the defense sector, at military repair enterprises.

[Savkov] The Department for Firefighting Technology of the Togliatti Higher Military Construction Officers School has developed a comprehensive program for using the capacities of industrial enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Defense to establish serial production of effective firefighting equipment. One of the rocket forces enterprises started to manufacture recharging stations; the Navy supplies fire extinguishers; housing construction organizations—automatic fire extinguishing devices; the Main Missile and Artillery Administration [GRAU]—hydraulic cutters. In addition, the GRAU is working on technical specifications for scientific research and design and testing work in creating experimental prototypes of firefighting equipment with anti-fragment protection that would be mounted on the chassis of tanks and other combat vehicles. This is for use, for instance, during a fire in the munitions or explosives warehouses.

[Poroskov] How did your service react to structural and other changes taking place in the Army and Navy?

[Savkov] First of all, subordination to various commands and interdepartmental lack of integration between the service's various components have been liquidated. The service has been in existence since 1925, but this is the first time it has been reorganized. Officers' position classifications have been upgraded. This reduced the turnover of specialists. An increase in fire brigade crews to 12 members permits round-the-clock duty.

The structure of junior specialist schools has been changed. The school in Togliatti has been shifted to a five-year education program. Officers and ensigns can now receive classification up to a master inclusive (which means a 50 ruble additional salary), and fixed-time servicemen, up to the rank of first class.

[Poroskov] Since we are talking about personnel now, let me share my own observations. Soldiers in garrison firefighting brigades I had an opportunity to visit do not appear to be of particularly powerful build. But these are the people who must be ready to work in overheated air, smoke, and collapsing structures. Firefighting is among the 10 most dangerous professions in the world. How are specialists selected?

[Savkov] Quite often by a residual principle. Moreover, personnel are sometimes detached for auxiliary operations. In one unit, a fire depot had been refitted for use as a pigsty. More than a quarter of military fire brigades do not have a depot or training facility. This is further proof of the tendency to economize on fire protection. There are no restraining factors in this except for our service.

I think the situation will change. After the issuance of an appropriate order from the minister of defense, all components of the Armed Forces conducted an analysis of our service's work. First deputy commanders in chief, commanders, chiefs, and commanding officers are now charged with spearheading the work of strengthening fire protection.

Unfortunately, fire crews and brigades have little practical training—rehearsals and practice to meet performance standards. They seem to be outside of general combat training. However, brigade personnel are an inseparable part of military collectives. We have sent various methodological materials to the forces. Now it is the commanders' turn to act.

Much of the trouble stems from carelessness and non-compliance with standard requirements for fire safety during the design and construction stage of military installations. We are seeing new fire- and explosion-prone substances and new technologies where the slightest deviation from instructions turns into severe losses. Design documentation is not always coordinated with the fire protection service. Many violations occur particularly during construction using their own resources.

I want to remind you that the decree on changes and additions to the RSFSR Criminal and Criminal Process Codes and the RSFSR Administrative Liability Codes is now in force. They are all directed against carelessness, since this is one of the main reasons for many fires.

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